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Perfecting Patent Prizes 
 
Michael Abramowicz*  
 
A number of commentators in recent years have suggested permitting holders of 
intellectual property rights to give up these rights in exchange for cash prizes from 
the government. In this Article, Professor Abramowicz shows that each of the 
proposals has significant flaws that would make implementation impractical and 
argues that no single perfect formula or algorithm for determining the size of prizes 
exists. A prize system is nonetheless worth pursuing because it could increase social 
welfare significantly by eliminating deadweight loss. Professor Abramowicz 
recommends a relatively simple approach that would complement rather than replace 
the patent system. The proposal is to establish an agency to distribute a fund that 
would be used to reward corporate efforts to reduce the monopoly effects of patent 
rights. As long as there is a substantial delay between the activities reducing 
deadweight loss and the granting of prizes, and as long as the rights to future prizes 
are tradable, granting of wide agency discretion has significant advantages and few 
drawbacks. Even assuming the agency is likely to do a poor job of distributing prizes, 
the system will be efficient if no biases in granting prizes are predictable. After 
addressing a variety of issues concerning the design of a prize system, Professor 
Abramowicz offers several potential applications for patent, copyright, and beyond.  
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When anthrax attacks recently led to a run on the patented antibiotic drug Cipro,1 
politicians and commentators suggested that the government consider purchasing generic 
alternatives.2 Some used the occasion to illustrate what they perceived as a broader problem with 
patent protection: that pharmaceutical companies seeking profits would not allow the sick to 
                                                 
1 See Tamar Lewin, Anthrax Scare Prompts Run on an Antibiotic, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 2001, at B8. 
2 See, e.g., Shankar Vedantam, Cipro Is Not the Only Pill That Fights Anthrax, WASH . POST, Oct. 17, 2001, at A20 (reporting that 
Senator Charles E. Schumer “issued a public appeal that the government suspend Bayer’s patents and allow generic companies to 
add to the supply”); see also Donald G. McNeil Jr., A Rush for Cipro, and the Global Ripples , N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 17, 2001, at A1 
(discussing such proposals); Jesse Pesta & Daniel Pearl, Indian Drug Makers May Now Imitate Cipro: Controversial for 
Knockoffs of AIDS Pills, the Firms May Do Same for Anthrax, WALL ST. J., Oct. 19, 2001, at A13 (same). President Bush 
rejected these proposals on the ground that patent law made them illegal. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Administration Won’t Allow 
Generic Versions of Drug, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2001, at B8. The Canadian government initially embraced similar proposals. See 
Amy Harmon & Robert Pear, Canada Overrides Patent for Cipro to Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at A1. 
Subsequently, however, the Canadian government backed down, agreeing to rely on Bayer unless the company was unable to 
accommodate requests for the drug. See Tom Cohen, Canada Allows Bayer to Supply Anthrax, AP, Oct. 23, 2001, available at 
2001 WL 29336130. 
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obtain access to needed medications.3 The argument repeated a familiar refrain in the intellectual 
property debate, as a long history of articles has inquired whether society would be better off 
with no patent 4 or copyright law5 at all. Even recently, commentators have questioned the broad 
scope of intellectual property protection, arguing that business methods should not be 
patentable,6 or that copyright terms should be shorter than Congress has dictated.7 The anti-
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Ronald Johnson, In the War of Nerves, the Capitol Is a Front, N.Y. T IMES, Oct. 19, 2001, at A18 (arguing in a Letter 
to the Editor that developing countries should be allowed to import generic versions of AIDS drugs); Ciprofloxacin: The Dispute 
over Compulsory Licensing, at http://www.salon.com/tech/feature/2001/10/18/cipro_patent/index.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
2001) (advocating governmental purchase of government Cipro, as part of a broader website critiquing expansive patent 
protection). 
4 See, e.g., FRITZ M ACHLUP ,  AN ECONOMIC REVIEW OF THE PATENT SYSTEM, in SUBCOMM. ON PATENTS TRADEMARK AND 
COPYRIGHT OF THE SENATE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY , 85th Cong. 44-45 (Comm. Print 1958) (summarizing arguments both for 
and against the patent system); EDITH PENROSE , THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNATIONAL PATENT SYSTEM (1951) (arguing that the 
patent system harms developing countries); C. TAYLOR & Z. SILBERSTON, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 194-
208 (1973) (reporting results of a survey suggesting that abolition of the patent system would affect innovation in some industries 
more than in others); Brian Peckham, Should the U.S. Patent Laws Be Abolished?, 11 J.  CONTEMP .  L. 389, 421 (1985) 
(concluding that present knowledge does not strongly justify immediate abolishment of the patent system); Donald F. Turner, The 
Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 454-55 (1969) (identifying various costs of the patent system); 
The Debate on the Patent Laws, 27 ECONOMIST 656, 656 (1869) (predicting that “it was probable enough that the Patent Laws 
will be abolished ere long,” as the laws “either are, or are becoming, out of date”). Some recent researchers have argued that 
patent protection may not be necessary in some industries even if it is necessary in others. See JAMES BESSEN & ERIC M ASKIN, 
SEQUENTIAL INNOVATION, PATENTS, AND IMITATION (Massachusetts Inst. of Technology Working Paper No. 11/99, 1999). For 
discussions of nineteenth-century debates on patent law, see H.I. DUTTON,  THE PATENT SYSTEM AND INVENTIVE ACTIVITY 
DURING THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION, 1750-1852 at 17-29 (1984); and Fritz Machlup & Edith Penrose, The Patent Controversy 
in the Nineteenth Century,  10 J. ECON.  HIST. 1 (1950). For an interesting compendium of quotations denouncing the patent 
system, see Gordon Irlam,  Coalition for Networked Information Forum, http://www.cni.org/Hforums/cni-copyright/1994-
04/0648.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2001). 
5 See, e.g., FRANCIS HARGRAVE ,  AN ARGUMENT IN DEFENSE OF LITERARY PROPERTY  30-33 (2d ed., Garland Publishing, Inc. 
1974) (1774); T. M ACAULAY, SPEECHES ON COPYRIGHT 21-24 (C. Gaston ed., 1914); ADAM SMITH , LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE 
83 (R.L. Meek, D.D. Raphael & P.G. Stein eds., Oxford Univ. Press 1978) (1896); Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The 
Economic Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON.  REV. 421 (1966); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 328-29 (1989); A. Plant, The Economic Aspects of Copyright in Books, 1 
ECONOMICA  167 (1934). Perhaps the most famous exchange on the utility of copyright law is between then-Professor Stephen 
Breyer and Professor Barry Tyerman, with Tyerman more enthusiastic about copyright than Breyer. See Stephen Breyer, The 
Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281 
(1970); Barry W. Tyerman, The Economic Rationale for Copyright Protection for Published Books: A Reply to Professor Breyer , 
18 UCLA L. REV. 1100 (1971); Stephen Breyer, Copyright: A Rejoinder, 20 UCLA L. REV. 75 (1972). 
6 The Federal Circuit found business methods to constitute patentable subject matter in State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. 
Signature Financial Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998). Critics include Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business 
Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 263 (2000); Leo J. Raskind, The State Street 
Bank Decision: The Bad Business of Unlimited Patented Protection for Methods of Doing Business, 10 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. 
MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 61 (1999); Brian P. Biddinger, Note, Limiting the Business Method Patent: A Comparison and Proposed 
Alignment of European, Japanese and United States Patent Law, 69 FORDHAM L. RE V. 2523 (2001); and James Gleick, Patently 
Absurd, N.Y. TIMES, March 12, 2000, § 6 (Magazine), at 44. See also Nicholas Groombridge & Christopher Loh, Congress Takes 
Aim at Business Method Patents , N.Y.L.J., Mar. 6, 2001, at 1. Defenders of business method patents include Jeffrey R. Kuester & 
Lawrence E. Thompson, Risks Associated with Restricting Business Method and E-Commerce Patents , 17 GA.  ST. U. L. REV.  
657 (2001); and Sari Gabay, Note & Comment, The Patentability of Electronic Commerce Business Systems in the Aftermath of 
State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group, Inc., 8 J.L. & POL’Y 179 (1999).  
7 In 1998, Congress extended the copyright term of many works to seventy years beyond the author’s death, twenty years beyond 
the previous length. See Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, § 102(b)(1)-(2), 112 Stat. 2827, 2827 
(1998) (codified at 17 U.S.C. § 302(a)). Critics have argued that this is too long. See Edward C. Walterscheid, The Remarkable—
and Irrational—Disparity Between the Patent Term and the Copyright Term, 83 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 233 (2001); 
see also William Patry, The Failure of the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 907, 
923-30 (1997) (critiquing the proposed extension); Jenny L. Dixon, Note, The Copyright Term Extension Act: Is Life Plus 
Seventy Too Much?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 945 (1996) (same); Joseph A. Lavigne, Comment, For Limited Times? 
Making Rich Kids Richer via the Copyright Term Extension Act of 1996, 73 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 311 (1996) (same). At one 
time, the copyright and patent terms were the same. See Walterscheid, supra, at 234.  
Lloyd Weinreb has argued that arguments for increasing the scope of copyright protection generally have not considered the 
costs and benefits of such expansion: 
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protection advocates have won some victories,8 but the Patent and Trademark Office does 
business largely as before, or even as never before.9  
At least some of the Cipro-related proposals, however, offered a new twist. The 
government, some suggested, should allow generic drug manufacturers to produce the drug, 
ciprofloxacin, and charge a low price for it,10 but Bayer, Cipro’s manufacturer and patent owner, 
should be compensated.11 Such a proposal may seem particularly appropriate given concerns that 
Bayer would not by itself be able to produce enough of the drug to meet demand,12 but the 
proposal has broader resonance. In theory, the government could pay patent owners to place their 
discoveries in the public domain. Doing so would encourage research and development and 
produce inventions, while ensuring that the rich and poor alike could benefit from them. Indeed, 
the newest generation of scholars to challenge the foundations of intellectual property law have 
not called for simple abolition of intellectual property rights, recognizing the importance of the 
innovation incentives that these rights provide. Instead, they have considered the alternatives of 
prize or reward systems, in which the government would provide some form of monetary 
compensation instead of patent or copyright protection. 
The basic idea of a prize system is not new. Michael Polanvyi trumpeted the idea as a 
means of patent reform back in 1944,13 and participants in a nineteenth-century debate about the 
appropriateness of patent protection recognized the possibility that the government might buy out 
some patents.14 There are historical precedents for awarding prizes for the development of useful 
                                                                                                                                                             
The inclusion of new subject matter has generally been responsive not to a demonstrated need but to the bare assertion 
of need, indicated only by the proliferation of copies and occasional anecdotal evidence, and an analogy to books, for 
which copyright was taken for granted. The expansion of copyright in ways that the argument cannot plausibly justify 
suggests its substantial irrelevance to the outcome, except as a talking point. 
Lloyd Weinreb, Copyright For Functional Expression, 111 HARV. L. RE V. 1149, 1243 (1998). 
8 The most prominent victories of anti-protection forces, however, have been technological rather than legal. See, e.g., Lior Jacob 
Strahilevitz, Napster, Gnutella, Hybrids, and the (Re)emergence of Anti-Property 6-16 (Aug. 29, 2001) (unpublished manuscript, 
on file with author) (exploring the continuing success of copyright infringement through peer-to-peer file sharing despite the 
Ninth Circuit’s injunction preventing such infringement on Napster). 
9 The number of patent applications rose from 90,643 in 1990 to 149,825 in 1999, with grants rising from 47,393 to 83,911. See 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.pdf (last visited Oct. 25, 2001).  
10 Senator Schumer emphasized that the concern was not just adequate production, but also that the drug be sold at “reasonable 
prices.” Robert Pear, Government Talks with Drug Companies About Buying Antibiotics That Treat Anthrax, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 
20, 2001, at B8 (quoting Sen. Schumer). 
11 See, e.g., McNeil, supra note 2 (discussing the possibility of a taking of the patent under the eminent domain power); US 
Government Could Override Bayer’s Cipro Patent (NPR radio broadcast, Oct. 17, 2001), available at 2001 WL 24074267 
(same). Advocates of the government’s overriding the patent cited 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1994), which provides that when the United 
States infringes a patent, “the owner’s remedy shall be by action against the United States in the United States Court of Federal 
Claims for the recovery of his reasonable and entire compensation for such use and manufacture.” 
12 Bayer has insisted that it would be able to meet demand. See Keith Bradsher, Bayer Insists Cipro Supply Is Sufficient; Fights 
Generic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2001, § 1B (A Nation Challenged), at 7. If Bayer were not able to meet demand with its own 
manufacturing facilities, it could seek to contract with generic drug manufacturers to produce the drug for Bayer. See Vanessa 
Fuhrmans, Questions of Security: Bayer May Ask Rivals to Help Make Cipro, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2001, at A10. 
13 See Michael Polanvyi, Patent Reform, 11 REV. ECON. STUD. 61 (1944). Polanvyi summarizes his primary proposal as follows: 
“In order that inventions may be used freely by all, we must relieve inventors of the necessity of earning their rewards 
commercially and must grant them instead the right to be rewarded from the public purse.” Id. at 65 (emphasis omitted). Later, he 
elaborates that the proposal “is to supplement licences of right by government rewards to patentees on a level ample enough to 
give general satisfaction to inventors and their financial promoters.” Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted). While Polanvyi suggests that 
rewards would be based on information from patent holders and licensees, he does not offer a detailed justification of his 
assumption that the government would be able to use such information to calculate rewards with sufficient accuracy. Polanvyi 
without elaboration explains simply that prizes should depend “only [on] data endorsable by accountants’ certificate.” Id. at 68. 
Perhaps recognizing the potential for inaccurate decisionmaking, Polanvyi adds that the system need only be “not markedly less 
fair than the rewards which are earned by patentees to-day.” Id.  
14 R.A. Macfie summed up such a proposal as follows: 
In every patent there should be a condition that the State, from public moneys, or moneys supplied by individuals, shall 
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information, 15 and even today, government-funded research dollars rival those from private 
research supported by the patent system.16 The new generation of scholars, however, has offered 
twists and credibility to the debate.17 Steven Shavell and Tanguy van Ypersele have described a 
prize system that inventors could opt into instead of the patent system. 18 Steve Calandrillo has 
argued for a prize system for copyright as well as for patent.19 Meanwhile, Michael Kremer has 
described a system in which patent recipients would agree to give up their patents in exchange 
for compensation that would be determined through a unique auction process.20 Finally, Douglas 
Lichtman has suggested that the government could achieve the benefits of a prize system with 
much lower costs by keeping the patent system and subsidizing consumers who would value 
patented products above marginal cost but cannot afford them at the monopoly price.21 
                                                                                                                                                             
be entitled to demand that the value of the invention be estimated, and, on this value being paid (with a liberal 
percentage added in consideration of ‘compulsory sale’), the use of the invention should become free to all the Queen’s 
subjects (even in the Colonies, so far as privileges granted there do not clash). 
2 R.A. MACFIE, COPYRIGHT AND PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS at vi (Edinburgh, T. & T. Clark 1883). Macfie also reports comments 
by various supporters of reward schemes. In 1795, for example, Sir John Sinclair proposed “a general agreement among the 
powers of Europe, and of the United States of America, for the purpose of rewarding those who make any useful discovery, 
interesting to the species at large.” Id. at 33. Others provided more detail on the mechanism for valuing patents, with Sir David 
Brewster arguing that a “Board at once scientific and practical, containing men of practical sagacity, and scientific men at the 
same time … might in my opinion come to a very sound decision on the value of a patent-right.” Id. at 33-34 (alteration in 
original).  
Commentators also offered concerns about the proposal, concerns that reflect some of the issues that the more modern 
literature addresses. R.W. Thomson, the President of the Royal Scottish Society of Arts, recognized the benefits and costs of 
delaying payment of a reward: 
It would be very easy for a scientific tribunal sitting now to determine the value of inventions which have been in use 
for a number of years, but the task the commission would have to fulfil would be to judge of the value of an invention 
before it is developed…. If the inventor is simply to register his invention and send it out into the world, letting all who 
wish bring it into use and work what improvements they please upon it, postponing the reward to the inventor until 
time has been given to ascertain the value of his invention, then the difficulty arises which, to all practical men 
acquainted with the growth and change which all inventions undergo, is at once evidence, how would it be possible to 
ascertain how much is due to the original inventor, and how much to those who have added successive improvements, 
and, in fact, turned what is very often a crude idea into a successful invention? 
Id. at 36.  
15 A famous example is the offer of a £20,000 prize for a chronometer, a device to determine the location of a ship. Amateur 
clockmaker John Harrison invented the device, but was initially denied the prize. See generally DAVA SOBEL, LONGITUDE (1995) 
(providing a detailed history); Frederick C. Leiner, Book Review, 27 J. MAR. L. & COM. 671 (1996) (reviewing SOBEL, supra) 
(offering a brief summary). The Society of Arts and the British Parliament tried to replicate the success of such approaches by 
offering prizes, but the experiments were unsuccessful, in part because prizes were too small. See DUTTON, supra note 4, at 25-
26. In the United States, the American Philosophical Society sometimes offered modest prizes, such as a seventy dollar prize 
“[f]or the best construction of improvement of ship -pumps.” Notification, PA.  GAZETTE, June 22, 1796, at n.p., available on 
Accessible Archives, Pennsylvania Gazette Database, Item No. 81211, 
http://srch.accessible.com/accessible/text/gaz4/00000812/00081211.htm. Prizes were of greater though still modest impact in 
France. See generally ELISABETH CRAWFORD , THE BEGINNINGS OF THE NOBEL INSTITUTION: THE SCIENCE PRIZES, 1901-1915 at 
16-22 (1984) (describing scientific prizes in Europe in the years preceding the establishment of the Nobel Prizes). 
16 About sixty percent of all U.S. research and development expenditures are privately funded, with the public sector providing 
disproportionate resources for basic research. See Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, Privatizing Public Research, SCI. AM., Sept. 
1994, at 72, 75; John M. Golden, Biotechnology, Technology Policy, and Patentability: Natural Products and Invention in the 
American System, 50 EMORY L.J. 101, 136 (2001). For an economic analysis of why the government might offer grants in 
addition to intellectual property protection, see Brett Frischmann, Innovation and Institutions: Rethinking the Economics of U.S. 
Science and Technology Policy, 24 VT. L. RE V. 347, 386-90 (2000). 
17 Other scholars have advocated radical reform of the intellectual property system without endorsing rewards. See, e.g., Lester 
C. Thurow, Needed: A New System of Intellectual Property Rights, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 95. 
18 Steven Shavell & Tanguy van Ypersele, Rewards Versus Intellectual Property Rights , 44 J.L. & ECON. 525 (2001). 
19 Steve P. Calandrillo, An Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property Rights: Justifications and Problems of Exclusive Rights, 
Incentives, and the Alternative of a Government-Run Reward System , 9 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. M EDIA & ENT. L.J. 301 (1998). 
20 Michael Kremer, Patent Buyouts: A Mechanism for Encouraging Innovation, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1137 (1998). 
21 Douglas Gary Lichtman, Pricing Prozac: Why the Government Should Subsidize the Purchase of Patented Pharmaceuticals , 
11 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 123 (1997). 
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This recent revival of interest in prize systems, even among such prominent scholars, 
seems unlikely to lead to full-scale implementation. For one, the change may be simply too 
radical to be politically palatable in the near future. Calandrillo might be correct that the 
government would be able to levy sufficient taxes to pay the rewards that would be necessary in 
a prize system,22 and Shavell and van Ypersele might be correct in stating that “industry should 
not object” to an opt- in proposal, “as it can only raise firms’ profits.”23 Nonetheless, there might 
be some special interests opposed to such a change, such as patent attorneys,24 and there certainly 
is not a powerful interest lobbying for such a change. Likelihood of adoption, of course, does not 
detract from the proposals’ academic merits, but it does suggest that any reform proposal should 
be incremental.25 In addition, radical proposals to replace existing legal institutions may offer 
substitutes for some of the features of those institutions while missing the importance of other 
features. The survival of an institution provides at least some evidence that it serves a useful 
purpose, but it may not be the purpose for which the institution was originally intended.26 
Moreover, as the diversity of reward proposals indicates, there is no academic consensus 
on how a prize system should work, let alone on whether any particular prize system is 
advisable. Prize system advocates recognize that the devil is in the details, and that the devil for a 
prize system is the government’s ability to dispense rewards accurately. Although prize system 
proponents have given more or less developed indications of what the government should look to 
in determining awards, none has given a detailed assessment from the perspective of public 
administration of how such an agency should work. That is the project of this Article, but the 
Article’s aim is not to fill in obvious implementation details for such a regulatory scheme. 
Outlining a design for a regulatory agency charged with disbursing funds is a familiar, if not 
easy, task. Give rulemaking authority, authorize the appointment of commissioners, create 
hearing procedures, and appropriate funds, and the agency will work well enough. Or perhaps it 
will not work so well, which is the point of those who laud the copyright27 and patent 28 system’s 
ability to induce innovation with a relatively small amount of governmental involvement and 
expense. 
                                                 
22 Calandrillo, supra note 19, at 345. 
23 Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 544. 
24 Members of the patent bar have in the past expressed opposition to many patent reform proposals. See, e.g., Allan M. Soobert, 
Breaking New Grounds in Administrative Revocation of U.S. Patents: A Proposition for Opposition—and Beyond, 14 SANTA 
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 63, 83 (1998) (describing one such instance). The patent bar, of course, is not a monolith, 
and different groups of attorneys may have different interests. Cf. Lee Rousso, Comment, Japan’s New Patent Attorney Law 
Breaches Barrier Between the “Legal” and “Quasi-Legal” Professions: Integrity of Japanese Patent Practice at Risk?, 10 PAC. 
RIM L. & POL’Y J. 781 (2001) (discussing such a conflict in Japan). 
25 Shavell and van Ypersele implicitly acknowledge this, concluding in the last line of their article that “serious study of the 
possibility of reward systems, with a view towards their implementation at least on an experimental, partial basis, is worth 
contemplating.” Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 545. They do not, however, describe how such an experimental, 
partial program would work. 
26 F. Scott Kieff has offered powerful arguments against prize system proposals based on the patent system’s role in facilitating 
commercialization of inventions, a problem that reward proponents have not considered. F. Scott Kieff, Property Rights and 
Property Rules for Commercializing Inventions, 85 M INN. L. REV. 697, 705-17 (2001); see also infra Part II.A.1. A second 
author who offers a brief but insightful critique of prize proposals is Arti Rai. See Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution 
Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 
173, 198-202; see also infra note 117 and accompanying text. 
27 See, e.g., Wendy J. Gordon, Asymmetric Market Failure and Prisoner’s Dilemma in Intellectual Property, 17 U. DAYTON L. 
REV. 853, 868 (1992) (concluding that markets are likely to be superior to courts and administrative agencies in setting 
appropriate prices for use of copyrighted material). 
28 As Dutton notes in explaining the reasoning of those who rejected prize systems in the 19th century, “Patents at least let the 
market decide.” DUTTON, supra note 4, at 26. 
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This Article seeks to undermine a premise common to all recent proposals. The quest 
underlying the renaissance of scholarship on prize systems seems to be for a specification of just 
how such an agency should act in granting awards. If only the task of giving awards can be 
reduced to a formula or algorithmically designed procedure, it must seem, then the objection that 
government will not do the job right will go away. Specify the formula or algorithm in the statute 
governing the reward-granting agency, leaving as little bureaucratic discretion as possible, and 
the system will work just fine. I will argue, however, that there are so many considerations 
relevant to dispensing of prizes, many of which cannot be measured in an objective way, that no 
suitable proposal is likely to be forthcoming. Even if academics could settle on a solution, and 
even if there were sufficient political will to effect a radical change in the patent system, 
Congress might not adopt the proper formula. Political considerations might interfere, and the 
ideal formula or procedure might be altered so as to benefit a key legislator’s constituent or 
district. In addition, legislators might distrust formulas and procedures that would be difficult for 
even an economist to understand quickly.  
Congress could charge an administrative agency with the task of creating regulations for 
optimal disbursement of funds, but this just moves the problem to a new venue, with concerns 
about agency capture replacing concerns about special interest influence in Congress.29 The 
agency might adopt an unsatisfactory formula too. Nonetheless, I will argue that leaving 
individual prize decisions to an agency to resolve on a case-by-case basis is both more feasible 
and more attractive than resolving the problem in Congress or through detailed regulations. A 
proposal that simply gives an agency a set amount of money to distribute also is more palatable 
than one that leaves the Treasury with an open-ended liability that could be both massive and 
difficult to project. A simple approach would be to give an agency a fixed sum, say $100 million 
initially, with which to reward industry concessions in a particular year that offset the negative 
consequences of patent monopolies in a particular market, and let the agency determine how to 
spend the money in adjudications with various claimants. My thesis is that such a flexible system 
is superior to a prize system working according to rigid pre-established rules. 
This proposal must seem naïve to the advocate of a particular formula or algorithm, but 
this Article will recommend it nonetheless. There is an important caveat, however, a caveat that 
can be summarized in one word: Delay. Instead of creating the agency immediately and 
distributing the money shortly after claimants file requests, Congress should place the money 
aside in an investment account, with statutory instructions that the agency not even be created 
until some years, perhaps a decade, later. Only once the agency is created would the government 
process the claims and distribute the money, including interest accrued, for actions by then long 
in the past. A claimant eager for immediate payment could sell the claim on the fund, but the 
government would not accommodate such eagerness in any other way. This is a unique design in 
a legal world that abhors delay, 30 but it has the virtue of being simpler than any of the formulas 
or algorithms advocated by prior scholars. Moreover, I will show, it is more likely to encourage 
cost-effective concessions and projects that best offset the monopoly effects of patents. 
                                                 
29 On capture theory and its successors, see Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. 
REV. 1039 (1997). 
30 Delay by courts in resolving civil litigation has resulted in innovations such as the creation of “rocket dockets.” See, e.g., T.S. 
Ellis III, Judicial Management of Patent Litigation in the United States: Expedited Procedures and Their Effects , 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 
541 (2000); Heather Russell Koenig, The Eastern District of Virginia: A Working Solution for Civil Justice Reform, 32 U. 
RICHMOND L. REV. 799 (1998); Carrie E. Johnson, Comment, Rocket Dockets: Reducing Delay in Federal Civil Litigation, 85 
CAL. L. REV. 225 (1997). 
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Though a novel tool in a public administrative regime, delay is not a new idea in the 
world of prizes. Nobel Prizes are typically awarded only long after the achievement being 
credited.31 The wait ensures that achievements withstand the test of time and do not prove to be 
errors or frauds.32 Indeed, delay seemed so necessary to those entrusted with awarding the prizes 
that the practice of waiting was adopted despite a provision in Alfred Nobel’s will specifying 
that the Prizes were to be awarded for achievements made in the preceding year.33 Similarly, 
garden-variety inventions may turn out to be more weeds than flowers only a few years after 
introduction, either because an inventor exaggerated the importance of the invention or because 
the invention turns out to be part of a fad of only transient importance.34 Sales figures and other 
data over a series of years may provide a more meaningful measure of an invention’s 
significance and expose any flaws in an invention that an inventor might recognize but sensibly 
withhold from the prize grantor. One purpose of delay in my proposal is thus similar to the 
purpose of waiting to award Nobel Prizes, subjecting claimants to the test of time. 
There is, however, an additional, and arguably more important, justification different 
from the one for Nobel Prizes. Delay prevents prize applicants from being influenced by the 
identity and idiosyncratic preferences of those granting the rewards. It is delay that makes a prize 
system in which the eventual awarders of prizes are not bound to a previously agreed formula or 
method attractive. Without delay or constraint, a prize system might amount to nothing more 
than a system allowing decisionmakers to spend money on pet projects as they please. With 
delay, as long as innovators do not believe that the ultimate decisionmakers will deviate in any 
predictable way from granting optimal rewards, they will expect that their inventions will receive 
the socially optimal amount of compensation, and this in turn will induce socially optimal 
investments, or at least the investments that seem most likely to be optimal at the time that they 
are made. Delay thus serves as an alternative to a system of detailed and constraining rules in 
preventing individual decisionmakers’ preferences from having too large an effect on the system. 
Moreover, I will argue, it is preferable to a system of rules, both because of the difficulty of 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., http://www.britannica.com/eb/article?eu=57415&tocid=93433#93433.toc (last visited August 29, 2001) (providing 
an overview of the criteria for awarding prizes). 
32 The Nobel committees’ caution may be a result of some awards that the committees would come to regret. For an account of 
Nobel Prizes that seem today to have been errors, see LEO KATZ,  ILL-GOTTEN GAINS: EVASION,  BLACKMAIL,  FRAUD, AND 
KINDRED PUZZLES OF THE LAW 221-22 (1996). The Nobel Peace Prize is often given for recent efforts toward peace and is often 
controversial for precisely this reason. See, e.g., Padraic P. McGuinness, Nobel Prize for Political Meddling, AGE, Oct. 19, 1996, 
at 31 (criticizing the committee awarding the Peace Prize for making political decisions); Shawn Pogatchnik, Hume, Trimble Win 
Nobel Peace Prize,  AP, Oct. 16, 1998, available at  1998 WL 21172668 (“The Oslo Nobel judges previously have used their 
award to encourage progress in peacemaking . . . .”). 
33 Nobel provided that the interest from the fund established “shall be annually awarded in prizes to those persons who shall have 
contributed most materially to benefit mankind during the year immediately proceeding.” Code of Statutes of the Nobel 
Foundation § 1 (June 29, 1900), reprinted in CRAWFORD , supra note 15, at 221. This provision was interpreted liberally as 
follows: 
The proviso in the Will to the effect that for the prize-competition only such works or inventions shall be eligible as 
have appeared “during the preceding year”, is to be so understood, that a work or an invention for which a reward 
under the terms of the Will is contemplated, shall set forth the most modern results of work being done in that of the 
departments, as defined in the Will, to which it belongs; works or inventions of older standing to be taking into 
consideration only in case their importance have not previously been demonstrated. 
Id. § 2, reprinted in CRAWFORD , supra note 15, at 222. The statutes also provide, “No work shall have a prize awarded to it unless 
it have been proved by the test of experience or by the examination of experts to possess the preeminent excellence that is 
manifestly signified by the terms of the Will.” Id. § 5, reprinted in CRAWFORD , supra note 15, at 223. 
34 John Thomas notes the danger of fads in addressing the appropriate patent policy for pioneer inventions. See John R. Thomas, 
The Question Concerning Patent Law and Pioneer Inventions, 10 HIGH TECH L.J. 35, 97 (1995) (“The remarkable success of a 
particular invention may be due to elements such as marketing efforts and technological fads, which may falsely suggest that an 
undeserving invention is worthy of an award of broad patent protection.”) (footnotes omitted). 
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forging agreement on any particular set of rules for compensation ex ante and because the 
creation of any given set of rules invites potential prize applicants to exploit loopholes. 
Delay is not by itself enough to assure a sound system for prizes, and the Article will also 
deal with a number of other design issues. For example, it is important to provide incentives to 
third parties to point out defects in others’ applications for rewards.35 Although the 
decisionmakers themselves might notice some problems, they may have trouble verifying some 
assertions, such as those based on sales data, that may in fact be controversial. A solution to this 
is to provide for each prize applicant a third-party opponent that will benefit from producing 
evidence that will keep rewards low. This solution, in turn, introduces a new problem, the 
prospect that litigation between prize applicants and the opponents will use up too many social 
resources, necessarily limiting the benefits of prize systems. The challenge is to ensure that the 
costs of such litigation, as well as the related problem of rent-seeking by prize applicants and 
third parties once the prize distribution apparatus is established, are minimized, without losing 
the benefits attributable to more optimal resource use. These implementation details are not 
central to the task of creating a politically palatable prize system, but I will consider them in 
some detail, with the intent of persuading those who otherwise would believe that such concerns 
would make a prize system unattractive.  
Though the system for awarding prizes is particularly appropriate in the patent context, I 
will argue that prize systems, though previously neglected in the legal and political science 
literatures, are a potentially useful tool of governmental administration. The argument for patent 
prizes is generalizable to many other areas in which the government distributes funds to private 
organizations in order to produce some social benefit. Often, there are reasons to doubt that the 
government will be capable of making sound decisions about how to distribute funds, either 
because a decision is inherently complex or for reasons familiar from public choice scholarship.36 
For example, in giving scientific research grants, a government agency may have trouble 
identifying which research projects are most likely to be successful and produce social benefit, or 
have difficulty deciding how much money to allocate each of a number of potentially successful 
proposals.37 Similarly, we might worry that some budget allocations by Congress will reflect 
indulgence in “pork barrel spending” rather than dispassionate analysis of the public good.38 
While it would be fanciful to imagine Congress giving up such spending altogether, it is 
conceivable that if new systems for promoting certain kinds of projects developed, a norm 
against certain types of line item appropriations might develop.39 
                                                 
35 See infra Part II.A.2. 
36 Public choice scholars are generally skeptical about the legitimacy of the administrative state and about the quality of decisions 
made by administrative agencies. But see David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 
GEO. L.J. 97 (2000) (seeking to counter public choice critiques of administration). Public choice has also long concerned itself 
with government spending, providing explanations of phenomena such as government deficits. See, e.g., E. Donald Elliott, 
Constitutional Conventions and the Deficit, 1985 DUKE L.J. 1077, 1090 (summarizing public choice theories explaining spending 
that benefits particular interest groups). For a useful, albeit skeptical, introduction to public choice, see DANIEL A. FARBER & 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE  (1991). 
37 The problem may not be solely technical. As Thomas McGarity notes, even with peer review, various forms of bias can affect 
the quality of decisions made in the awarding of government grants. See Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal 
Grants in the Arts and Sciences , 9 HIGH TECH L.J. 1, 38-55 (1994). 
38 For an argument that even legitimate government programs should count in a definition of “pork,” see Einer Elhauge, Are 
Term Limits Undemocratic?, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 83, 118 (1997). 
39 There is precedent to justify such a belief. It once was common practice for Congress to award pensions through private bills, 
but the emergence of systematic pension systems has all but eliminated them. See, e.g., Note, Private Bills in Congress, 79 HARV. 
L. REV. 1684, 1684 (1966) (noting that although the definition of “private bill” includes pension awards, currently private bills 
rarely involve such awards). See generally United States v. Hall, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 343, 346 (1878) (finding the award of pensions 
constitutional); Susan Sterett, Serving the State: Constitutionalism and Social Spending, 1860’s-1920’s, 22 LAW & SOC. INQ. 311 
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A prize system can achieve the particularism that is a virtue of the common law in a 
context that, because of the subjectivity of government spending decisions, is not easily 
amenable to the crafting of doctrine and precedent. By delaying payment and allowing tradability 
of prizes, the government may be able to induce efficient private allocation of funds toward 
achieving desired social goals even if the government itself would never be able to make funding 
decisions in an optimal way. The possibility of government failure is not an argument against a 
retrospective prize system, but an argument for it. The decisions that matter most in a prize 
system are not the government’s, but those of private parties predicting what the government will 
do, and spending based on the expected value of governmental awards reduces the arbitrariness 
that sometimes is associated with governmental decisionmaking. With the prevailing approach to 
government spending, the government makes all decisions ex ante, so noise in individual 
allocation decisions impairs the government’s ability to achieve the desired social goal. A 
retrospective prize system neutralizes random deviations from efficient allocation decisions. Just 
as venture capitalists provide funding to firms that invest in research and development that might 
or might not result in a commercially successful project, so too would projects be funded in 
proportion to the prizes that they would be expected on average to garner.40 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I critically reviews the recent literature urging 
acceptance of reward mechanisms in the patent context. It begins by identifying weaknesses in 
each of the major proposals for a comprehensive system that either would replace the patent 
system or would be available for inventors as an alternative to it. While my purpose in doing so 
is partly to critique the mechanics of the proposals, it is more broadly to emphasize that any 
approach is likely to have advantages and disadvantages. Part II then identifies potential 
obstacles for any such comprehensive system. Problems include inadequate incentives for 
commercialization, deadweight loss attributable to the distortionary effect of taxes, redundant 
research effort by competitors, uncompetitive markets for production or distribution of goods, 
lack of incentives for adequately screening reward applications, high administrative costs, and 
rent-seeking.  
Part III details the proposal summarized above by considering a variety of design issues 
facing a patent reward system. It argues, for example, that a system allowing flexibility in 
providing awards is superior to one that hews to a formula, and that a system providing for 
delayed determination and payment of rewards is better than one that pays rewards immediately. 
Other significant issues concern the structure of the agency charged with distributing prizes and 
the design of a system for litigating disputes about prizes. Finally, Part IV identifies criteria for 
determining the suitability of particular markets for a prize system of the type described here. It 
then examines several specific patent areas in which such a prize system would be helpful. These 
areas include prescription drugs, genomics, and business methods. Part IV concludes by 
assessing the potential usefulness of the basic scheme for areas other than patent, such as 
copyright for digital recordings and government spending for social services. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1997) (discussing the granting of pensions for military and other service in the nineteenth century). Presumably, some legislators 
might like to reward individual constituents with supplemental pensions, but the existence of a governmental system for 
providing pensions in a neutral way has made such private bills politically impossible. Similarly, if it became common for the 
government to encourage certain kinds of initiatives through prizes, bills granting money to specific organizations for initiatives 
of dubious value might not succeed. 
40 See infra text accompanying notes 400-403 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE LIMITS OF PATENT PRIZE PROPOSALS 
This part considers four recent proposals to establish patent prize systems. The proposals 
exhibit a remarkable diversity in approaches. All, however, share the goal of addressing how the 
government might determine the size and form of prizes. The earliest proposal, in Part I.A, 
imagines that the government would use its eminent domain power to take certain patents, with a 
“market test” available to patent holders to challenge the size of the prize given. The proposal in 
Part I.B, by contrast, seeks to derive a formula that a government agency could use in providing 
prizes, and the proposal in Part I.C describes a market mechanism involving auctions and 
randomization for determining how much should be paid in patent buyouts. The most distinctive 
of the proposals is that in Part I.D, which urges that the government give prizes in the form of 
coupons instead of buying out patents. Besides describing the proposals, I aim to show that each 
has significant flaws and that even if these flaws could be corrected, different approaches might 
be optimal in different situations. 
A. Guell and Fischbaum’s Market Test 
Robert Guell and Marvin Fischbaum offered the first of the recent proposals for prize 
systems, focusing specifically on the prescription drug industry. 41 Their proposal is useful 
initially for describing the central problem that all proposals for patent prizes seek to attack: the 
inefficiency associated with the grant of a limited monopoly. 42 As Guell and Fischbaum explain, 
“[t]he problem is that, in order to garner [monopoly] profits, monopolists set price above 
marginal cost and produce less than the socially desirable output.”43 By definition, a profit-
maximizing firm will raise its prices on a product until the decrease in the number of consumers 
purchasing the product more than offsets the profit attributable to the higher price paid by 
consumers who will still buy it. If the producer can prevent other firms from selling the same 
product, as a patent entitles the producer to do,44 then the price the producer charges ordinarily 
will be more than it costs to make an additiona l unit of the product. A pill that costs just a few 
cents to manufacture might sell for tens or hundreds of dollars. 
This is a familiar story, but two points are worth emphasizing. First, as Guell and 
Fischbaum note, “monopoly profits per se are not a cause for concern. 45 The economist’s 
standard objection is not that the drug producer will get rich at the expense of consumers, a 
distributional issue.46 The economist worries about the effect of an increase in price on 
production. 47 Some consumers who value the drug at more than the price it costs to manufacture 
the drug will fail to purchase the drug at the monopoly price, either because they decide that their 
money is better spent elsewhere or because they do not have sufficient resources to make the 
                                                 
41 Robert C. Guell & Marvin Fischbaum, Toward Allocative Efficiency in the Prescription Drug Industry, 73 M ILBANK Q., June 
1995, at 213.  
42 See, e.g., ROBERT B. EKELUND, JR. & ROBERT D. TOLLISON, ECONOMICS 273-74 (3d ed. 1991) (describing the welfare losses 
associated with the exercise of monopoly power). 
43 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 216-17. 
44 See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (prohibiting infringement of a patent). Excludability is, of course, the essence of the patent right. 
45 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 216. 
46 See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System Is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax in Redistributing Income, 23 
J. LEGAL STUD. 667 (1994). 
47 This emphasis is apparent in George Stigler’s Coasean observation that in a world of zero transactions costs, consumers could 
pay a monopolist to increase output. See George J. Stigler, The Law and Economics of Public Policy: A Plea to the Scholars, 1 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 1, 12 (1972). In effect, in a patent prize system, the government serves as the consumers’ representative in making 
just such a bargain with a patent holder. 
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purchase.48 When this occurs, “consumers lose more from higher prices than producers gain,”49 
and a deadweight loss results. Second, the economist’s concern may not be the same as the 
politician’s concern. To be sure, politicians sometimes worry publicly about people  being denied 
health care.50 It is at least as common, however, for politicians to complain about the effect of the 
high cost of prescription drugs, sometimes on specific groups like senior citizens.51  
The possibility of deadweight loss is by itself not sufficient to justify eliminating the 
patent system, of course. Guell and Fischbaum recognize that the “static efficiency” from 
elimination of the patent system might be outweighed by the system’s “dynamic efficiency.”52 
Elimination of patent protection would produce a short-term benefit, as the price of products 
currently inflated because of patents fall. 53 It would, however, discourage producers from 
innovating in the future. The end of patents would not be the end of invention altogether. 
Innovators might still be able to protect some inventions by keeping them secret.54 In addition, 
research and development might be worthwhile because of first-mover advantages.55 In a survey, 
chief R&D executives acknowledged that many of their inventions would have been developed 
even in the absence of patent protection, more in some industries than in others.56 A drawback of 
the patent system is that it covers, perhaps by necessity, both inventions spurred by the promise 
of a monopoly and inventions that would have been developed in any event.57 Deadweight losses 
                                                 
48 This occurs because consumers’ demand for the drug is not completely inelastic. See EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 42, at 
119-22 (explaining elasticity). 
49 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 217. 
50 See, e.g., Gore Vows Penalties if HMOs Cut Seniors, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 26, 2000, at 8, available at 2000 WL 4975826 
(describing Al Gore’s criticizing of drug companies for refusing coverage and dropping patients). 
51 See, e.g., GOP Rips Al’s Far-Fetched Story on Pooch’s Drug Prices , N.Y. POST, Sept. 19, 2000, at 4 (discussing a controversy 
involving Gore’s allegation that his mother-in-law paid more for arthritis medication than the price of the same drug for his dog). 
52 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 221. 
53 This assumes that the government could eliminate the patent system without providing compensation, which is unlikely given 
the Takings Clause. See Mitchell N. Berman et al., State Accountability for Violations of Intellectual Property Rights: How to 
“Fix” Florida Prepaid (And How Not To), 79 TEX. L. REV. 1037, 1072 (2001) (“[S]tate infringements of patents, copyrights, and 
trademarks are likely in some cases to constitute takings of intellectual property that will require the state to pay just 
compensation to the rightsholders.”). See generally Shubha Ghosh, Toward a Theory of Regulatory Takings for Intellectual 
Property: The Path Left open After College Savings v. Florida Prepaid, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 637 (2000) (arguing that state 
infringement of intellectual property might be remedied by takings suits, despite state sovereign immunity).  
54 See Vincent Chiapetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade 
Secret Law?, 8 GEO. M ASON L. REV. 69, 136-45 (1999) (analyzing the relationship between trade secret law and patent law). 
55 The classic study of the advantages of being a first-mover is Richard Schmalensee, Product Differentiation Advantages of 
Pioneering Brands, 72 AM. ECON. RE V. 349 (1982). See also  Cecelia C. Conrad, The Advantage of Being First and Competition 
Between Firms, 1 INT’L J. INDUS.  ORG. 353 (1983); Paul Klemperer, Entry Deterrence in Markets with Consumer Switching 
Costs, 97 ECON. J. supp. at 99 (1987). For an assessment of whether first-mover advantages would be sufficient to spur 
innovation in the pharmaceuticals industry, see F.M. SCHERER & DAVID ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE  588-92 (3d ed. 1990). Calandrillo specifically discusses first-mover advantages in considering the virtues of prize 
systems. Calandrillo, supra note 19, at 318-21. 
56 See Edwin Mansfield, Patents and Innovation: An Empirical Study, 32 M GMT.  SCI. 175 (1986). “Weighting the responses 
according to 1982 company -financed R&D expenditures in the reporting groups, the aggregate loss of inventions without patent 
protection would have been roughly 14 percent of those actually made.” SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 55, at 629 (basing a 
calculation on National Science Foundation data). For a more recent survey suggesting that executives generally view patents as 
a relatively ineffective way of protecting intellectual property, but that reliance on patents may have increased since the Levin et 
al. study, see WESLEY M. COHEN ET AL., PROTECTING THEIR INTELLECTUAL ASSETS: APROPRIABILITY CONDITIONS AND WHY U.S. 
MANUFACTURING FIRMS PATENT (OR NO T) (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 7552, 2000). 
57 Some commentators have suggested enforcing only patents on inventions that would not have been developed in the absence 
of patent law. See, e.g., A. Samuel Oddi, Beyond Obviousness: Invention Protection in the Twenty-First Century, 38 AM. U. L. 
REV. 1097, 1101 (1989); see also Roberts v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 697 F.2d 796 (7th Cir. 1983) (Posner, J.) (employing such 
reasoning).  
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will exist not only for inventions that would never have existed but for the patent system, but 
also for inventions that would have existed anyway. 
Nonetheless, it is at least theoretically plausible that the benefits of the patent system 
exceed the costs,58 and for the purposes of this Article, we will assume this to be true. Patent 
advocates cannot end the inquiry here, though, because the question is whether it is possible to 
provide incentives for the inventions that the patent system offers without suffering the 
deadweight loss inherent in monopoly pricing. One way that this might be achieved is by having 
the government provide funds for research and development directly, with requirements that the 
results of the research be released and shared with the public. If research is a public good, let it 
be publicly produced. The government, of course, does just this with basic research, conducting 
much basic research itself and providing subsidies for other basic research. 59 Governments, 
however, may be unsuccessful at picking winners,60 that is at deciding what type of research is 
important and who is best suited to perform it. Even if the government knew what invention it 
would like developed and who is best situated to develop it, Guell and Fischbaum argue that 
inefficiencies in government contracting may make direct procurement “a recipe for disaster.”61 
Presumably, the government encourages research with both patent protection and subsidization 
of research because each approach is the more efficient in its own sphere. 
Enter the proposal for a prize system. Instead of having the government only choose ex 
ante what research projects to finance, the government could allow the invisible hand to work, 
inventers to obtain patents, and then pay the inventers for their patents. Guell and Fischbaum 
propose simply “that the government buy prescription drug patents at a price equaling the net 
present value of the profit they would have generated and distribute the patents to U.S. drug 
manufacturers.”62 Assuming that the government could do this, it is easy to see how this 
approach would solve the deadweight loss problem. By allowing free use of the patent by 
                                                 
58 Even if the patent system imposes greater costs than benefits for run-of-the-mill inventions, its benefits may exceed its costs 
once truly revolutionary inventions are taken into account, since these may require “completely new marketing channels and 
production facilities.” A. Samuel Oddi, Trips—Natural Rights and a “Polite Form of Economic Imperialism, 29 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 415, 442 n.112 (1996). 
59 The United States typically performs basic research itself instead of subsidizing research when the research is aimed at direct 
government use, for example for national defense. See Michael L. Doane, Green Light Subsidies: Technology Policy in 
International Trade, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & CO M. 155, 160 (1995). 
60 Michael Hart, for example, argues, “Governments do not have a good track record of picking winners and losers, but losers 
have an excellent record of picking governments. When governments are committed to picking winners, the losers will show up 
and insist on their share . . . .” Michael Hart, The Chimera of Industrial Policy: Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 19 CAN.-U.S. 
L.J. 19, 36 (1993); see also Steve Charnovitz, Designing American Industrial Policy: General Versus Sectoral Approaches , 5 
STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 78, 85 (1993) (noting the difficulty that the government faces in establishing adequate criteria for picking 
winners). One problem with the critique that government is ineffective at picking winners is that the private sector has its share of 
losers too, from the Edsel to New Coke. On the other hand, when the government seeks to pick winners, even when it seems to be 
successful, it may have literally picked the winners by creating an unequal playing field. See Joel B. Eisen, Antitrust Reform for 
Joint Production Ventures , 30 JURIMETRICS J. 253, 254 (1990). 
61 Guell and Fischbaum note that the government could accomplish procurement either through fixed-cost pricing, in which a 
contractor agrees to do research for a set fee, or cost-plus pricing. Fixed-cost pricing “can lead to cost minimization without 
regard to quality.” Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 222. It is particularly problematic for research whose prospects are 
uncertain and for which assessments ideally should be made each step of the way whether the research should continue or 
scrapped as a sunk cost. Cost-plus pricing solves some of these problems, but “invariably this results in cost overruns because the 
builder does not share in the savings.” Id. at 223. Government contracts law, of course, is all about trying to overcome these 
problems, but agency costs may be substantial for some types of government procurement. See generally William E. Kovacic, 
Whistleblower Bounty Lawsuits as Monitoring Devices in Government Contracting, 29 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1799, 1806-07 (1996) 
(noting that while the government may overcome agency costs by allowing whistleblower lawsuits, these lawsuits entail agency 
problems of their own).  
62 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 221. 
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manufacturers,63 the government would invoke competitive forces, leading to production at a 
level that normally would be higher than the monopoly output level at a lower price. The 
inventors should be indifferent, assuming that the government gives them precisely the 
difference between the profits that they would have earned and the profits that they might still 
earn from being one producer of the drug among many. As Figure 1 illustrates, the patent buyout 
benefits society as a whole by eliminating deadweight loss, while leaving pharmaceutical 
companies indifferent. Indeed, pharmaceutical companies might even benefit, because free 
distribution of drugs might provide positive publicity for them, or at least less negative publicity 
than they currently receive for “price gouging.”64  
                                                 
63 Guell and Fischbaum do not explain why only U.S. drug manufacturers would be entitled to produce the drugs, though this 
approach could satisfy a protectionist motive. An alternative nonprotectionist approach would be to distribute the patent to all 
manufacturers producing the drug for distribution in the United States. This solution would allow the inventor to obtain and 
enforce patents abroad, unless of course foreign countries also adopted a prize system. Guell and Fischbaum do recognize the 
international nature of the patent system and that the size of the U.S. economy may mean that the optimal solution for it is 
different from that for a small country: 
[A]n absence of a measurable effect of price controls on R&D in smaller markets would not necessarily provide 
support for price controls in the United States because these are clearly “beggar-thy-neighbor” policies, which allow 
other nations to benefit from high U.S. prices. If high U.S [sic] prices serve to motivate drug research globally, the 
existence of price controls in a “small country” would have minimal impact on the level of R&D investment in that 
country. Because the United States provides the largest national market for pharmaceuticals, price controls here would 
have a very different impact; it would induce a significant drop in R&D not only in the United States, but elsewhere as 
well. 
Id. at 222. Of course, even a small country might rationally adopt a patent system to achieve reciprocity benefits for its own 
inventions. But see A. Samuel Oddi, The International Patent System and Third World Development: Reality or Myth?, 1987 
DUKE L.J. 831 (arguing that membership in the international patent system may harm third-world nations). 
64See, e.g., Christopher Connell, Drug Prices Rising Faster Than Inflation, Senators Complain, AP, Feb. 3, 1993, available at 
1993 WL 4525594 (discussing accusations that the drug industry was “price-gouging” consumers).  
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Figure 1. Economic effects of a patent buyout 
A profit-maximizing patent holder will choose the monopoly price Pm and quantity Qm. Rectangle A 
represents a monopoly rent, the profits that the patent holder receives as a result of the patent. The 
monopoly pricing produces a deadweight loss represented by triangle B, and consumer surplus with 
monopoly pricing is equal to triangle C. In a patent buyout, the government pays to the patent holder an 
amount equivalent to rectangle A, thus leaving the patent holder as well off as it would have been before. 
The patent is then placed in the public domain, and competition results in a price Pc and quantity Qc. 
Consumer surplus is now A + B + C. The patent buyout thus increases consumer welfare by A + B for a 
cost of A, resulting in a total increase in social welfare equivalent to B.  
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Guell and Fischbaum’s primary contribution is in setting forth the analytic case for a 
prize system. It will be worthwhile, though, to consider just how Guell and Fischbaum propose 
implementing the scheme, while in fairness recognizing that the specific proposal is not the 
central point of their paper. Guell and Fischbaum suggest initially that the government confiscate 
patents, much as it confiscates other goods for public use and pays just compensation under the 
Takings Clause.65 This is an analytically simple solution, placing aside the question of how to 
create an administrative agency that would determine which patents to take. It does not, 
                                                 
65 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 225. There is a historical precedent for the government’s taking of a patent. See City of 
Milwaukee v. Activated Sludge, Inc., 69 F.2d 577 (7th Cir. 1934). 
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however, explain just how the courts would determine the amount of compensation, and even 
Guell and Fischbaum do not have full confidence in the results of eminent domain proceedings, 
characterizing the process as one in which “wholly unqualified judges determine the ‘just 
compensation’ based on two competing claims of value.”66 As a result, Guell and Fischbaum 
advocate “the possibility of a market appeal,” in which a drug would be marketed “in a specific 
test area,” with the firm’s “scaled-up profits” used as “an indicator of the firm’s true monopoly 
profits had it kept the patent.”67  
This proposal has a number of problems. First, while the market appeal is designed to 
offset the danger of judges “biased against inventing firms,”68 there is the possibility that judges, 
whether biased or not, sometimes might provide valuations that are higher than necessary. 69 To 
offset that, one might allow the government to use the market appeal too, but if that is so, then 
the eminent domain process essentially reduces to a form of nonbinding arbitration, 70 perhaps 
useful but essentially just a first act to the market appeal. Second, the market appeal will result in 
a delay in selling the product. Guell and Fischbaum explain, “Because the drug would be sold 
only within the test region, no one would leave the area to buy the drug at a cheaper price.”71 
Thus, some consumers (including some who would be willing to pay the monopoly price)72 
would be excluded for a time from obtaining the product, producing a deadweight loss. 
Third, and most significantly, it might be difficult to extrapolate from the results in the 
test market. Perhaps the particular geographic area in which the test market is conducted has 
different demographics from the nation as a whole. Moreover, the test period may not be 
representative. As Guell and Fischbaum themselves recognize, “the ultimate effectiveness of [a] 
new drug is uncertain,”73 but they fail to recognize that a brief test market period may be 
inadequate. A drug may initially be popular, but later prove less effective than originally 
believed,74 or it may take time for a drug to catch on among prescribing doctors.75 Indeed, Guell 
                                                 
66 Id. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. 
69 Guell and Fischbaum contend that “[t]he purchasing agency would have an incentive to state the [patent value] accurately 
because a history of being proved wrong in test markets would lead judges to side more often with firms.” Id. The purchasing 
agency, however, might systematically provide overly generous offers as a way of avoiding market appeals. Even if the 
purchasing agency tried to state the patent value accurately, however, the purchasing agency sometimes might give overly 
generous offers inadvertently, and neither side would appeal in such cases. 
70 Nonbinding arbitration may be useful, for example by encouraging settlement. See, e.g., Steven A. Weiss, ADR: A Litigator’s 
Perspective, BUS. L. TODAY, Mar./Apr. 1999, at 30, 30 (“From my experience, nonbinding arbitration is only useful when the 
parties have litigated for a while, discovery is mostly or completely finished, and the parties are trying to reach a settlement.”). 
See generally Kathryn L. Hale, Note, Nonbinding Arbitration: An Oxymoron?, 24 U. TOL. L. REV. 1003 (1993) (exploring the 
usefulness of nonbinding arbitration). 
71 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 225. 
72 Under current doctrine, the test market period would need to occur after or shortly before the patent application is filed. See 
Jay David Schainholz, Note, The Validity of Patents After Market Testing: A New and Improved Experimental Use Doctrine?, 85 
COLUM. L. REV. 371, 371-72 (1985) (noting that market testing does not count as an experimental use permissible more than one 
year prior to filing a patent application). To minimize the period in which the drug would be available only in a test market, 
Congress might consider expanding the experimental use exception. Alternatively, the output -reducing effect of the test market 
could be mitigated by allowing the patent holder to sell the drug nationwide until the buyout is completed. Indeed, the test market 
could simply be a “test period” in which the drug were marketed nationwide. Such sales, however, would still be at the monopoly 
price, thus implying some welfare loss relative to a system that effected patent buyouts at the beginning of a patent term. 
73 Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 224. 
74 In an extreme case, a drug may be withdrawn because of unexpected safety problems. See, e.g., Vanessa Fuhrmans & Gardiner 
Harris, Bayer Withdraws Major Cholesterol Drug, WALL ST. J., Aug. 9, 2001, at A3 (reporting on Bayer’s withdrawal of Baycol, 
a cholesterol-lowering drug, after at least 311 deaths among patients taking the drug). 
75 Capital markets, however, often react strongly to unexpectedly slow drug sales, suggesting that initial sales may well be 
predictive of future sales. See Susan Pulliam & Thomas M. Burton, Investors Focus on ‘Scrip Sales’ of New Drugs Like Lilly’s 
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and Fischbaum note that a drug ultimately may prove beneficial for other than its initially 
intended use,76 but such uses may take more time to become apparent. Guell and Fischbaum urge 
that the pharmaceutical company be encouraged to advertise the drug and that the price of 
marketing efforts be taken into account in determining the profits from the drug. But advertising 
expenditures may be quite different for the initial introduction of a drug than they would be 
later.77  
I do not mean to imply that these problems could not be overcome, or that they are so 
severe as to make Guell and Fischbaum’s proposal inadvisable. A government agency might be 
able to develop detailed demographic models allowing it to extrapolate from a test market to the 
country as a whole. Similarly, the agency might rely on data about profits from pharmaceuticals 
in the past to estimate future advertising and sales of a drug from the initial sales in a test market. 
Moreover, one might argue, as long as the agency is not systematically wrong, the system might 
produce the appropriate invention incentives.78 There is, however, the possibility that the agency 
will be systematically wrong, that it will adopt a formula or procedure for computing the value of 
a patent that is inaccurate in a predictable way. Such a systematic error might have a substantial 
effect on innovation incentives, either positive or negative, if it changes the expected returns to 
research and investment. While Guell and Fischbaum’s proposal is a first step, they do not offer 
enough details or argument to justify a belief that the agency would be able to manage its task 
sufficiently well. 
B. Shavell and van Ypersele’s Reward Formula 
The Shavell and van Ypersele proposal is in presentation nearly the polar opposite of 
Guell and Fischbaum’s. While Guell and Fischbaum explain their proposal primarily with words, 
using a figure only to convey the concept of deadweight loss, the Shavell and van Ypersele 
proposal is based on and developed through a mathematical model. The motivation for the 
Shavell and van Ypersele project is the recognition that the “principal difficulty with reward 
systems … concerns the government’s need for information to calculate rewards.”79 Following 
an earlier model by Brian Wright,80 they worry particularly about asymmetric information. This 
                                                                                                                                                             
Evista, and Punish Slow Takeoffs , WALL ST. J., Feb. 19, 1998, at C4 (discussing investors’ consideration of “scrip sales,” weekly 
reports on the sales of prescription drugs, particularly new ones). 
76 “In medical research the unintended beneficial qualities of medicines are often as important as the intended ones. Temin 
[1980], for example, relates how research on sulfa drugs led to whole new classes of therapeutic agents, including tranquilizers 
and antihypertensives.” Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 224 (citing P. TEMIN, TAKING YOUR MEDICINE: DRUG REGULATION 
IN THE UNITED STATES (1980)). As this quotation reveals, not only might a particular drug have beneficial but possibly unforeseen 
uses, but also it might serve as a building block to another invention. A patentee can take advantage of this either by developing 
the subsequent invention or by licensing, but the test market approach would not help to calculate potential profits from such 
activities. 
77 One commentator has argued that determining the value of patents in the prescription drug contexts is complicated by the 
existence of insurance. See Rai, supra note 26, at 179 (“[T]he growing number of commentators who advocate publicly financed 
buyouts of important pharmaceutical patents as a means of eliminating deadweight loss ignore the demand-side reality that for 
the most part, individual consumers do not purchase individual drugs directly at the time they need them.”) (footnote omitted). 
Guell and Fischbaum might respond to this criticism by noting that it does not matter from the perspective of the market test 
whether drugs are purchased by insurance companies or by consumers, though this response only highlights the problem that 
insurance companies’ purchasing and reimbursement decisions in the test market might not be reflective of their later decisions. 
An alternative response would be to prevent insurance companies from providing the drug in the test market as a way of gauging 
consumer demand independent of moral hazard. 
78 This is quite similar to an argument that I will offer later. See infra text accompanying notes 402–403. 
79 Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 526.  
80 Brian D. Wright, The Economics of Invention Incentives: Patents, Prizes, and Research Contracts , 73 AM. ECON. REV. 691 
(1983). 
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focus is sound. If both the inventor and the government have the same estimate of the value of a 
patent, then a patent buyout at that value will be efficient even if it turns out that the estimate of 
the value of the patent is wildly inaccurate. The government is less risk-averse than a private 
party, and all that matters is providing equal value on average. What is worrisome is that the 
private party might have a better sense of the value of its patent than the government has. 
Systematic errors in calculating the value of patents might distort innovation incentives, perhaps 
enough to overwhelm the benefit from eliminating the deadweight loss associated with a patent 
regime.81 
Shavell and van Ypersele model the asymmetric information problem by assuming that 
the inventor and the government have different information about demand for the product. In 
particular, the innovator knows the demand curve, but the government does not.82 The 
government can identify only a family of demand curves to which the innovator’s demand curve 
may belong, and it can calculate the probability that any of these demand curves is the actual 
demand curve.83 Given these assumptions, Shavell and van Ypersele compare the surplus that 
would result in various possible regimes to the social surplus that would result from the “first-
best outcome,”84 in which a potential innovator invests the socially optimal amount in seeking to 
develop the innovation, and, if the innovation is successful, prices the product at its marginal 
cost.85 The surplus will be less than this in a standard patent regime for two reasons, both familiar 
to the economic literature on patents.86 The first reason is the deadweight loss from the patent 
holder’s pricing the product at the monopoly level. The second follows from the first. Because 
deadweight loss is the portion of consumer’s surplus in competition not transferred to producer’s 
surplus,87 the patent holder’s profits will necessarily be less than the social surplus in the first-
                                                 
81 Shavell and van Ypersele offer the following explanation as a prelude to the model: 
On one hand, the reward system is superior to patent in that deadweight loss due to monopoly pricing is avoided under 
rewards. On the other hand, the incentive to invest in research is imperfect under both systems, but in different ways. 
Under the patent system, the incentive to invest is always inadequate because monopoly profits are less than social 
surplus; but the incentive to invest is linked to actual social surplus because the innovator knows the demand for the 
potential innovation. Under the reward system, the incentive to invest is governed by the reward and thus is not 
systematically inadequate; yet the incentive to invest is not linked to actual surplus but only to the reward. 
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 530 (footnotes omitted). 
82 Shavell and van Ypersele recognize that in practice neither the innovator nor the government will know the demand curve, and 
the innovator’s information will merely be better than the government’s. They explain, however, that the assumption of perfect 
knowledge on the part of the innovator is a useful simplification:  
The assumption that the innovator has perfect information about demand (since he knows t) and that the government 
does not is the simplest way to reflect the idea that the innovator possesses superior information about demand. A more 
realistic assumption is that the innovator’s information about demand is not perfect but still is better than the 
government’s, and were this the assumption, it will be obvious that the qualitative nature of our results would not be 
altered. 
Id. at 532 n.25. 
83 Mathematically, the inverse demand function d reports the price as a function of the quantity of the product q and a parameter 
t. See id. at 531. The inventor knows the parameter t, but the government only knows a minimum and a maximum possible value 
of the parameter, denoted ta and tb, as well as the probability that any particular value within that range will be the actual value, 
represented by the probability density function g(t). 
84 Id. at 532.  
85 Shavell and van Ypersele explain, “If there is an innovation, the first-best quantity, denoted q(t), is such that the height of the 
demand curve is c, that is, d(q(t),t) = c.” Id.  
86 See JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 399-400 (1988). For an additional treatment, see SCHERER & 
ROSS, supra note 55, at 622-24. 
87 For a graphical illustration, see WALTER NICHOLSON, MICROECONOMIC THEORY : BASIC PRINCIPLES AND EXTENSIONS 574 
fig.19.5 (5th ed. 1992). The illustration shows that monopoly pricing results in inputs that would have been devoted to the 
product being transferred to other, less productive uses in the economy. 
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best outcome. As a result, the innovator will invest less in research initially than is socially 
optimal.88 
The first original contribution offered by Shavell and van Ypersele is a comparison of the 
reward and patent regimes in their model. If the government’s information were identical to the 
innovator’s,89 the government could achieve the first-best outcome simply by paying the 
innovator the social surplus. The deadweight loss would be eliminated, as the invention passes 
into the public domain and is manufactured at marginal cost.90 In addition, the prospective 
innovator would invest the socially optimal amount in seeking the innovation, because paying 
the innovator the full social surplus allows the innovator to internalize the benefits of the 
innovation. 91 With imperfect information, however, the government, with imperfect information, 
does not know the social surplus, and it can thus promise the inventor only what it expects the 
social surplus to be.92 That is, the government calculates the probability of each possible social 
surplus, based on its knowledge of the probability distribution of the demand parameter, and it 
awards the inventor the average expected social surplus.93  
Under this approach, the prize system will continue to eliminate the deadweight loss.94 It 
will, however, lead to an inefficient amount of research. If the expected value of the social 
surplus for a particular innovation is lower than the actual social surplus, then the innovator will 
invest too little in the project. In such a case, the innovator recognizes that government will 
underestimate demand for the product and thus anticipates a smaller than ideal reward. If, 
however, the expected value of the social surplus is higher than the actual social surplus, then the 
innovator will invest too much in the project. In such a case, the innovator recognizes that 
government will overestimate demand for the product and thus anticipates a higher than ideal 
reward. Recall, however, that a patent regime also fails to optimize investment, producing 
systematically too little of it.95 Thus, while Shavell and van Ypersele conclude as a formal matter 
that either the patent or the prize system may be superior to the other, the informal case for 
reward seems strong. Patent can dominate reward in their model only if the investment 
inefficiency in a prize system is so much greater than the investment inefficiency in a patent 
system that it outweighs the benefit of the prize system in eliminating deadweight loss.96 
                                                 
88 “Under the patent system, there are two sources of welfare loss relative to first-best welfare: insufficient investment in 
research; and insufficient quantity of the innovation product sold, with accompanying deadweight loss, due to monopoly 
pricing.” Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 534. 
89 Shavell and van Ypersele note that this is “contrary to our assumption.” Id. Differently stated, this is the result that would 
obtain if ta = tb. 
90 Id. (“[T]he quantity produced is always optimal, q(t), under the reward system.”). 
91 Id. (“[T]he innovator would then choose k(s*(t)), the first-best investment in research.”). The notation k(s*(t)) means that the 
innovator will invest an amount k corresponding to an anticipated profit of s*(t), the social surplus given demand parameter t, if 
the research successfully leads to an innovation. 
92 Shavell and van Ypersele demonstrate that providing a reward equal to the expected social surplus is optimal. See id. at 534-
35. 
93 The calculus notation for the expected social surplus is ò
b
a
t
t
dttgts .)()(*  Id. at 535. 
94 Id. at 535 (“Under reward, there is no deadweight loss from insufficient production, whereas there is under patent.”). 
95 See supra text accompanying note 88. 
96 Shavell and van Ypersele explain this as follows:  
[I]f the information that government has about demand is sufficiently good, then the reward system will dominate 
patent. Specifically, if the probability mass is sufficiently concentrated about E(s*), it follows . . . that reward will 
dominate patent. This is because the research investment under reward will tend to be superior to (and higher than) that 
under patent and deadweight loss from monopoly pricing will be avoided. 
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 536.  
 PATENT PRIZES 20 
Whether this is so depends on the relative efficiency in producing optimal investment of the 
patent and prize systems, as well as on the relative importance of calibrating research incentives 
and eliminating deadweight loss.97 
Shavell and van Ypersele’s most important insight is that an optional reward program can 
dominate patent. They suggest that the most intuitive way to understand this aspect of their 
model is to compare a relatively simple optional reward program to patent.98 Under this simple 
program, the government calculates the lowest possible social surplus, i.e. the social surplus 
corresponding to the weakest possible demand function in the family of possible demand 
functions, and it offers this social surplus to the innovator in exchange for the patent. If the 
innovator turns down the offer, the optional reward program acts just like the patent regime, so 
the only cases that require analysis are those in which the innovator accepts the offer.99 In these 
cases, deadweight loss is eliminated. Moreover, it must be that the reward is greater than 
monopoly profits would have been; otherwise, the innovator would not have opted for the 
reward. As a result, the amount of investment will be greater than what would have been 
generated by the patent system alone, which always creates too little investment. At the same 
time, the amount of investment will be less than or equal to the socially optimal amount of 
investment, because the reward offered is equal to the lowest possible social surplus. So, this 
relatively simple optional prize system eliminates deadweight loss and moves the amount of 
investment closer (though not all the way) toward the optimal amount, and it therefore must be 
superior to the patent system. 
This simplest optional prize system is not necessarily the best optimal prize system. 
Increasing the reward to an amount somewhat above the lowest possible social surplus will 
induce more innovators to accept the optional reward. An increase in the optional reward will 
make a difference for a particular innovator when the reward offered becomes greater than 
monopoly profits. As long as the reward remains lower than the actual social surplus, then the 
increase in the reward for that innovator was worthwhile. Indeed, it will be worthwhile as long as 
the reward is lower than the sum of the actual social surplus and deadweight loss saved, less any 
loss from more inefficient investment relative to the patent system. Awards offered past this 
point for a particular innovator will result in a social loss, so erring on the high side in general 
will have some benefits (inducing innovators to accept the award where doing so is socially 
beneficial) and some costs (inducing inefficient research by innovators in cases where the reward 
is considerably greater than the amount of monopoly profits). Shavell and van Ypersele show 
how to solve this optimization problem, thus indicating how the government could calculate the 
“optimal optional reward”100 based on the probability distribution of demand functions in a 
particular case.101 The superiority of the simple prize system to the patent system means that the 
optimal optional prize system is a fortiori superior. 
                                                 
97 Id. (“[I]f the need for well-calibrated incentives to invest in research is sufficiently attenuated, then the reward system will 
dominate patent, because the factor of the elimination of deadweight loss from monopoly pricing will be of dominating 
importance.”). 
98 Id. at 539. 
99 Id. (“[T]he patent system is equivalent to an optional reward system with r = p(ta) [lowest possible monopoly profits], because 
then the patent would always be chosen.”). 
100 Id. (concluding that the optimal optional reward system must be superior to the patent system). 
101 Shavell and van Ypersele do not solve for the optimal reward, but they calculate the first derivative of social welfare in an 
optional prize system. Id. at 538. Setting this derivative to 0 and solving for r would produce the optimal reward. The formula for 
the optimal reward would be messy, but a computer program easily could be written to calculate r given variables including the 
family of demand functions and the probability distribution of those functions. 
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Shavell and van Ypersele extend their model to support two additional conclusions. First, 
a mandatory prize system might be superior to the optional prize system, but it might not be.102 
To see why, first consider why a mandatory prize system may be better than an optional one. In 
an optional prize system, some innovators will choose patent rather than reward even though 
reward would be socially optimal. The optimal optional reward will be lower than the 
government’s estimate of social surplus,103 which is what the government would pay in a 
mandatory system, 104 and this estimate in turn may be lower than the actual social surplus. When 
monopoly profits are greater than the optimal optional reward but less than the actual social 
surplus, the innovator would make the socially undesirable choice of patent, and if this would 
occur frequently enough, the mandatory prize system, by forcing the innovator to accept the 
reward, will be superior to an optional prize system. At the same time, we have seen that the 
mandatory prize system could be worse than the patent system. 105 Because the optimal optional 
regime is better than the patent system, in these cases the mandatory prize system would be 
worse than the optimal optional system. 
Second, Shavell and van Ypersele show that the government could improve its 
performance in either the mandatory or optional prize system by basing rewards on the quantity 
of the relevant product sold. That is, after a patent were placed in the public domain, the 
government would wait to determine the quantity of goods sold in the market.106 Observation of 
the quantity of goods is not by itself sufficient to deduce the innovator’s demand curve; it allows 
for specification of one point on the demand curve.107 Nonetheless, this information allows the 
government to improve its estimate of the demand curve, narrowing down the family of demand 
curves that the government might consider in the absence of sales information. This analysis 
recognizes that delay allows the government better to gauge the quality of an innovation (albeit 
without acknowledging what this Article argues may be a more important benefit of delay).108 
Indeed, Shavell and van Ypersele suggest that the government could revise rewards on an annual 
basis, “[a]s events unfold and information flows to the government.”109 Conceivably, the 
                                                 
102 Id. at 539. 
103 Asymmetric information provides an intuitive explanation for this discrepancy. When innovators choose whether to accept 
the reward, some will choose the reward in part because they expect their monopoly profits to be lower than the government 
would have guessed. This phenomenon pushes the optimal optional reward lower than the expected social surplus. The 
optimization of the optional reward in effect takes into account the problem of adverse selection. See infra Part II.C (discussing 
the adverse selection problem). 
104 See supra text accompanying note 93. 
105 See supra text accompanying note 96.  
106 This analysis depends on the assumption that “the government can observe quantity q sold and base rewards on this.” Shavell 
& van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 540. Shavell and van Ypersele do not give any indication of whether they believe government 
in fact would be able to observe the quantity of goods sold, though presumably it could, with some error. 
107 This assumes that the government also would be able to observe price. Shavell and van Ypersele also suggest that the 
government could “estimate demand elasticities, [and] undertake surveys to determine the character and frequency of use of, for 
example, computer software, musical recordings, cinematic and television productions.” Id. at 541-42. Presumably, although a 
government agency trying to estimate demand curves could use such information, it would be more complicated to develop a 
formula or algorithm for determining an award based on such additional variables. Independent of this comment, which does not 
include explanation of how the government would use the relevant data, Shavell and van Ypersele’s model may seem to reflect 
an assumption that the government’s task must be a mechanical one, even if that means that the government must overlook 
relevant information. But see  infra Part III.A (arguing that allowing the government to consider a variety of types of information 
not reducible to a simple formula will not be problematic if innovators have no reason to think that the government will err 
systematically in considering such information).  
108 See infra Part III.B.2 (explaining that delay prevents patent holders from factoring in the predilections of known individual 
decisionmakers). 
109 Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 542. Shavell and van Ypersele argue that the government “could appropriately 
supplement rewards, perhaps on an annual basis.” Id. This statement may reflect an assumption that the government would not be 
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government’s ex post information could be even better than the innovator’s ex ante information, 
in which case a mandatory prize system necessarily would be superior to the patent system in 
Shavell and van Ypersele’s model.110 
The Shavell and van Ypersele proposal provides an elegant execution of economic 
modeling, and it elaborates intuitions about different prize programs. Nonetheless, there are 
several practical problems in using the Shavell and van Ypersele approach to design an actual 
prize system, even apart from problems to be discussed below that are general to all such 
attempts.111 Shavell and van Ypersele acknowledge one caveat, that the “government’s problem 
of determining rewards is made more difficult when the value of an innovation is in part that it 
leads to subsequent innovations.”112 If the government considers only sales data for a particular 
innovation, then it will ignore that a patent holder might have licensed the patent to someone  
who wished to use the innovation in a subsequent innovation. 113 There is a partial solution to this 
problem, if we are able to distinguish the initial innovation from subsequent innovations. The 
patent could be placed into the public domain for the limited purpose of allowing anyone to 
produce the specifically described invention, but the patent holder would retain the right to 
license use of the patent for subsequent innovations. This approach, however, could be 
cumbersome, and it reduces the benefit of placing the patent into the public domain. 
Moreover, the problem is really just an example of a broader problem that Shavell and 
van Ypersele do not acknowledge: that an invention is not the same as a product.114 A single 
product, say a computer, may be based on a variety of patents, including some held by the patent 
holder and some licensed from other patent holders. Similarly, one cannot assess the demand for 
a business method patent simply by assessing the demand for the product that the business 
method produces.115 There may be some markets, such as for pharmaceuticals, in which the 
invention and the product are essentially the same,116 although, as Arti Rai has pointed out in 
critiquing the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal, even in pharmaceutical markets, the existence of 
insurance complicates estimations of consumer surplus.117 When inventions cannot be mapped 
                                                                                                                                                             
able to lower rewards by demanding that innovators give money back. If this assumption were correct, the government’s optimal 
course would be to give initial awards based on pessimistic assessments of demand, with later supplements as the invention 
proved itself. Shavell and van Ypersele do not consider the possibility of having the government make a single reward 
determination well after the initial innovation. 
110 Id. at 542-43. Technically, of course, Shavell and van Ypersele’s model does not allow for the possibility that the government 
has superior information, since the innovator has perfect information about the demand function. See supra note 82. Their 
analytic point holds, though, if the knowledge of the innovator were more realistically specified. 
111 See infra Part II. 
112 Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 543. 
113 Shavell and van Ypersele point out that the reward system may solve some problems associated with other intellectual 
property systems, where “subsequent innovations may be stymied by refusal of holders of property rights to allow 
improvements.” Id. Thus, this benefit may balance or offset any costs of a reward system attributable to the government’s failure 
to account for the value of a patent for subsequent innovations.  
114 Cf. Kieff, supra note 26, at 713 (noting, in critiquing Shavell and van Ypersele, that “existence of market demand . . . does not 
establish that the invention itself would have been patentable”). 
115 Consider, for example, Priceline.com’s controversial patent on its “name your price” reverse auction system for purchasing 
plane tickets and other products. See generally Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., Strategy, Structure and Regulation: 
Telecommunications in the New Economy, 2000 L. RE V. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 253, 271 (discussing the patent). The relevant 
market is not the market for plane tickets, but how much Priceline and its competitors would be willing to pay to license the 
patent if someone else owned it. 
116 Even in these areas, though, the innovative product might be put to a number of different uses over time, as for example the 
government approves a medication for additional uses. Although a doctor can prescribe an FDA-approved drug for any use, a 
manufacturer can promote a drug only for approved uses. See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc. v. Marion Merrell Dow, 
Inc., 93 F.3d 511, 514 n.3 (8th Cir.1996) (noting that doctors may prescribe an approved drug for any use). 
117 See Rai, supra note 26, at 200. Rai explains: 
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one-to-one onto products, determining the demand for any particular invention may be 
extraordinarily difficult. The government would have to consider not only whether other 
companies would be likely to pay to license an invention, but also how much the patent holder 
selling a product based in part on the invention would have paid to license the patent, if the 
patent had been held by someone else.118 In addition, the government might wish to assess the 
value of a patent in extracting settlements and licensing fees for competitors’ products already 
incorporating the patented invention. 119 Importantly, none of this information will become clear 
over time, as the release of a patent into the public domain will prevent any licensing fees or 
settlements from being collected. We can wait to see sales of a particular computer, but that will 
not allow us, even with the most refined equations, to determine any better than initially the 
contribution of one innovation embedded in that computer. 
Shavell and van Ypersele might have defended their proposal against the subsequent 
innovation argument and the broader argument by noting that neither affects their analytic case 
for the optional prize system. If government systematically undervalues patents, by failing to 
take into account the value of a patent with respect to licensing and the like, fewer innovators 
will accept the government’s offers to buy out the patent. The optional prize system will still be 
better than the patent system—not as much better, but Shavell and van Ypersele do not quantify 
the benefits of adopting the system anyway. As long as the government limits itself to examining 
observed demand for the innovation itself, whether that demand is from consumers or other 
producers, the system will still work when the government plugs in the variables it knows. In 
reality, though, this observation may mean that the Shavell-van Ypersele model is useful only, or 
at least mostly, for markets in which the innovation and the product are essentially the same. 
When a sufficiently high percentage of the value of a patent derives from something other than 
sales of a product uniquely associated with the patent, inventors will categorically not accept the 
government’s offers. 
There is a different answer that might be offered in defense of the Shavell-van Ypersele 
approach. The government could make its best effort to take all of these factors into account in 
calculating the social surplus created by an invention. After all, Shavell and van Ypersele never 
suggested that the government knows the demand function, merely that it can estimate the 
probability that each of a number of demand functions is in fact the demand function. Demand 
may be difficult to estimate, but that merely means that there will be a wide variety of possible 
demand functions. The government still can do its best, and optional rewards will still dominate 
patent. When the range of potential demand functions is wide, however, government offers in the 
optional prize system will have to be low to prevent innovators who know that their innovations 
                                                                                                                                                             
[I]n the context of pharmaceuticals, the Shavell/van Ypersele proposal has limitations. As contrasted with other goods, 
individuals do not generally purchase individual pharmaceuticals at the time they need them. Rather, they enroll ex 
ante in insurance plans that cover pharmaceuticals. These plans often do not differentiate their insurance product on the 
basis of the pharmaceutical products they offer. Even when plans do differentiate, it is at best a very rough 
differentiation (e.g., between plans with no drug coverage, plans with a closed formulary, and those with an open 
formulary). 
Id. 
118 One technique used to determine how much a company would pay for its own products is known as transfer pricing, which is 
used for international tax purposes. See generally 1-2 TRANSFER PRICING HANDBOOK (Robert Feinschreiber ed., 2001); Terry 
Thompson, Comment, Canada’s Transfer Pricing Laws: Keeping Pace with an International Trend, 11 TRANSNAT’L LAW. 311, 
314-18 (1998) (providing an overview). 
119 See, e.g.,  BroadVision Settles Suit Against Art Technology, BUS. J., Mar. 3, 2000, at 29 (reporting a settlement resulting in the 
payment of a licensing fee). 
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are relatively useless from cashing in on high offers.120 But the optimal rewards may end up so 
low that no one with a valuable patent would accept them.  
Part of the appeal of the Shavell-van Ypersele model may stem from the observation that 
from the beginning, the government knows a probability distribution of different demand 
functions. We are, however, given no information of how exactly the government calculates this 
probability distribution, and our confidence in relying on their model as a basis for a shift in 
public policy ultimately rests on how good a job we think that the government can do in 
calculating this probability distribution. Stripped of its mathematics, the Shavell-van Ypersele 
model reduces to a simple argument: Providing a reward for a patent eliminates deadweight loss. 
While rewards could improve innovation incentives, there is a risk that rewards that deviate 
substantially from actual social surplus could result in innovation incentives that are too low or 
too high. The case for a mandatory prize system depends on how much of a distortion in 
innovation incentives rewards produce, if any. In principle, though, the government can make 
offers to buy out patents that innovators can accept or reject, setting the offers to a low enough 
level that overall society will benefit more than it will lose from offers that are accepted. The 
government is most likely to be able to make adequate offers in areas in which an innovation and 
a product are essentially the same thing and the government can use sales figures to calculate 
demand. 
That this is a simple argument does not detract from its truth or from Shavell and van 
Ypersele’s achievement in modeling it formally. It does, however, suggest that the benefit of 
Shavell and van Ypersele’s article is not that it produces a formula that the government can use 
to determine rewards. After all, as noted above, Shavell and van Ypersele do not give any 
indication of how to make the initial calculation of possible probability functions. If that is so, 
the additional insight offered by the Shavell-van Ypersele approach over, for example, the Guell 
and Fischbaum proposal is modest. Its main virtue may be in showing that, at least in certain 
markets, well-motivated economists could use relatively standard economic techniques to 
determine how large rewards show be. When they do so, and properly take into account that 
rewards must be lower than social surplus in the optional prize system, 121 an optional prize 
system will be beneficial. When they are particularly good at calculating demand, a mandatory 
prize system will be even better.  
This reduction of the model, however, points out an additiona l problem, probably the 
most significant one, and the problem lies in the words “well-motivated.” If Shavell and van 
Ypersele have shown that economic science provides tools that the government might use to 
determine appropriate rewards, that does not show that government in fact will do a good job of 
using those tools. One concern is that the government officials charged with the task might make 
various errors in calculating demand. Conceivably, a government official might produce a family 
of demand functions that does not even include the actual demand function. If the demand 
functions are all too low, then little harm done—just one more inventor sticking with the patent 
system. 122 But if there are a number of cases in which the demand functions are all systematically 
too high, the prize system could be quite expensive. The Shavell-van Ypersele optimization only 
works if the probability distributions are accurate.123 If the government thinks that a low value is 
                                                 
120 See supra note 103 and accompanying text. 
121 See supra text accompanying notes 103-105. 
122 Shavell and van Ypersele note that “the fear that government would act suboptimally, and give unuly conservative rewards, 
would be less an issue under an optional reward scheme because innovators can always obtain intellectual property rights.” 
Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 544. 
123 Conceivably, the government might recognize that the probability distributions are systematically inaccurate and mandate 
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1% likely when a more competent evaluation would indicate that it is 90% likely, the reward 
program may be problematic. 
The problem, however, is less likely to be the competence of the government employees 
than their motivations. Shavell and van Ypersele’s model produces an image of objective 
bureaucrats doing their best, but this is an image that administrative law and public choice 
scholars have been skeptical of for over fifty years.124 Suppose, for example, that the agency 
were “captured” by industry. 125 It might systematically offer extraordinarily generous buyouts by 
starting with generous estimates of the demand function. Or, we might worry that a particular 
presidential administration would have some agenda that it would advance through a reward 
program. In a mandatory reward regime, we might worry that an administration hostile to 
industry interests would buy out patents at very low prices. Or, we might worry that certain 
industries would do well at the expense of others in a particular administration. The creation of a 
reward regime might in effect allow presidential control over innovation, with research flowing 
chaotically depending on assessments of the agenda of the particular administration or agency 
and shifting abruptly with transitions in power. 
As with my analysis of the Guell-Fischbaum approach, I do not mean to imply that the 
Shavell-van Ypersele approach must be rejected. To some extent, these problems might be 
averted by forcing the agency to rely on proxies in calculating social surplus, for example by 
specifying precise procedures for calculating the family of demand functions. At least, such 
constraints might be possible to devise for some industries. Much work would be needed, 
however, to determine what these proxies should be, and there is no guarantee that Congress 
would create the agency with the appropriate set of constraints, even if academic agreement on 
them could be achieved. Perhaps there are some areas in which concerns about distorted agency 
incentives might be less severe, but again more work would be needed to determine what those 
areas are. In fairness, Shavell and van Ypersele recommend only “serious study of the possibility 
of reward systems,”126 not adoption of a system that they claim to have fully specified. 
Nonetheless, unless one can develop a way of overcoming these problems, the Shavell-van 
Ypersele approach can be considered only a preliminary blueprint. 
C. Kremer’s Market Mechanism 
Michael Kremer’s proposal is similar to Shavell and van Ypersele’s in seeking to identify 
a means of objectively pricing patents so that the government can effect buyouts. Like Shavell 
and van Ypersele, Kremer suggests an opt-in approach rather than a mandatory reward regime. 
The mechanism he suggests, however, could not be more different. Instead of relying on 
government bureaucrats to calculate the optimal patent prize, Kremer suggests use of an 
ingenious market mechanism.127 The mechanism, in simplified form, would work as follows.128 
                                                                                                                                                             
some transformation to convert the economists’ probability estimates into more appropriate estimates, which presumably would 
entail a wider range. It is difficult, however, to determine how systematic errors in probability distributions would be identified or 
corrected. 
124 For an early work alleging that administrative agencies might not act on behalf of an objective view of the public interest, see 
Samuel Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission, the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 467-
70 (1952). 
125 See generally M ERRILL, supra note 22, at 1050-52 (discussing the rise of capture theory). 
126 Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 545. 
127 Kremer’s is but one of a number of recent proposals in a variety of legal fields to supplant existing institutions with 
institutions based on market mechanisms. See Michael Abramowicz, The Law-and-Markets Movement, 49 AM. U. L. REV. 327 
(1999) (describing a number of recent proposals); Mark A. Cohen & Paul H. Rubin, Private Enforcement of Public Policy, 3 
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After a patent holder decides to apply the mechanism, bids for the patent would be solicited at a 
sealed-bid auction, with any private party permitted to bid. The government would then offer to 
purchase the patent at the price determined by the auction. If the patent holder accepts the offer, 
the government would execute a randomization function. With some probability (say, ninety 
percent of the time), the patent would be placed in the public domain. The rest of the time, the 
high bidder would be required to purchase the patent. 
The chief virtue of Kremer’s proposal is that it allows the government to harness private 
information. Private parties will submit bids at the auction because they recognize that there is 
some probability (ten percent) that they will be permitted to purchase the patent. Competitors 
and potential competitors of the innovator may have better information than the government 
about the patent’s value.129 As Kremer recognizes, the use of an auction is valuable not only 
because it gives government officials more information, but also because it constrains their 
discretion. 130 At least in the simplified version above, the governmental role would be minimal, 
limited to overseeing the auction, a task that experience suggests the government is capable of 
performing.131 Even without any investigation at all, the government could rely on private 
parties’ bids, because the private parties will be well incentivized. As in any sealed-bid auction, 
private parties will consider their own interests in bidding. If a private party bids too low, then it 
will not win the auction, making the entire effort a wasted expense; if the private party bids too 
much, then it may end up paying too much for the patent.  
A potential limitation of the market mechanism that Kremer anticipates is that the value 
of a patent may be too low, because the social value of the patent may exceed the private value. 
Indeed, this problem animates Kremer’s proposal, as he reviews a literature “suggest[ing] that 
social returns to innovation far exceed the private returns.”132 Rather than purchase patents at 
their private value, as revealed by the auction, the government could offer to purchase patents at 
the private value times some markup, which Kremer indicates might be between 2.5 and 3.33.133 
                                                                                                                                                             
YALE J. ON REG. 167 (1985) (urging the use of auctions to identify private enforcers of public policy); Jonathan Macey & 
Geoffrey Miller, The Plaintiffs’ Attorney’s Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and 
Recommendations for Reform, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1991) (recommending using auctions in class action and derivative 
litigation); A.C. Pritchard, Auctioning Justice: Legal and Market Mechanisms for Allocating Criminal Appellate Counsel, 34 AM.  
CRIM. L. REV.  1161, 1166-70 (1997) (urging that right to serve as appellate counsel for convicted indigent defendants be 
auctioned off, with the high bidder receiving a contingency fee if successful). 
128 See Kremer, supra note 20, at 1147 & fig.I. 
129 Id. at 1146 (“While the value of potential inventions may be private information of the researcher before research is 
conducted, other firms in the industry are likely to have at least some information on the private value of the invention after 
inventions are patented.”). 
130 Id. at 1138 (“Allowing government officials wide discretion to set payments to inventors ex post may lead to rent-seeking and 
to expropriation of investors after their research costs are sunk.”); see also id. at 1138-39 (“One problem with allowing broad 
administrative discretion over the patent buyout price is that this may lead to purchases at confiscatory prices, and thus reduce 
incentives for innovation.”). 
131 Government frequently holds auctions, for example to sell forfeited property. See, e.g., 21 U.S.C.A. § 881(e)(1)(B) (West 
2001) (providing for disposition of property in a “public sale”); Shanxi's First Public Property Auction, XINHUA ENG. NEWSWIRE , 
Dec. 11, 1997, available at 1997 WL 15760495 (describing a forfeiture auction in China). 
132 Kremer, supra note 20, at 1141 (citing M. ISHAQ NADIRI, INNOVATIONS AND TECHNOLOGICAL SPILLOVERS (Nat’l Bureau of 
Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4423, 1993); M ANUEL TRAJTENBERG , ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PRODUCT INNOVATION: THE 
CASE OF CT SCANNERS (1990); Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907 
(1981)); see also Timothy F. Bresnahan, Measuring the Spillovers from Technical Advance: Mainframe Computers in Financial 
Services, 76 AM. ECON.  REV. 742, 753 (1986); Edwin Mansfield et al., Social and Private Rates of Return from Industrial 
Innovations, 91 Q.J. ECON. 221, 234 (1977). Kremer concludes that social rates of return to research and development are 
generally about 50 percent, in comparison with private rates of return of about 25 percent. In individual circumstances, social 
returns may be much higher. Id.  
133 Id. at 1142. 
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The government would purchase the patent at this high markup even in those cases in which it 
ends up selling the patent to a private party, thus ensuring the inventor the benefit of the markup 
in all cases, whether the patent is randomized to the public domain or not. The existence of this 
markup would provide a strong incentive for inventors to offer their patents to the market 
mechanism rather than retain their patent right and exploit it in the market.  
The markup also helps solve problems associated with the “winner’s curse,”134 which 
refers to the tendency of winners of auctions to find that they have paid too much. First, Kremer 
worries that without the markup, no one would bid. After all, without a markup, if the inventor 
accepts a bid, it is presumably because the bid is higher than the actual value of the patent, which 
the inventor is likely in a better position to know than any of the bidders.135 One solution would 
be to prevent the inventor from rejecting the highest offer, but this solution is not necessary 
given Kremer’s approach. A sufficiently high markup will solve the problem, because with the 
government effectively subsidizing bids, bidders will recognize that an inventor might accept the 
offer even if the high bidder offered less than the patent value.  
Second, the markup could be applied to a bid other than the highest bid to determine what 
the government mus t pay for the patent. The highest bid, after all, might be an outlier, perhaps 
reflecting the one firm that made a severe miscalculation in estimating the value of the patent.136 
The need for this crude system—Kremer recommends a “simple rule” in which the patent holder 
would be offered a “multiple of the third highest bid”137—is less clear than the need for a 
markup. Bidders, after all, have incentives to shave their bids in anticipation of the winner’s 
curse,138 and Kremer in any event would make the highest bidder the winner in cases in which 
the government sells the patent.139 Presumably, the purpose is to save the government from the 
folly of an occasional irrational bidder, but the government is relatively risk-neutral, and there is 
no reason to think that the  highest bids will be systematically too high. The purpose may also be 
to ensure that the patent holder receives a relatively accurate bid. But it is not clear that some 
multiple of the third bid will be more likely to be accurate than the highest bid. 
This last criticism may seem petty, in part because Kremer attaches little importance to 
using the third bid.140 It points, however, to a broader problem. Kremer recognizes, correctly, that 
                                                 
134 See generally Richard H. Thaler, The Winner’s Curse, in THE WINNER'S CURSE: PARADOXES AND ANOMALIES OF ECONOMIC 
LIFE 50 (1992) (characterizing the winner’s curse as an example of irrational market behavior); E.C. Capen et al., Competitive 
Bidding in High-Risk Situations, 23 J. PETROLEUM TECH . 641, 643 (1971) (providing an example of the winner’s curse); Kenneth 
Hendricks & Robert H. Porter, An Empirical Study of an Auction with Asymmetric Information, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 865, 882 
(1988) (assessing the extent to which individuals can learn to overcome the winner’s curse). 
135 Kremer does not conclude that no one would bid, only that “patent owners would never sell their patents” because bids would 
be too low. Kremer, supra note 20, at 1149.  
136 Id. at 1148 & n.8. 
137 Id. at 1148. 
138 See, e.g., Stuart E. Thiel, Some Evidence on the Winner's Curse, 78 AM. ECON. REV. 884, 884-86 (1988) (suggesting that 
bidders on construction contracts overcome the winner’s curse by shaving their bids). 
139 The high bidder would pay the bid of the second-highest bidder. Kremer, supra note 20, at 1147. This is known as a Vickrey 
auction, after Nobel laureate William Vickrey, who developed it. See William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and 
Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8, 20-23 (1961); see also James D. Dana, Jr. & Kathryn E. Spier, Designing a Private 
Industry: Government Auctions with Endogenous Market Structure, 53 J. PUB. ECON. 127, 135 (1994) (discussing this auction 
approach); cf. David Lucking-Reiley, Vickrey Auctions in Practice: From Nineteenth-Century Philately to Twenty-First-Century 
E-Commerce, J. ECON.  PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2000, at 183 (demonstrating that Vickrey auctions were used among stamp 
collectors even before Vickrey was born). In such a second-price, sealed bid auction, each competitor will bid his own valuation 
of the good, without shaving her bid downward in the hope of still winning the auction at a lower price. 
140 Kremer states only that “it might be best for the government” to use such a rule. Kremer, supra note 20, at 1148. In addition, 
Kremer states, “If the government knew the prior distribution of valuations, it would be able to aggregate the information of all 
bidders to estimate the private value of the patent.” Id. at 1147-48. One way to understand the intuition that the government 
should not simply average all bids in determining its offer to the inventor is to focus on very low bids. Someone may bid $1 on 
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the highest bid in an auction may not represent the proper valuation of a patent. But the 
development of an algorithm to determine the appropriate valuation is difficult, and merely using 
the third-highest bid is hardly a perfect solution. The problem is more severe, the less 
competitive the auction. If there are only three bidders on a patent, the third-highest bid will in 
fact be the low bid. It is certainly plausible that some auctions would generate very few bidders, 
for two reasons. First, there may be only a small number of firms ideally positioned to exploit the 
patent. Second, the high cost of investigation of a patent’s prospects to determine what to bid 
will discourage some bidders. In all auctions, bidders risk that their investigation costs will buy 
them nothing, as someone else emerges the high bidder. The problem is more severe here, given 
that the government often places patents in the public domain instead of selling to the high 
bidder. 
Imprecision, of course, is not fatal to Kremer’s market scheme; even with a very small 
number of bidders, as long as the bidders have sufficiently strong incentives to bid accurately, 
we may still have more confidence in private bids than in government assessments. An 
additional concern, to which Kremer devotes considerable attention, 141 is the problem of 
collusion. A seller of a patent would have an incentive to bribe potential bidders to enter high 
bids. Suppose, for example, that Company A auctions off a patent that in fact is worthless. 
Company A might promise to pay Company B $200,000 to bid $1,000,000 for the patent. As 
long as the probability that the randomization function leads to a purchase is sufficiently less 
than 20% to overcome any risk aversion by Company B, Company B should accept the offer. If, 
for example, the probability that the private bid will be accepted is 10%, Company B’s expected 
payment for the worthless patent will be $100,000, and so its average profit from the transaction 
will be $100,000. The deal also benefits A, which will receive $1,000,000 90% of the time for a 
cost of just $200,000. Similar bribes, of course, might be possible with valuable patents to make 
them even more valuable. Once the government ignores the private bidding some percentage of 
the time, there will be opportunities for mutual gains from trade between patent owners and 
bidders. 
Kremer offers several possible solutions to the collusion problem. 142 First, reliance on the 
third-highest bid, as described above, would make collusion more difficult by forcing a company 
to bribe three different bidders.143 This provides a better argument for the third-highest-bid 
approach than Kremer offered earlier, but it may not be foolproof. If the three bidders 
cooperated, after all, relatively small bribes would be needed for the second and third bidders, 
since they would recognize that they would never have to pay for the patent. Second, the agency 
might respond to suspicions of overbidding by skipping the randomization function and forcing 
the high bidder to purchase the patent.144 The problem, of course, is that the agency would need 
                                                                                                                                                             
the off chance that no one else will bid, yet this $1 bid conveys very little information. More generally, some bidders may do less 
research than other bidders and correspondingly shave their bids by a greater amount than those other bidders because of the 
winner’s curse. These low bids also convey relatively little information. 
141 Id. at 1157-62. 
142 For a different solution to collusion problems with market mechanisms, see Abramowicz, supra note 127, at 390-93. 
143Kremer, supra note 20, at 1158 (“The original patent holder would therefore have to bribe three companies instead of one to 
ensure a substantial increase in the buyout price.”). 
144 Id. Kremer also suggests that the agency should reduce the markup when it detects collusion. This would presumably require 
a costly hearing, as patent holders would argue that they had not in fact bribed bidders. While the decision to accept the high bid 
should be neutral to a patent holder and a bidder that have not overbid, lowering the markup or eliminating the patent holder’s 
ability to decline to sell the patent is essentially a penalty. At the least, the government would have to provide adequate 
predeprivation protections to prevent such penalties from being applied inappropriately. See generally Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 
U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (providing a three-part test for determining whether a governmental procedure violates the due process of 
law). 
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to be able to identify suspicious activity, and false positives would reduce the effectiveness of the 
regime by reducing the number of patents ultimately placed into the public domain. Third, “[t]he 
government could develop lists of suspect bidders by checking whether winning bidders made 
money, since systematic overbidders would incur big losses.”145 Once again, this is perhaps a 
sound approach, but a costly, time-consuming, and imperfect one. 
Kremer’s most developed proposal for combating collusion recommends the adoption of 
“ceiling prices.”146 Such prices would represent the maximum that could be paid for a patent and 
would be determined in several complementary ways. First, “[a] waiting period of several years 
could be required before patents were bought by the government, and ceiling prices could be set 
as a multiple of annual revenues prior to the patent buyout.”147 Second, “patents could be capped 
by total sales of the drug following the patent buyout, times an administrative estimate of the 
social value of the drug per dose or per patient.”148 Interestingly, these rules make Kremer’s 
proposal closer to Shavell and van Ypersele’s, with the attendant strengths and limitations of that 
approach. The government would monitor sales, both before and after the patent buyout, while at 
the same time using some method to extrapolate to the social value of the drug. The proposals, of 
course, are not identical. Shavell and van Ypersele would use such data to calculate a relatively 
low offer for the patent holder,149 while Kremer would use sales data as a cap on market price. 
Nonetheless, the more government must make discretionary decisions, the less attractive 
Kremer’s market mechanism becomes.  
Perhaps the government could be successful in combating explicit collusion, either 
through one of Kremer’s approaches or through some other approach, such as rigorous criminal 
enforcement of a ban on such collusion and bounties for private parties who expose collusive 
behavior.150 Nonetheless, even if the government can eliminate all explicit collusion between 
patent holders and bidders, it still might face the problem of implicit collusion. 151 Consider two 
drug companies. One company might offer a large bid for the other company’s patent in the hope 
that the other company will reciprocate, and if the companies are repeat players, they might start 
offering generous bids on each other’s patents without even communicating directly with each 
other.152 Again, the government might be successful in identifying such behavior, but it would be 
                                                 
145 Kremer, supra note 20, at 1158. 
146 Id. at 1159-62. 
147 Id. at 1159. 
148 Id. at 1160. Kremer also offers a third, slightly more elaborate proposal. Id. at 1160-61. Under this proposal, inventors would 
be paid only if the randomization function led the patent to be sold to the high bidder. In this case, the inventor would receive an 
amount equal to the monopoly profits earned by the high bidder, multiplied by the inverse of the probability that the patent would 
be sold to the high bidder. This proposal has two limitations. First, there would be a substantial risk that the patent holder would 
receive nothing. Presumably, a patent holder might try to insure against this risk, but the insurance could be expensive. Second, 
and more significantly, there would still be an incentive to manipulate the system ex post. Kremer notes that one might do so by 
“bribing the high bidder to boost sales artificially through tie-ins with other products.” Id. at 1161. More generally, any 
falsification of sales figures would be profitable. Alternatively, the original patent holder might just buy lots of the product (or 
pay third parties to do so), especially if the probability of the patent being randomized to the high bidder is sufficiently low (and 
thus the inverse sufficiently high). Once again, the government could try to protect against these schemes, but it may not do so 
successfully. 
149 See supra text accompanying notes 103-105. 
150 For a related proposal in the antitrust context, see William E. Kovacic, Antitrust Policy and Horizontal Collusion in the 21st 
Century, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 97 (1997). 
151 Implicit, or tacit, collusion presents a substantial challenge to antitrust lawyers. See generally Michael Freed et al., The 
Detection and Punishment of Tacit Collusion, 9 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 151 (1997) (reporting a conference on the problem of 
implicit collusion). 
152 The challenge is for the parties to solve the prisoners’ dilemma, as each of the two companies would benefit most by having 
the other company help it without itself providing help to the other company. See generally DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ET AL., GAME 
THEORY AND THE LAW 31-35 (1994) (providing an introduction to the prisoners’ dilemma). Here, the prisoners’ dilemma would 
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especially difficult to police on the margins, where the companies’ bids are high but not absurdly 
so. The government might combat collusion, either implicit or explicit, by reducing markup 
prices accordingly, 153 but this is a crude solution that will lead some markups to be too high and 
some markups to be too low.  
Kremer does not recognize the possibility of this form of implicit collusion, but he does 
recognize another form. A company might make a routine practice of buying back its patents 
from the high bidders at a generous price. This would work only for a frequent player, especially 
if relatively few patents are randomized to the high bidder rather than to the public domain. A 
company that acquires such a reputation, however, would receive high benefits and thus benefit 
in all the cases in which the patent is randomized to the public domain. Kremer’s solution is that 
“inventors would be prohibited from buying back the patent from the winning bidder.”154 The 
government might be able to enforce this successfully, but it does have costs. As Kremer 
recognizes elsewhere in his article, the original patent holder may be the lowest-cost producer,155 
so the proposal would mean that when patents are randomized to the high bidder, it will be 
owned not just by a monopolist but by an inefficient monopolist. The cost of such inefficiency 
might be reduced by lowering the probability that the patent is randomized to the high bidder, 
but this will decrease the number of bidders and increase the risk of collusion. 
Collusion is not the only potential problem for Kremer’s system. Just as Shavell and van 
Ypersele’s model worked best when each innovation corresponded to a single product,156 so too 
Kremer’s proposal works most smoothly when the sales of each invention are independent of the 
sales of all other innovations. When one product is a substitute or a complement of another, 
incentives will be distorted. As an example of the complication that arises from substitutes,157 
Kremer explains that “people would bid less for the patent on Prozac if they expected that the 
patent on Zoloft would be put in the public domain.”158 After all, if the Prozac patent is 
randomized to a bidder rather than the public domain, but the Zoloft patent is randomized to the 
public domain, then Prozac will not be worth as much as it would have been if bidders believed 
that the Zoloft patent were also a monopoly product. If Prozac and Zoloft are perfect substitutes 
and can be manufactured for zero marginal cost, then the value of each in the auction will be 
discounted by the probability that the other will be placed in the public domain. Thus, if there 
were a 90% chance that both Prozac and Zoloft will be placed in the public domain by the 
market mechanism, then each would fetch only 10% as much as if the other drug did not exist. 
Complementary products present the opposite problem. Suppose that a new drug cocktail 
for a disease consists of two independently patented drugs, Drug A and Drug B, which again can 
be produced for zero marginal costs. A and B are perfect complements,159 so that a pill of A is 
                                                                                                                                                             
occur over multiple rounds, making it potentially tractable. See David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely 
Repeated Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY  245 (1982) (providing a model leading to cooperation in finite-period 
prisoners’ dilemmas).  
153 See Kremer, supra note 20, at 1162 (“For example, if the optimal markup was three (as seems plausible), and if collusion 
were thought to raise prices by up to 50 percent, then the government could simply offer a markup of two.”). 
154 Id. at 1159. 
155 Id. at 1150-52. 
156 See supra text accompanying notes 115-119. 
157 Economists define products as substitutes if they are “related such that an increase in the price of one will increase the 
demand for the other or a decrease in the price of one will decrease the demand for the other.” EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 
42, at G-20. 
158 Kremer, supra note 20, at 1154. 
159 Complements are “[p]roducts that are related such that an increase in the price of one will decrease the demand for the other 
or a decrease in the price of one will increase the demand for the other.” EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 42, at G-4. 
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worthless without a pill of B and vice-versa. If these complements are auctioned independently, 
the private bids for the two independently will be greater than the value of the two together. A 
bidder for the A patent will reason, using the same probability for randomization as before, that 
there is a 90% chance that B will be placed in the public domain. Thus, if A is randomized to a 
bidder, there is a 90% chance that the owner will be able to extract the full monopoly profits for 
the combined cocktail. There is just a 10% chance that the owner will have to enter into some 
arrangement with the new owner of the B patent and thus receive only about half of the 
monopoly profits.160 Thus, the bidder on patent A, if risk-neutral, will bid 95% of the value of the 
monopoly profits of the two drugs combined. Using precisely the same reasoning, the bidder on 
patent B will do the same. If both are randomized to the public domain, the government will pay 
1.9 times monopoly profits, even before the markup. And the problem, of course, will be more 
severe with a three-drug cocktail. 
Kremer offers a neat solution to the substitute and complement problems, but the solution 
is an imperfect one. The trick is to jointly randomize groups of such patents,161 so that either all 
or placed in the public domain or all are randomized to private bidders. Doing this would solve 
the problem, since the distortions above arise only when one innovation is placed in the public 
domain while the other is not. The difficulty is that the government must identify substitutes and 
complements. Substitutes are easier,162 since holders of substitute patents would have every 
incentive to present their patents for joint randomization, and, as Kremer points out, joint 
randomization of patents that are not really substitutes would do no harm.163 The challenge, 
however, would be greater for complementary patents, since companies would have no incentive 
                                                 
160 Kremer gives a similar example, though in his example, the patents are auctioned at different times: 
[C]onsider an example in which two complementary inventions each have private value 0.1p individually but have 
value p together, and suppose that the social value of the patents alone or together is twice their private value. If one 
patent is put in the public domain, then the reward for invention of the other patent will be 0.9p times the markup. This 
implies that under separate patent buyouts the developers of each patent can expect to receive approximately 0.9p 
times the markup, since bidders for the first patent will anticipate that the second patent is likely to be put in the public 
domain and by the time the second patent has been invented, the first patent will probably be in the public domain. 
This will create excessive incentives for creation of the pair of inventions, since the social value of the pair is only 2p. 
Kremer, supra note 20, at 1156. 
161 See id. at 1154-55 (proposing joint randomization for substitute patents); id. at 1155-57 (proposing joint randomization for 
complementary patents). 
162 Professor Rai, however, notes, that in the pharmaceutical market, “[g]iven the pervasiveness of me-too pharmaceuticals . . . 
Kremer’s proposed regime would effectively result in mandatory buyouts for many innovator patents.” Rai, supra note 26, at 
201. 
163 There is, however, a problem that Kremer does not recognize. Kremer explains: 
Note that joint randomization does not require a bureaucracy to judge whether goods are substitutes. Any patent holder 
could claim that his or her patent was a substitute for a new patent, and request that it be jointly randomized with the 
new patent. Even if the new patent was not in fact a substitute for the old patent, jointly randomizing the old patent 
together with an unrelated new patent would create no harm and would have the advantage of possibly transferring 
another patent to the public domain. 
Id. at 1155. The problem is that once a patent is randomized to a bidder, the bidder should not be able to place the patent through 
the system again. The reason is that bidders in the initial auction would anticipate being able to place the patent back up for 
auction and receive the markup. Suppose, for example, that the monopoly profits for an innovation will be $1,000,000 and the 
markup is two. In Kremer’s system, if the patent if randomized to the high bidder, then the high bidder will pay the amount of the 
second highest bid and receive the patent; the original patent owner, meanwhile, will receive the benefit of the markup. But if the 
high bidder could then reauction the patent and receive the markup, then the initial bid would be around $2,000,000 rather than 
$1,000,000. Indeed, it would be higher, since the bidder would anticipate that the bidder in the next round would anticipate being 
able to reauction the patent, and so on ad infinitum. Happily, the problem is not a fatal one. The solution is simply to eliminate 
the markup for patents that are reauctioned. As this example reveals, however, the Kremer system cannot be relied on to place 
virtually all patents in the public domain, since the patents that are randomized to bidders will likely stay with bidders, rather than 
being repeatedly auctioned until being placed in the public domain. The example also shows that it may be difficult to anticipate 
all possible ways that a particular approach might be exploited. 
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to come forward.164 Kremer suggests that the government would be able to identify “very strong 
complements,”165 but the approach would require bureaucrats at least to recognize that a patent 
might be complementary to another,166 and the method might not work for weaker complements.  
The market mechanism’s susceptibility to gaming, either through collusion or in the case 
of complementary patents, does not necessarily rule it out as a useful method for valuing patents. 
It is especially useful when other methods for valuing patents, such as those described in the 
preceding sections, would be ineffective. For example, when a patent holder would obtain value 
from the patent primarily by licensing it to other companies that would incorporate the patent 
into their own inventions, the market mechanism provides a useful means of obtaining an 
objective valuation. Nonetheless, the mechanism does not eliminate the need for human 
supervision, either in the form of a bureaucracy or through some sort of litigation, to identify 
instances in which gaming of the system might lead to inaccurate results. At the same time, the 
mechanism will be less useful when it is imperative to transfer a particular patent to the public 
domain with complete certainty, or when the existence of complementary patents complicates 
the valuation process. 
D. Lichtman’s Coupon Scheme 
Perhaps the most startling article in the recent literature is Douglas Lichtman’s Pricing 
Prozac.167 Lichtman’s proposal differs from those of the other three authors in that he does not 
suggest buying out patents. Indeed, Lichtman’s article begins by discussing Kremer’s proposal, 
and while complimentary of it,168 Lichtman suggests that deadweight loss might be eliminated far 
more cheaply.169 Under Kremer’s proposal and the others discussed so far, the government would 
buy out the patent, thus paying in an opt- in regime at least the monopoly profits that the patent 
holder would have expected to receive. Lichtman argues that a full buyout is not necessary to 
eliminate deadweight loss. Instead, Lichtman suggests that the government subsidize the 
purchase of patented products such as pharmaceuticals. In essence, the government would give 
discount coupons to the consumers who would be willing to pay more than marginal cost for the 
drugs but would not be willing to pay the monopoly price. Astonishingly, Lichtman 
demonstrates that, under certain assumptions, a well-executed program might cost only one-
eighth as much as a patent buyout.170  
                                                 
164 Indeed, a company would seek to market different components of the same product separately if multiple patents could be 
obtained. See id.  (“It would also create an incentive for inventors to divide up inventions into multiple complementary patents.”).  
165 Id. at 1157. 
166 Kremer explains that “[i]f a set of patents are complements, the sum of the bids for subsets will be less than the bids for the 
entire set.” Id. The government thus must have sufficient suspicions of complementarity to allow bidding on a set of patents in 
addition to bidding on the individual members of the group. If patents are being auctioned at the same time, the government 
might allow bidders to bid on any combination of patents, resulting in joint randomization if the bid on whatever combination a 
bidder chooses is higher than the highest bids for the patents individually. This market solution, however, will not work, at least 
without substantial elaboration, when patents are auctioned at different times, which inventors of complementary patents 
accordingly would have an incentive to do. 
167 See Lichtman, supra note 21. 
168 See id. at 124 (“The proposal has much to recommend it. Unlike more conventional approaches, Kremer’s suggestion 
balances the twin goals of encouraging private research and increasing the availability of new pharmaceuticals.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
169 For Lichtman, the purpose of limiting the government’s expense is to limit the deadweight loss associated with the 
distortionary effects of taxation. See id. at 124, 136; infra Part II.D.1 (discussing the distortionary effects of taxation). 
170 Id. at 135. 
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This demonstration is a tour de force, and before arguing that patent buyouts nonetheless 
might be superior to coupon schemes in some circumstances, I will trace Lichtman’s argument. 
First, however, it may be worthwhile identifying a principle that provides an intuitive basis for 
why a coupon scheme can eliminate deadweight loss. It is a familiar concept from introductory 
microeconomics courses that there will be no deadweight loss from a monopoly if the 
monopolist can perfectly price discriminate.171 A monopolist who does this charges each 
consumer who values the product at more than its marginal cost the maximum that this consumer 
will pay for the product. Even the consumer who values the product at just one cent above 
marginal cost is worth selling to if the sale does not affect the price paid by the other consumers. 
Perfect price discrimination eliminates consumer surplus, but it eliminates deadweight loss 
too.172 
Just as a monopolist that can perfectly price discriminate eliminates deadweight loss, so 
too might the government use coupons to eliminate deadweight loss even if a monopolist charges 
the same price to everyone. Some consumers, of course, will be willing to purchase the product 
at the monopoly price, but some will not. For consumers that place some value on the product 
but not so much as to buy it at the monopoly price, a coupon can make the difference. For 
example, if the price of a drug is $5 and a consumer values it at $4, then the consumer will be 
willing to purchase the drug with a $1 coupon. If the government can give each consumer who 
values the drug at between marginal cost and the monopoly price just the right size coupon, then 
the government will have eliminated deadweight loss. Moreover, it will do so relatively cheaply. 
A buyout would require the government in effect to spend the full $5 to provide the consumer in 
the example above. “Give him just one dollar,” Lichtman explains, “and you will, in effect, be 
increasing the producer’s revenue by five dollars.”173 
The government’s ability to do this is contingent on its ability to determine the size of 
coupons that individual consumers should receive. Moreover, Kremer argues in a footnote 
rejoinder to Lichtman, 174 the government must have better information than the monopolist. 
After all, if the monopolist knew how much each consumer valued the product, it presumably 
would be perfectly price discriminating itself, saving the government the trouble. Lichtman 
anticipates this argument in two ways. First, he suggests in a footnote that the government might 
be better positioned to give coupons than a monopolist would be to price discriminate. “Clues 
that are available to the government (tax returns, voluntary disclosures made for the purpose of 
qualifying for health and welfare programs, etc.) are, for good reason, not available more 
broadly.”175 In addition, “even where price discrimination is practical, such behavior is sharply 
restricted under both antitrust and patent misuse doctrine.”176 Second, Lichtman falls back on the 
                                                 
171 See, e.g., NICHOLSON, supra note 87, at 574. 
172 In addition, because the monopolist will capture the full social benefit of the invention, the monopolist has the proper 
incentive to invest the appropriate amount in an innovation. See supra note 88 and accompanying text. But see infra text 
accompanying notes 272-275 (arguing that patents might promote excessive incentives to innovate). 
173 Lichtman, supra note 21, at 125. 
174 Kremer, supra note 20, at 1139 n.1 (stating that targeting subsidies “requires that the government have lots of information”). 
Kremer is able to respond to Lichtman because Lichtman’s article was a response to an early version of Kremer’s. See M ICHAEL 
KREMER, PATENT BUY-OUTS: A MECHANISM FOR ENCOURAGING INNOVATION (Nat’l Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper No. 
6304, 1997). 
175 Lichtman, supra note 21, at 133 n.133. 
176 Id. But see Kieff, supra note 26, at 727-32 (arguing that patent holders often reduce deadweight loss through price 
discrimination). Lichtman’s allusion to antitrust is presumably a reference to the Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1994), 
which makes it “unlawful for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different purchasers of 
commodities of like grade and quality.” Enforcement of the Act, however, has long been on the decline, in part because of the 
recognition that price discrimination may promote efficiency. See Rudolph J. Peritz, The Predicament of Antitrust Jurisprudence: 
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conclusion that a well-executed scheme would cost only one-eighth as much as a patent buyout. 
“[S]o long as one in every eight dollars is placed in the hands of an appropriate consumer, the 
consumer subsidy scheme will be the most effective option.”177 
The first of Lichtman’s claims is difficult to assess without a detailed empirical analysis. 
On the one hand, government might have access to some data that a company either does not 
have access to or cannot take advantage of, but it is also true that the company may be able to 
price discriminate in ways that the government cannot. This observation, however, does not 
undercut Lichtman’s proposal. A company’s price discrimination and the government’s 
distribution of coupons can be complementary, with the first eliminating some deadweight loss 
and the second eliminating some more or perhaps even all deadweight loss. Indeed, the existence 
of some price discrimination by patent holders strengthens Lichtman’s argument by leaving the 
government with less to do on its own. Suppose a company can effect perfect price 
discrimination with a representative half of its consumers and cannot price discriminate at all 
with the other consumers. Then, a well-executed scheme to eliminate deadweight loss should 
cost only half as much as before, or one-sixteenth as much as the cost of a patent buyout if the 
government has perfect information about consumers’ price preferences. And even if the 
government does not have perfect information, Lichtman’s logic suggests that as long as one of 
every sixteen dollars is placed in the hands of a consumer who needs it, the scheme will be as 
cheap as a patent buyout. 
Surely Lichtman is right that a one-in-eight “ratio seems exceedingly achievable” for 
pharmaceuticals,178 and a one- in-sixteen ratio even more so. Thus, the strength of Lichtman’s 
proposal ultimately depends on his second fallback argument. Lichtman is indeed correct under 
his stated assumptions that if the government has perfect information, then, ignoring 
administrative costs,179 a coupon scheme will be one-eighth the price as a buyout scheme. I will 
argue, however, against his intuitively appealing inference that the coupon scheme must be 
judged as successful as a buyout scheme if only one in eight dollars is placed in the proper 
hands. This inference would be correct if the incorrectly allocated dollars are used on other 
products altogether—groceries or movie tickets, say. Such misuse, though, is presumably easy to 
prevent with coupons.180 But it is not correct if the government awards coupons to people who 
will use them to purchase the drugs but who are not the people who would have received the 
coupons had the government executed the scheme perfectly. When someone who would 
purchase the product anyway receives a coupon, Lichtman’s conclusion is incorrect. To justify 
                                                                                                                                                             
Economics and the Monopolization of Price Discrimination Argument, 1984 DUKE L.J. 1205, 1210-11; see also Brookes Group 
Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 229-30 (1993) (requiring proof of generalized injury to competition 
in certain types of price discrimination cases). It is true, meanwhile, that some courts have found patent misuse based on price 
discrimination even in the absence of a finding of an antitrust violation. See, e.g., Motorola, Inc. v. Kimball Int’l, Inc., 601 F. 
Supp. 62, 65 (N.D. Ill. 1984). The Federal Circuit, however, sharply limited the doctrine of patent misuse in Mallinckrodt, Inc. v. 
Medipart, Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 708 (Fed. Cir. 1992), by holding that use restrictions beyond the scope of a patent grant would be 
evaluated under antitrust law’s rule-of-reason analysis. 
177 Lichtman, supra note 21, at 136. 
178 Id. at 136. 
179 See infra Part II.D.2. 
180 In defending the proposition that the “opportunity for abuse is small,” Lichtman argues that “[t]his would be especially true if 
subsidies were ultimately implemented in a very precise manner – a $5 non-transferable coupon given to consumer A, usable only 
toward this month’s purchase of Prozac.” Lichtman, supra note 21, at 136. I agree that we probably need not worry too much 
about the possibility that A will get around this limitation by, say, falsifying a receipt for Prozac. A greater concern might be that 
A would sell the receipt to someone who does not need it or that pharmacies might facilitate fraud, similar to problems that exist 
currently with food stamps. Cf. FOOD & CONSUMER SERV., U.S. DEPT. OF AGRIC., THE EXTENT OF TRAFFICKING IN THE FOOD 
STAMP PROGRAM (1995) (discussing the black market in the food stamp program). I will assume, however, that even this type of 
abuse could be addressed. 
 PATENT PRIZES 35 
Figure 2. The coupon alternative to patent buyouts 
As in Figure 1, a profit-maximizing patent holder will choose the monopoly price Pm and quantity Qm in the 
absence of a buyout program or coupon scheme. Because marginal cost is assumed to be zero, the 
shaded area in the left panel represents the patent holder’s profits. This is the minimum amount that the 
government would have to pay the patent holder to buy out the patent and leave the patent holder just as 
well off as with the patent system. In the absence of a buyout, the patent holder could make equal profits 
by selling at half the monopoly price to twice the number of consumers. The point representing this 
combination, however, is above the demand curve, because the lowest-valuing quarter of consumers do 
not value the patent at even this much. By providing just a large enough coupon to each of these 
consumers, the government in effect fleshes out the demand curve. The shaded area in the right panel is 
the cost of this program, and is one-eighth the size of the shaded area in the left panel. 
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this fully, I will need to fill in more of Lichtman’s argument and explain just how Lichtman 
calculates the one-eighth figure.  
To understand Lichtman’s calculation, consider Figure 2, which includes two panels 
nearly identical to figures in Lichtman’s article.181 Both panels assume a linear demand function 
and zero marginal cost of production. 182 Under these circumstances, a monopolist who can set 
only a single price will sell to half of all consumers who assign some value to the product,183 
because doing so maximizes monopoly profits, the shaded area in the left panel. Such a 
                                                 
181 See Lichtman, supra note 21, at 131 fig.1, 135 fig.4. 
182 Id. at 130. 
183 Id. at 132 n.21 (“When facing linear demand and zero marginal cost, a monopolist maximizes profit by selling to exactly half 
the consumers.”) (citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, ECONOMICS 583 (13th ed. 1989)). Lichtman’s figures, 
unfortunately, are not drawn to scale, making it appear that the monopolist would be selling to more than half of consumers. I 
have tried to correct this problem in the diagram above. 
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monopolist would be equally well off if it could sell its product to all the consumers at half the 
monopoly price, as indicated in the right panel. The problem, of course, is that this point is above 
the demand curve. In the absence of government intervention, at that price, only three-quarters of 
consumers would buy the product.184 
The government’s task then is simply to give coupons to the remaining quarter of 
consumers (which is equal to half the number of consumers that would be served by the 
monopolist). Moreover, the government does not have to give a full coupon, equal to half the 
monopoly price, to every one of these consumers. If the government has perfect information, 
then it can give some consumers just a penny coupon, so that the average coupon needed 
amounts to just one-half of one-half of the monopoly price. Paying an average of one-fourth of 
the monopoly price to one-half the number of consumers who would be served by a monopolist 
is equivalent to paying one-eighth of monopoly profits. Indeed, the subsidy triangle in the right-
hand panel is one-eighth the size of the producer’s surplus box in the left hand panel. Voilà! 
Lichtman’s reasoning on this point is sound, original, and important. To assess the 
limitations on this observation, however, begin by considering what the monopolist would do if 
the government were able to effect its perfect coupon scheme. Assuming with Lichtman that the 
monopolist must set a single price, the monopolist should be indifferent between selling at the 
monopoly price and selling at the lower price that, with the coupons, will produce an identical 
profit. Thus, even if the government issues the coupons to the proper consumer, the monopolist 
could still choose the monopoly price. Presumably, the monopolist would not do so for 
reputational reasons, though the monopolist might if the government is not able to give all of the 
last quarter of consumers coupons. As soon as a single consumer who needs a coupon does not 
receive one, the monopolist will be better off selling at the monopoly price.  
The example, however, reveals two things. First, the government cannot ensure 
cooperation from monopolists in pricing their drugs if they fail to execute the coupon scheme 
perfectly. Second, it is important for the government to ensure that all consumers who should 
qualify for coupons do in fact receive such coupons. In the absence of perfect information, 
however, a government intent on accomplishing this is likely to give coupons to some people 
who should not receive the coupons, and indeed it may become necessary to give coupons to all 
consumers. This in turn will lead monopolists not to cooperate in pricing. When relatively high-
valuing consumers receive coupons, the monopolist is less likely to set the price to the lower 
value. Indeed, giving coupons to consumers who would have purchased the drug anyway may 
lead the monopolist to raise the price.  
To see why the monopolist might raise its price in response to the award of coupons, 
consider the case in which the government gives all consumers of a particular drug a full coupon, 
that is the amount that would be needed to induce the consumer who  least values the drug (but 
still values it more than zero, the marginal cost) to purchase it in a perfectly executed subsidy 
scheme. This is, of course, the only way that the monopolist can ensure that all of the consumers 
in the last quartile receive coupons. The government’s generosity effectively shifts out the 
demand curve, as illustrated in Figure 3. A profit-maximizing monopolist will respond by raising 
the price and, even with the shifted out demand curve, serving only a few more consumers than 
before. The monopoly profits will be greater than previously, but the government will not have 
accomplished its aim. Many consumers still will not use their coupons because the coupon is 
                                                 
184 This follows from the assumption of linear demand. If at the monopoly price half of all consumers would buy the product, and 
all of the consumers would take the product if it were free, then at half the monopoly price, three-quarters of consumers will buy 
the product. 
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insufficient to allow them to meet the higher price, and the deadweight loss will be reduced only 
somewhat.  
Figure 3. The effect of a universal coupon scheme 
Providing coupons to all consumers shifts out the demand curve from the patent holder’s perspective. 
The patent holder will respond by serving 25% more consumers at a price 25% higher than in the 
monopoly case. The deadweight loss triangle, shaded in both panels, is reduced from half the monopoly 
profits in the standard monopoly case to 9/32, a reduction of just 43%. 
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This example shows the fallacy in Lichtman’s inference that the government can 
misspend seven dollars for every dollar it spends correctly and still achieve the same benefit that 
a patent buyout program would bring. Here, the government misspends seven dollars for every 
dollar that it spends correctly (including the excess from granting full rather than partial coupons 
to the lowest-valuing quarter of consumers), and much of the benefit of the program is lost. This 
is not a fatal flaw, 185 as the government might award coupons only to those consumers it believes 
to be in the bottom quartile and compensate by paying the monopolist a bonus for every coupon 
cashed. Thus, the government might pay the company $2 for a coupon worth $1 to induce the 
                                                 
185 The observation does, however, problematize Lichtman’s argument, in an appendix, that the government might choose “to 
pursue a mixed strategy, allowing some of the deadweight loss to remain but eliminating the remainder by means of a consumer 
subsidy.” Lichtman, supra note 21, at 138. A government pursuing such a mixed strategy would result in a profit-maximizing 
monopolist pricing at the monopoly price, unless the government adopted t he approach suggested above. 
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company to price its product at the low level where coupons will make an impact. As long as the 
government gives low-valuing consumers coupons with sufficient producer bonuses to make up 
dollar for dollar revenue lost from low-valuing consumers who do not receive the coupons, the 
patent holder will choose the lower price rather than the monopoly price. 
Similarly, the government could increase the redemption value of just some coupons, 
those that will go to consumers that the government is most confident are in the last quarter of 
consumers. To what extent must the government increase the producer’s redemption value of 
such coupons to make up for relatively high-valuing consumers who mistakenly receive 
coupons? The theoretical analysis is complex. Giving a coupon to a consumer will have no effect 
on the monopoly price if the amount that the patent holder would have to raise the price to 
increase its revenues from this consumer is less than the amount that the patent holder would lose 
from decreased output.186 On the other hand, giving a coupon to some consumers may require the 
government to make up for this coupon more than dollar-for-dollar.187 A further complication is 
that the amount that the government must make up for giving one coupon erroneously may 
depend on to whom else the government has erroneously awarded coupons. This makes it 
difficult to develop a simple formula for how much the government will have to make up in 
coupon bonuses for the producer to compensate for imperfections in the government’s 
calculations. 
To produce at least tentative calculations, I designed and executed a computerized 
simulation. The simulation featured 5000 consumers whose valuations ranged linearly from $0 
up to $1.00. The simulated government was able to estimate the maximum amount that each 
consumer would pay for the product with some error. The simulation calculated the 
government’s estimates by adding to each consumer a stochastic error term with a specified 
variance. For every consumer that the government estimated would be willing to pay less than 
$0.25—that is, for consumers that appeared to the government to be in the bottom quartile—the 
government granted a coupon equal to the amount that the government estimated would be 
necessary to induce the consumer to purchase the product at $0.25.188 (Recall that $0.25 would be 
the price at which the government would seek to induce pricing in Lichtman’s model to 
eliminate all deadweight loss if coupons are allocated correctly.) Thus, if the government 
estimated that a consumer would be willing to pay $0.05, the consumer would receive a $0.20 
coupon. 189 In addition, for consumers whose willingness to pay the government estimated at less 
than $0.125, the government added a producer’s bonus to the coupon. The producer’s bonus 
                                                 
186 For example, awarding coupons of up to the difference between the monopoly price and the desired low price to only the very 
highest-valuing consumers, those in the first quartile, would have no effect on the monopoly price or producer welfare at all. 
Raising the monopoly price by up to that amount would not affect the amount that these high-valuing consumers will end up 
paying and would cause the patent holder to lose revenue from the second quartile. The only effect would be distributional.  
187 Take, for example, the consumer who values the product at one penny less than the monopoly price. If that consumer is given 
a one penny coupon, then the consumer will buy at the monopoly price. Thus, the monopolist’s profits from selling at the 
monopoly price instead of at the lower price will rise by the full amount of the monopoly price. To make the lower price 
attractive, the government will have to make up for the full amount of the monopoly price. 
188 I also ran simulations in which the government gave all consumers in the bottom quartile slightly more than the government 
estimated would be necessary. This approach proved to be less cost effective than giving consumers exactly what it appeared they 
needed. 
189 Because of the stochastic error term, the simulated government estimated the maximum that some consumers would pay as a 
negative number. For these consumers, the government granted a $0.25 coupon. Presumably, consumers who in fact have 
negative reservation prices would not take the product even for free, so giving $0.25 coupons to all consumers who seem to have 
such negative reservation prices would be an appropriate policy. Consumers who really do not want the product presumably 
would throw the coupons out (assuming away the risk of arbitrage, see supra note 180), and consumers whom the government 
has misplaced in this category would be able to use the coupons. 
 PATENT PRIZES 39 
would not change the price to the consumer but would result in a government payment to the 
patent holder at the specified price. 
Figure 1 shows the results of the simulation. 190 The first column shows different values 
for the variance of the error term; lower variance means the government has a greater ability to 
estimate consumers’ willingness to pay. The second column indicates, for that variance, the 
minimum producer’s bonus needed in the simulation so that it would be more profitable for the 
patent holder to price the product at $0.25 than at $0.50. Finally, the la st column indicates the 
total cost to the government of redeeming the coupons and paying bonuses to the patent holder at 
that level. Thus, the first row shows that if the government can estimate individual consumers’ 
demand perfectly, then it need pay only a penny in producer’s bonus to induce pricing at 0.25 
rather than 0.50, and the total cost of the coupons to the government as a percentage of 
deadweight loss is 13%. Note that this is one- in-eight dollars, just as Lichtman’s model 
predicts.191 For higher variances, the government’s total cost grows, with the cost of subsidies 
exceeding the cost of a patent buyout when the variance reaches approximately 0.4. 
 
Table 1.  Simulation of Coupon Program Effectiveness Based on Quality of Government 
Information 
Variance of error term (in 
dollars) 
Minimum producer’s bonus needed (in 
dollars) 
Total cost to government as percentage of original 
deadweight loss 
0 0.01  13% 
0.01 0.35 24% 
0.1 0.49 57% 
0.4 0.62 102% 
0.5 0.64 109% 
1.0 0.67 128% 
2.0 0.70 150% 
 
This simulation analysis thus indicates that when the government has sufficiently good 
information for distinguishing high-valuing from low-valuing consumers, subsidies are indeed 
considerably cheaper than buyouts. Of course, the simulation hardly provides the final word on 
which approach is superior, even if it were possible to determine precisely what the variance of 
the error term would be for a particular product. The approach of giving producer’s bonuses to 
just the bottom eighth of the population may not be optimal. In addition, to ensure pricing by the 
patent holder at the lower level, the government would have to give somewhat higher producers’ 
bonuses. With real world products, moreover, demand may not be linear, and marginal cost may 
not be zero. Nonetheless, the analysis is sufficient to make clear that subsidies are preferable to 
buyouts in some situations, while buyouts are preferable to subsidies in others. 
In the end, Lichtman’s analysis might establish that the optimal regime is a cross between 
buyouts and coupons. Instead of seeking to induce pricing at a relatively low level, the 
government might negotiate directly with a patent holder to price the product at a certain level, 
and in exchange for this agreement, the government would provide the patent holder some 
                                                 
190 The computer file containing the simulation is available on request from the author. 
191 The percentage will be exactly 12.5% if the government does not pay any producer’s bonus. As indicated above, however, 
this would leave the monopolist indifferent between pricing at $0.25 and $0.50. See supra text preceding note 185. 
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combination of cash and coupons for relatively low-valuing purchasers.192 If the government and 
the patent holder manage to arrive at just the right price, the one that by itself would result in 
three-quarters of consumers being served if the demand curve is linear, and if the government 
can police the price agreement successfully, then Lichtman’s conclusion that only one of eight 
dollars needs to be spent correctly will hold. This proposal, of course, has its own risks. The 
government might agree to too high a price, perhaps even a price above the monopoly price.193 
At least patent buyouts guarantee that the product will be priced at marginal cost,194 while price 
ceiling agreements potentially could make no impact at all,195 and unless the government is 
successful in identifying all who would benefit from coupons, will leave some potential 
consumers unserved. Depending in part on the government’s ability to determine a satisfactory 
price ceiling, this negotiated coupon plan might be superior, or a pure buyout or induced coupon 
scheme might be. 
II. HURDLES FOR PATENT PRIZE SYSTEMS 
This part introduces additional complications for any prize system. These complications 
reveal that even if a prize system could determine with perfect accuracy the social value of an 
invention, it might be inadequate or incomplete. In each of the sections that follow, I explore one 
set of such complications and examine how they might differentially affect various proposals for 
prize systems. Section II.A addresses functions of the patent system beyond promoting 
innovation, while Section II.B considers whether prize systems might ameliorate or exacerbate 
existing limitations of the patent system, such as its tendency to promote wasteful patent races 
and “inventing around.” Section II.C discusses the danger that an opt- in prize system would lead 
to prizes being granted for worthless inventions or inventions that would be developed in the 
absence of a prize system. Finally, Section II.D analyzes the costs of prize systems, including the 
costs of the prizes themselves, as well as administrative, litigation, and rent-seeking costs. 
My aim is partly to establish a foundation for assessing the costs and benefits of any 
particular proposal, including the proposal that I will introduce in Part III. It is also, however, to 
extend the generalizations of Part I. The previous part has established that although an effective 
prize system could produce social benefits by eliminating deadweight loss and perhaps by 
increasing innovation incentives, the task of calculating prizes may be more difficult than 
commentators have suggested. Even the best formula or algorithm may be insufficient to ensure 
that optimal prizes are given, and the best approach to reducing deadweight loss in one situation 
may be different from that in another. In assessing the various proposals, I will make a 
preliminary case that I will extend explicitly in Part III.196 The argument is that a flexible prize 
system, allowing and incentivizing inventors to adopt various techniques for avoiding 
                                                 
192 This would be an opt-in version of the system, giving the patent holder the right to turn the government down. A mandatory 
version would feature a combination of government price controls and coupons. 
193 The situation might be similar to that illustrated in Figure 2. 
194 But cf. infra notes 324–327 and accompanying text (noting that even if a product is placed in the public domain, the existence 
of a natural monopoly may prevent pricing at marginal cost). 
195 If prices are directly set, rather than the government’s agreeing to price ceilings, the government agency conceivably could be 
used as a means of achieving cartelization by holders of patents for substitute products. Cf., e.g., Curtis J. Milhaupt & Geoffrey P. 
Miller, Cooperation, Conflict, and Convergence in Japanese Finance: Evidence from the “Jusen” Problem , 29 LAW & POL’Y 
INT’L BUS. 1, 12 (1997) (defining a “regulatory cartel” as one “in which both the regulated and the regulators cooperate in order 
to enforce market segmentation, control entry, regulate output, and allocate the gains of the cartel’s activities among the various 
participants”); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Antidumping Law as a Means of Facilitating Cartelization, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 725 (2000) 
(arguing that firms often use antidumping complaints as a means to facilitate industry cartelization). 
196 See infra Part III.A.  
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deadweight loss, may be superior to any system based on criteria and procedures set forth in 
advance in a statute, at least if any drawbacks of such flexibility can be overcome. 
A. Patent System Incentives Beyond Invention 
F. Scott Kieff offers the only sustained analysis of recent proposals for revolutionizing 
the patent system. 197 Kieff’s analysis covers a great deal of ground, ranging from a critique of Ian 
Ayres and Paul Klemperer’s interesting proposal to limit patent holders’ rights in exchange for a 
lengthening of patent term, 198 to an assessment of Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg’s 
proposed modifications of the patent system to prevent excessive patenting from suppressing 
scientific research. 199 In one section of the article, Kieff argues against proposals to replace the 
patent system with a reward-based system, focusing particularly on the Shavell and van Ypersele 
proposal. 200 Kieff, however, approaches the task from a different vantage point than I have; 
instead of inquiring as to whether the proposals would make possible accurate valuations of 
patents, Kieff assumes that they would and then asks whether accepting the proposals would 
deprive patent law of other functions. This section considers the two such functions that Kieff 
identifies. 
1. Commercialization 
Kieff’s first argument against prize systems is that even if they are successful in 
stimulating inventive activity, they may fail in encouraging entrepreneurs to commercialize the 
inventions.201 Science in academic journals may be valuable in part because it contributes to our 
self-awareness in much the same way as research in the humanities,202 but it is also valued 
because it leads to practical applications. If there were no incentive to convert pure science into 
applied science, then our innovative policy would be a failure indeed. The reward proposals 
discussed in Part I assume away this problem, expecting that release of a patent in the public 
domain will lead to the production of an invention at marginal cost. This, however, must be a 
simplification, as firms will enter an industry only if they expect to recover their fixed costs in 
                                                 
197 See Kieff, supra note 26. 
198 Ian Ayres & Paul Klemperer, Limiting Patentees’ Market Power Without Reducing Innovation Incentives: The Perverse 
Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies , 97 M ICH. L. REV. 985 (1999), cited in Kieff, supra note 26, at 732. 
199 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCI. 698 (1998), cited in  Kieff, supra note 26, at 719-23. Kieff explores the issue further in F. Scott Kieff, Facilitating Scientific 
Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science—A Response to Rai and Eisenberg, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 691 
(2001). 
200 See Kieff, supra note 26, at 705-17. 
201 Id. at 707-12. 
202 A problem in debates concerning the appropriateness and level of government funding of the humanities is the difficulty of 
ascertaining whether such funding has been successful. One commentator, for example, concludes that “the NEH has advanced 
scholarship in America” but cites in support of this claim only that the number of scholarly publications in the humanities 
“exploded in the period following the creation of the NEH,” an explosion that might have had other causes. See Alvaro Ignacio 
Anillo, Note, The National Endowment for the Humanities: Control of Funding Versus Academic Freedom, 45 VAND. L. REV.  
455, 462 (1992). Even if the effect of government funding on the level of academic research could be established, this would 
leave unanswered the social value of this increase in research. Developments in literary theory are presumably socially valuable 
for more than their instrumental value (itself almost impossible to ascertain), but quantifying the value of such a public good is 
largely subjective, given the absence of revealed preferences. Such difficulties, however, should not necessarily prevent 
government funding, and reward systems easily could be used to foster innovation in the humanities. One virtue of applying the 
proposal developed in Part III to such funding is that the proposal allows for largely subjective determinations without making 
funding determinations depend heavily on the preferences of any individual. See infra Part III.A. 
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addition to their marginal costs.203 The paradox of reward proposals is thus that if they were truly 
effective in reducing the price of products to their marginal costs, then as long as there were any 
fixed costs, no one ever would produce the products. 
This problem, of course, is one that is often solved, typically with what economists call 
imperfect competition;204 we do, after all, have markets even in areas without intellectual 
property or other forms of monopoly protection. There may, however, be products and markets 
that would exist but for the inability to keep out imitators. As Kieff observes, “[s]econd movers 
generally enjoy numerous advantages over the first movers against whom they compete.”205 A 
first mover takes the risks associated with the uncertainty of demand and identifies solutions to 
both anticipated and unanticipated difficulties.206 Suppose, for example, that Company X has 
developed a pharmaceutical product but is not yet sure whether it is safe and effective. X must 
decide whether to invest resources in conducting tests of the drug and seeking FDA approval.207 
If X anticipates that the drug is so cheap to manufacture that X would be able to sell the drug only 
at or just above marginal cost, X will have no incentive to invest the original resources. 
The argument is an important one, and it bears a distinguished lineage. In perhaps the 
most important and famous modern article on patent law, Edmund Kitch offered a rationale for 
the patent system supplemental to the classical one that the system offers incentives to 
innovate.208 Kitch compared patents to prospecting systems for mineral rights.209 In such a 
system, a prospector who finds minerals on public land could stake a claim to the land and 
extract minerals from it. In the absence of such a system, no one might have an incentive to 
search for minerals on public land, because as soon as one found the minerals, others would join 
to dig out what they could. Kitch’s metaphor of the patent holder as prospector has a number of 
important implications, some of which will be considered below, 210 but for present purposes, his 
most important observation is that “the patent owner has an incentive to make investments to 
maximize the value of the patent without fear that the fruits of the investment will produce 
unpatentable information appropriable by competitors.”211 Kitch concludes, “Only in the case of 
a patented product is a firm able to make the expenditures necessary to bring the advantages of 
                                                 
203 The dilemma is common to provision of all public goods. See, e.g., Yoram Barzel, The Market for a Semipublic Good: The 
Case of the American Economic Review, 61 AM. ECON. REV. (COMMUNICATIONS) 665, 665 (1971) (discussing the difficulty of 
achieving zero marginal cost pricing of public goods). 
204 See, e.g., EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 42, at 284 (defining “imperfect competition”). 
205 Kieff, supra note 26, at 708. 
206 Id.; see also Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Technology Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities , 94 J. POL. 
ECON. 822, 825 (1986) (providing a formal model suggesting the existence of a second-mover advantage in a market in which 
products may be “sponsored”). 
207 The FDA approval process is an expensive one for pharmaceutical companies. See, e.g., Richard A. Merrill, The Architecture 
of Government Regulation of Medical Products , 82 VA. L. REV. 1753, 1754 (1996) (“The expense of the studies FDA requires 
before granting approval—coupled with the substantial time spent conducting these studies and waiting for agency approval—is 
among the common explanations for the cost of new treatments.”); Charles J. Walsh & Alissa Pyrich, Rationalizing the 
Regulation of Prescription Drugs and Medical Devices: Perspectives on Private Certification and Tort Reform, 48 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 883, 937-39 (1996) (arguing that the FDA review process is “hindered by its entrenched bureaucracy,” which results in 
“duplicative” testing of new drugs and devices). The burdens attendant FDA approval have led to some proposals for self-
regulation and privatization of the FDA process. See generally  Vivian I. Orlando, The FDA’s Accelerated Approval Process: 
Does the Pharmaceutical Industry Have Adequate Incentives for Self-Regulation, 25 AM. J.L. & MED. 543, 561-63 (1999) 
(discussing such proposals). 
208 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System , 20 J.L. & ECON. 265 (1977). 
209 Id. at 271-75. 
210 See infra notes 272-275 and accompanying text (noting the danger of rent dissipation by excessive development of the 
innovation). 
211 Kitch, supra note 208, at 276. 
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the product to the attention of the customer without fear of competitive appropriation if the 
product proves successful.”212 
Before considering the application of this insight to prize systems, it is worth noting that 
if patent law’s concern is to ensure commercialization of inventions, then it is both overinclusive 
and underinclusive.213 Patent law is overinclusive because sometimes first-mover advantages will 
outweigh second-mover advantages.214 Studies indicate that being the first entrant in a field raises 
the product’s reputation for quality. 215 A first-mover may solidify this reputation through brand 
advertising. The continued value of a brand like Tylenol, despite the existence of generic 
acetaminophen alternatives, attests to this phenomenon. 216 Patent law is underinclusive because 
commercializers of unpatentable inventions also face the prospect of copying. 217 Even an obvious 
commercial product might not be developed if second-mover advantages are sufficiently strong. 
These observations, of course, do not necessarily argue for the abolition or extension of patent 
protection, but they emphasize that the possible existence of second-mover advantages is not 
necessarily sufficient to overcome any advantages of a prize system alternative to patent. 
Kieff appropriately does not claim that commercialization necessarily dooms any reward 
proposals, but he emphasizes that prize systems should take them into account. Critically, it may 
be appropriate for rewards to be deferred until after there has been some time for 
commercialization. For example, he acknowledges, the Shavell-van Ypersele approach might 
still work, especially if the reward is based on “data from actual sales,”218 as they suggest would 
be desirable.219 Kieff worries, though, that if “the moment of entitlement to the reward is pushed 
later along the commercialization timeline,”220 the length of races to achieve and commercialize 
innovations will be inefficiently extended.221 Moreover, he maintains, “[t]he shift down the 
commercialization timeline of the entitlement to the reward will also increase the uncertainty 
over who will be a reward recipient.”222 Such uncertainty might lead both of two firms arguably 
responsible for an innovation to refrain from commercializing it.223 
These are important concerns, but they are not fatal. If multiple firms were unsure about 
which would ultimately receive the benefit of a reward, they would have strong incentives to 
                                                 
212 Id. at 277. 
213 Kitch devotes a section of his article to explaining how specific aspects of patent law reflect his theory. Id. at 267-71. 
Advancing considerably past Kitch’s initial insights, Mark Grady and Jay Alexander offer a more robust positive economic 
theory of patent law. See Mark F. Grady & Jay I. Alexander, Patent Law and Rent Dissipation, 78 VA. L. RE V. 305 (1992). 
214 See sources cited supra note 55. 
215 See William T. Robinson & Claes Fornell, Sources of Market Pioneer Advantages in Consumer Goods Industries , 22 J. 
MARKET RESARCH  305 (1985). 
216 See, e.g., Lance W. Rook, Listening to Zantac: The Role of Non-Prescription Drugs in Health Care Reform and the Federal 
Tax System, 62 TENN. L. REV. 107, 119-20 (1994) (“Tylenol first began to be sold OTC during Dwight D. Eisenhower’s 
administration. Nonetheless, its annual sales are $719.7 million, even though the same medication is widely and inexpensively 
available in generic form.”). For a study of the diffusion of generic drugs into pharmaceutical markets, see Andrew Tat Tin 
Ching, Dynamic Equilibrium in the United States Prescription Drug Market After Patent Expiration (2000) (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation, University of Minnesota) (on file with author). 
217 As Douglas Lichtman argues, the absence of protection for such inventions is becoming increasingly problematic given the 
decreasing cost of copying technology. See Douglas Gary Lichtman, The Economics of Innovation: Protecting Unpatentable 
Goods, 81 M INN. L. REV. 693, 732 (1997). 
218 Kieff, supra note 26, at 710. 
219 See supra notes 106–110 and accompanying text (discussing Shavell and van Ypersele’s proposal to consider sales data). 
220 Id. at 710-11. 
221 See infra Part II.B.1 (discussing patent races). 
222 Id. at 711. 
223 Moreover, anticipating this outcome may lead to less investment. Id. (“The desirable, invention-inducing power of the reward 
may decrease, or the undesirable rent-dissipating power may increase.”). 
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cooperate. For example, they might enter into an agreement to commercialize the invention 
jointly and split the proceeds according to agreed-upon proportions.224 Moreover, the problem 
may vanish if the prize system is an adjunct to the patent system. If the reward regime is opt-in, 
as Shavell and van Ypersele suggest might be optimal, inventors simply will not opt in if rewards 
are based on sales and they expect that the buyout of the patent would lead no firm to have an 
incentive to commercialize the invention. Similarly, if an investor retains a right to receive a 
patent before commercialization, with rewards then deferred until such time that the patents 
literally may be bought out, there will be no uncertainty in such a case about who will benefit 
from commercialization. 225  
Once the uncertainty problem is overcome, an innovator will have an incentive to 
commercialize in a prize system. As Kieff recognized, an innovator will have an incentive to 
commercialize before offering a patent into the public domain in exchange for a reward, because 
doing so will make the patent more valuable. Even after giving up a patent, though, an innovator 
will have an incentive to commercialize if the ultimate reward depends on the success of 
commercialization. Kieff notes correctly that “the size of the reward will have to increase to 
cover the costs of some commercialization activity in addition to inventive activity,”226 but if the 
reward is based on sales, it automatically will do so. An innovator will have the same incentive 
to advertise and commercialize in such a regime as in the patent regime.227 The ultimate reward 
will depend on the full investment, including both the research and the efforts at 
commercialization before and after the patent is placed in the public domain. 
Although Kieff focuses his commercialization argument on a critique of the Shavell-van 
Ypersele proposal, the above discussion reveals that with appropriate design choices, the concern 
may be overcome with such an approach, because rewards depend on ultimate sales in a 
competitive market. It is a greater concern with proposals in which the value of the reward 
depends on the value of a patent to a monopolist. Under the Guell and Fischbaum approach,228 
the value of the reward would depend on profits in a test market, in which the patent holder 
would be permitted to advertise.229 This might overstate the eventual value, since the patent 
holder would have little incentive to advertise after receiving an award based on the test market. 
If such advertising is important and socially beneficial,230 their proposal may need revision. 
Similarly, in the Kremer approach, the winning auction bid would depend on how much a 
                                                 
224 Such a result would not be uncommon. See, e.g., Joseph Kattan, Antitrust Analysis of Technology Joint Ventures: Allocative 
Efficiency and the Rewards of Innovation, 61 ANTITRUST L.J. 937, 944 (1993) (“[R]ivals may collaborate in a joint venture 
precisely because they wish to reduce the risk of being left behind in a technology race.”). 
225 It is not clear whether this is the approach that Shavell and van Ypersele envisioned. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 
18, at 534 (referring simply to a “reward paid by government for an innovation”). 
226 Kieff, supra note 26, at 711. 
227 Economists observe that the amount of advertising will be greater in a monopoly than in a competitive market. See, e.g., 
SCHERER & ROSS, supra note 55, at 592-94. Producers in competitive markets sometimes seek to overcome this by lobbying for 
requirements that all producers contribute to joint marketing funds. Cf. United States v. United Foods, 121 S. Ct. 2334 (2001) 
(invalidating a program requiring all mushroom growers to contribute to a fund advertising mushrooms as a violation of the First 
Amendment, where the program was not ancillary to a more comprehensive program involving elements other than advertising). 
228 See supra Part I.A. This concern might be relatively slight in the pharmaceutical context with which they are specifically 
concerned, since the cost of producing pharmaceuticals is low. Note that Guell and Fischbaum assume that the patent buyout 
would take place only after a drug is approved and test-marketed in a limited location. 
229 See Guell & Fischbaum, supra note 41, at 225. 
230 Some commentators argue that advertising of pharmaceuticals may in fact be socially harmful. John Rizzo, for example, 
shows empirically that advertising tends to make consumers more price inelastic, thus leading them to pay more for drugs. See 
John A. Rizzo, Advertising and Competition in the Ethical Pharmaceutical Industry: The Case of Antihypertensive Drugs, 42 J.L. 
& ECON. 89 (1999). 
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monopolist would be able to earn from a patent.231 It is thus possible that the original patent 
holder will receive the monopoly profits even though the innovation will not be commercialized 
in a competitive market. Even market-based rewards ideally should be contingent on a 
demonstration that the product will be or already has been commercialized. 
2. Screening 
Kieff also critiques the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal for failing to screen valid from 
invalid patents.232 Measuring the sales of a product to determine demand for that product, Kieff 
correctly observes, “does not establish that the invention itself would have been patentable.”233 
The problem stems in part from the difference between a product and an innovation. I noted 
earlier that the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal would have difficulty when a product arguably 
included a number of different innovations;234 Kieff’s point is that it may not be possible to 
determine whether a product reflects even a single innovation. In the patent system, by contrast, 
“[t]he same core legal rules that drive the patent system simultaneously provide the system with 
its own method for deciding which inventive activities are eligible to receive the benefit of a 
patent.”235 The patent system seeks to ensure that an invention is useful,236 novel, 237 non-
obvious,238 and fully disclosed.239 These would all be potentially relevant in a prize system as 
well, but they cannot necessarily be determined just by examining market conditions. 
The problem, moreover, is one that cannot be solved merely by anchoring the prize 
system to the existing patent system. If inventors were required to obtain patents that they then 
would formally yield for a reward, then the existence of the patent would reveal that the Patent 
and Trademark Office believed that the invention met the criteria of patentability. The patent 
system, however, does not rely just on the Patent and Trademark Office, as the issuance of a 
patent provides only prima facie evidence of patent validity. 240 In the existing system, potential 
infringers have strong incentives to seek out evidence that might undermine a patent’s validity, 
for example by “scouring public and private sources around the world” for prior art,241 or even 
identifying prior art in their own files of which the patent holder might not have been aware.242 
Finding evidence that proves the invalidity of a patent will allow activity that otherwise would be 
                                                 
231 See supra text accompanying notes 127-128. 
232 Kieff, supra note 26, at 712-17. 
233 Id. at 713. 
234 See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text  
235 Kieff, supra note 26, at 714. 
236 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994) (allowing patents for “new and useful improvements thereof”). In Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 
(1981), the Supreme Court seized on the usefulness requirement to limit the potential scope of patentable subject matter, finding 
that abstract ideas are not “useful” in the sense specified by § 101. See also In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (en 
banc) (analyzing § 101). 
237 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (requiring that for a patent to be obtained, the invention not be “known or used by others . . . before the 
invention thereof by the applicant for patent”). 
238 Id. § 103(a) (“A patent may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the 
prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains.”). 
239 Id. § 112 (“The specification shall contain a written description of the invention . . . in such full, clear, concise, and exact 
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art . . . to make and use the same . . . .”). 
240 See id. § 282 (“A patent shall be presumed valid.”); Pennwalt Corp. v. Akzona Inc., 740 F.2d 1573, 1578 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(requiring clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption of validity). 
241 Kieff, supra note 26, at 713. 
242 Id. at 712-13. A practioner’s guide to defending an infringement action suggests, “Don’t forget to review your client’s own 
files for pertinent prior art.” David A. Dillard & Gary J. Nelson, Presentation of Invalidity Defenses , 493 PLI/P 519, 534 (1997). 
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infringement, and preparing a case that might lead to invalidation may allow a competitor to 
enter into an agreement to license the patent at a relatively low rate.243 In a prize system, once a 
patent is released into the public domain, there will be no incentive for anyone to argue for its 
invalidity. 
Patent validity, however, need not be the sine qua non for receipt of a prize. The criteria 
that a prize system employs could be different from those in the patent system. Some classes of 
patentable inventions might be excluded from a prize system, perhaps because prizes for those 
classes might be too difficult to calculate.244 At the same time, prizes might be offered for some 
innovations or activities that would not qualify for patent protection. The purpose of providing 
such prizes could not be to reduce deadweight loss from patents, but prizes could be used to 
reward other useful activities. Prizes, for example, might be useful to encourage 
commercialization of products that otherwise would not be commercialized.245 If patent and 
copyright laws provide inadequate protection and thus production of innovation in, say, 
fashion, 246 a prize system conceivably could be used to fill in the gaps. The first designer to 
repopularize bell-bottoms, thus stimulating a market that otherwise would not have existed, 
would receive a prize when other labels followed suit. Perhaps we would not want a prize system 
in this area; innovation in fashion arguably is a social cost rather than a social benefit, leading 
everyone to wasteful replacement of wardrobes. The case for and against providing incentives 
for this form of innovation, however, may be different in a world of patents than in a world of 
prizes. 
Similarly, a prize system might well differ from a patent system in not producing black-
and-white validity judgments at all. A patent either is or is not valid, or at least a court hearing a 
validity challenge must make one determination or the other on every patent claim.247 It may be 
useful for patent law to make binary judgments even if the world exhibits shades of gray. 
Innovations may be more or less nonobvious, but it is presumably impractical for the patent 
office to grant two-thirds of a patent.248 It might not be so impractical to provide partial prizes 
                                                 
243 On the relationship between threats to sue and patent licensing, see Jin-Li Hu, Choosing Litigation and Patent Licensing:  An 
Inquiry into the Relationship Between the Legal System and R&D (1995) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, SUNY Stony Brook). 
244 See infra Part III.E (arguing that patent prize systems should be designed for specific purposes rather than to cover all 
patent s). 
245 Commercialization might not occur in the absence of a prize because of second-mover advantages, even if the product idea 
were not innovative. See supra text accompanying notes 205-207. Indeed, to make Kitch’s comparison of patents and prospecting 
complete, a prize system might be an alternative to prospecting systems, at least if the only aim is to ensure adequate incentives 
for prospecting. But cf. infra text accompanying notes 256-260 (discussing other virtues of the prospecting approach). 
246 I choose fashion because fashion patterns generally cannot be copyrighted. See Whimsicality, Inc. v. Rubie’s Costumes Co., 
891 F.2d 452, 455 (2d Cir. 1989). For a critique of the current regime as inconsistent with general principles of copyright law, see 
Leslie J. Hagin, A Comparative Analysis of Copyright Laws Applied to Fashion Works: Renewing the Proposal for Folding 
Fashion Works into the United States Copyright Regime, 26 TEX. IN T’L L.J. 341 (1991). 
247 Different courts, of course, might come to different conclusions. Indeed, in a recent empirical analysis of over 10,000 patent 
cases, Kimberly Moore concluded that patent holder win rates differed considerably by district. See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum 
Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889, 916-20 (2001). For example, the 
infringer won 70% of cases in the District of Massachusetts and only 32% of cases in the Northern District of California, a 
discrepancy which was highly statistically significant. Id. at 917 tbl.8. Such discrepancies suggest that the probability of victory 
depends greatly on the identity of the judge, and even with a particular judge it is possible that there is some randomness in 
outcomes. 
248 The notion of two-thirds of a patent may not be as absurd as it sounds, given the possibility of varying the patent term length 
on a patent-by-patent basis. Most scholars who have tried to determine the optimal patent length, however, have not considered 
making patent life determinations on a case-by-case basis. See, e.g., WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, Invention, Growth, and Welfare 76-
86 (2979); C. Michael White, Why a Seventeen Year Patent, 38 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 839 (1956). The current approach to patent 
terms is sometimes called “variable,” since the term is 20 years from the date of filing, but the patent term does not depend on the 
novelty of the invention. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, An Empirical Study of the Twenty-Year Patent Term, 22 AIPA Q.J. 369, 385 tbl.1 
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when an innovation would be close to the patentability line. In addition, it may be impractical for 
the patent office to consider whether and when an innovation likely would have been developed 
and commercialized in the absence of the applicant’s discovery, a criterion that some have 
suggested that the patent office should apply.249 The benefits and costs of including such an 
analysis in a prize system might be different, depending on the form that the prize system would 
take. In a modification of the Shavell-van Ypersele proposal, for example, government officials 
might try to estimate the portion of sales of a product that would not have existed but for the 
claimed innovation. 
These considerations, of course, do not undermine the need for a prize system to have 
some sort of screening mechanism to separate worthwhile innovations from others, but reveal 
that the mechanism need not necessarily be the patent system itself.250 Ultimately, a prize system 
must have some means of distinguishing worthwhile from other inventions, but the success of 
the patent system in distinguishing innovative products from retreads does not imply that no 
other system could accomplish the same task. Sometimes, anchoring a prize system to the patent 
system may be the simplest and best approach. Even though Kieff persuasively shows that the 
issuance of a patent cannot be sufficient, he acknowledges that Kremer’s approach avoids the 
objection, because bidders “will be sure not only to acquire information about the market 
demand for the information claimed in the patents but also about patent validity.”251 Other prize 
systems will need to adopt some other approach, one that will assure that decisions on prizes take 
into account all considerations relevant for that system, ranging from the innovativeness of the 
inventions to the accuracy of claims about sales data and consumer demand. 
B. The Common Pool Problem 
So far, we have explored two vices of the patent system, its tendency to impose 
deadweight loss and its resulting dampening of innovation incentives, and two virtues, its 
effectiveness in encouraging commercialization of innovations and in screening prospective 
patent recipients to ensure sufficient innovativeness. This alignment of pluses and minuses is 
misleading, however, most importantly because the patent system can produce both benign and 
malign innovation incentives. Both types of incentives are associated with what is known as the 
“common pool” problem, discussed frequently in the context of fisheries.252 As H. Scott Gordon 
noted, in “sea fisheries the natural resource is not private property; hence the rent it may yield is 
not capable of being appropriated by anyone.”253 That is, even though a fishery conveys some 
social benefit, the competition for the benefit will produce a fully offsetting cost.254 To switch 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1994) (providing a numerical assessment of mean patent length with fixed and variable terms). A recent commentator has 
argued that patent term should vary depending on factors such as the interest rate at the time the patent is issued. See FRANK 
PARTNOY, FINANCE AND PATENT LENGTH  (Univ. San Diego Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 19, 2001). 
249 See sources cited supra note 57. 
250 Kieff acknowledges that a prize system need not require a patentable invention. For example, he states, that the Shavell-van 
Ypersele system “may be indifferent between new technologies and revived ones.” Kieff, supra note 26, at 713. Kieff worries, 
though, that “[e]very market having large demand would generate droves of reward claimants each asserting to have made some 
contribution.” Id. For a discussion of the danger of frivolous claims, see infra text accompanying note 549. 
251 Id. at 715. 
252 The term “common pool” itself is an old one, referring to the analogous situation of common pools of oil shared by multiple 
drillers. See, e.g., R.F. Kahn, Some Notes on Ideal Output, 45 ECON. J. 1, 18 (1935). 
253 H. Scott Gordon, The Economic Theory of a Common-Property Resource: The Fishery, 62 J. POL. ECON. 124 (1954). 
254 Gordon explains: 
[S]ince average cost is the same for all grounds and the average productivity of all grounds is also brought to equality 
by the free and competitive nature of fishing, this means that the intramarginal [fishing] grounds also yield no rent. It is 
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metaphors, if I promise that I will distribute $100,000 among all who come to a particular 
stadium, the total time costs of those who come will amount to about $100,000.255 
This problem animated Kitch’s comparison of the patent system to a prospecting 
system. 256 Kitch, as we have seen, revealed that a patent would give a patent holder incentives to 
commercialize an invention that otherwise might not be developed because of second-mover 
advantages.257 In the absence of patent protection, no one will have any incentive to search for a 
common pool if finding the pool will not allow the finder to exploit it. Kitch, moreover, 
recognized that the patent system also was a solution to the problem of how to manage a pool 
once it is found. Just as a prospector will have incentives to limit the number of people who can 
mine for a mineral, so too will a patent holder have an incentive to limit the number of inventors 
who can seek to improve upon the original patent. 
Emphasizing that “a patent ‘prospect’ increases the efficiency with which investment in 
innovation can be managed,”258 Kitch notes that “the patent owner [is] in a position to coordinate 
the search for technological and market enhancement of the patent’s value so that duplicative 
investments are not made and so that information is exchanged among the searchers.”259 Though 
Kitch does not develop the point fully,260 a patent holder owns the pool and therefore is in a 
position to prevent competing factions from emptying the pool. Once a particular innovation is 
developed, it might be clear that improvements to it would produce an estimated $100,000 in 
additional benefit exploitable by the developers, but if that is so, about the same amount will be 
spent if there is competition to secure pieces of this social benefit. A patent holder, by contrast, 
can ensure that the marginal benefit of expenditures is equal to the marginal cost. 
So far, this shows simply another benefit of the patent system. Patents, however, do not 
entirely solve the common pool problem, for two reasons. First, in solving the ex post common 
pool problem, patents may create an ex ante common pool problem, as multiple inventors 
compete for the right to own the patent in the first place. Second, because a patent is not 
infinitely broad, competitors may “invent around” the patent, developing cumbersome 
alternatives to the initial patent. The following sections explore these problems and consider their 
implications for prize systems. While these are problems associated with the existing patent 
system, various prize proposals might exacerbate them. At the same time, a prize system may 
strengthen its case by ameliorating the problems. 
                                                                                                                                                             
entirely possible that some grounds would be exploited at a level of negative marginal productivity. 
Id. at 131-32. 
255 Rent dissipation, however, need not use up the entirety of the $100,000, if different people would suffer different costs from 
attending the event. Suppose, for example, that there are 51,000 individuals for whom the time cost of the event is $1, and for 
everyone else, it is $2. With perfect information, the 51,000 will attend and each receive slightly less than $2, for a surplus of 
almost $1 each. Nobody else will attend. A similar effect could exist with any common pool problem. Because some people with 
relatively low costs will necessarily participate, fewer of those with higher costs may participate than would be necessary to 
consume the common pool entirely. Risk aversion may also limit the extent of rent dissipation. See Arye L. Hillman & Eliakim 
Katz, Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power, 94 ECON. J. 104 (1984) (providing a formal model of the 
effect of risk aversion on rent seeking). 
256 Indeed, Kitch begins his article by citing an essay by Yoram Barzel that “points out that the exploitation of technological 
information has much in common with fisheries, public roads, and oil and water pools—all resources not subject to exclusive 
control.” Kitch, supra note 208, at 265 (citing Yoram Barzel, Optimal Timing of Innovations, 50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 348 
(1968)). 
257 See supra notes 208-217 and accompanying text. 
258 Kitch, supra note 208, at 276. 
259 Id. 
260 The point is developed in Grady & Alexander, supra note 213, discussed infra notes 268-270 and accompanying text. 
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1. Patent Races 
That the patent system might solve one common pool problem at the expense of another 
was noticed shortly after Kitch published his initial article. Characterizing Kitch’s argument, 
Donald McFetridge and Douglas Smith acknowledged that “[t]he patent as a prospect prevents 
competitive dissipation of these private returns by homogeneous rival inventors,”261 for example 
by allowing the patent holder to prevent “premature commercial introduction” of the product.262 
The “surplus-increasing” effect of patents, however, “is dissipated in a resource-using rivalry for 
the patent itself.”263 The basic intuition is simple. If a patent holder is given ownership of a 
common pool of a certain value, the incentive to become a patent holder increases by the same 
amount. Therefore, the same “homogeneous rival inventors” who would have competed in 
improving an invention will compete in the initial development of it, dissipating the patent 
rents.264 
In a reply to the McFetridge-Smith critique, Kitch noted that potential inventors might 
overcome the common pool problem by making agreements amongst themselves to limit 
excessive innovation. 265 Offering a Coasean efficiency story, Kitch observes that with zero 
transactions costs, “the rent dissipation problem disappears.”266 Although transactions costs are 
positive, Kitch argues that they will be lower “[a]t the early stages of innovation,”267 and patent 
law appropriately solves the common pool problem later, where private ordering is less likely to 
achieve a satisfactory solution. A separate possibility, developed by Mark Grady and Jay 
Alexander, is that patent law seeks to provide a balance between the common pool problems.268 
                                                 
261 Donald G. McFetridge & Douglas A. Smith, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Comment, 23 J.L. & ECON. 197, 
198 (1980). 
262 Id. The focus on premature commercial introduction, as opposed to excessive research and development of improvements, 
follows from Barzel, supra note 256. 
263 McFetridge & Smith, supra note 261, at 198.  
264 Surprisingly, full rent dissipation is possible even if in equilibrium, only one firm innovates. For a formal model with this 
result, see Partha Dasgupta & Joseph Stiglitz, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, 90 ECON. J. 266, 284-87 
(1980). 
265 Edmund W. Kitch, Patents, Prospects, and Economic Surplus: A Reply, 23 J.L. & ECON. 205 (1980).  
266 Id. at 205. Kitch supports this argument with the following quote from Barzel: 
The fact that many information situations have the potential for waste does not necessarily mean that waste actually 
occurs. If, in the aggregate, these actions produce a negative product, arrangements that successfully restrain them or 
reduce their impact will generate a positive return. An implicit, but crucial, assumption of the model is zero costs of 
transacting. 
Yoram Barzel, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Information Costs , 20 J.L. & ECON. 291, 292 (1977), quoted in  Kitch, 
supra note 265, at 205. 
267 Kitch, supra note 265, at 206. Kitch supports this argument by claiming that “the number of firms with the necessary 
comparative advantage to exploit the inventive possibility will be small and the uncertainties attached to each possibility make it  
easier to agree upon a division of activities, since the value of what any one firm is either giving up or gaining is unclear.” Id.  
This argument is not persuasive. The number of firms that might exploit a possibility presumably will be smaller after an 
innovation is initially made. Moreover, uncertainty about relative prospects may make agreements more difficult to achieve, 
particularly if each firm is overconfident about its own prospects. Such overconfidence might occur frequently, given the 
existence of overconfidence and overoptimism biases. See Christine Jolls, Behavioral Economics Analysis of Redistributive Legal 
Rules, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1653, 1659 & n.22 (1998) (citing an unpublished bibliography listing over 200 articles on unrealistic 
optimism). See generally David Dunning et al., A New Look at Motivated Inference: Are Self-Serving Theories of Success a 
Product of Motivational Forces?, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 58 (1995) (assessing the source of self-serving biases); 
Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 806 (1980) (providing 
an early study of such biases); Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics , 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091-95 (2000).  
268 Grady & Alexander, supra note 213. For a useful summary of the theory, see Matthew Erramouspe, Comment, Staking Patent 
Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards and Rent-Dissipating Races, 43 UCLA L. REV. 961, 976-79 (1996). For comments 
and criticisms, see Donald L. Martin, Reducing Anticipated Rewards from Innovation Through Patents: Or Less Is More, 78 VA. 
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Thus, the developer of “an invention likely to inspire a number of slightly modified duplicates” 
will tend to receive a broader patent than one whose invention does not signal likely 
improvements,269 because in the former case the danger of the ex post common pool problem is 
greater than in the latter case.270 
Regardless of how effectively the patent system achieves a balance between the two 
common pool problems, however, patent races will occur. Patent races present three related 
problems. The first is excessive innovative activity. 271 This may seem a strange concern given the 
concerns of prize system proponents that the patent system produces too little inventive activity. 
Shavell and van Ypersele, for example, show that any given inventor will invest too little 
because they will not anticipate that they will be able to capture the full social benefit of their 
innovations.272 The problem is that Shavell and van Ypersele assume a single inventor pursuing a 
particular prospect, rather than multiple inventors competing. 273 These two models are ultimately 
reconcilable. The common pool from the perspective of potential inventors will be smaller in a 
patent system as a result of patent holders’ inability to capture social benefits above monopoly 
profits,274 but the competition among multiple inventors will lead to the consumption of a greater 
portion of this smaller pool than if one inventor owned the entire pool. 275  
The two effects thus pull in competing directions. On one hand, the ability of a patent 
holder to appropriate only monopoly profits and not the full social benefit will decrease the 
amount of research activity. On the other hand, the concern of each competitor with the private 
rather than social marginal benefits and costs of its research endeavours will tend to lead to 
excessive research activity. Even if the two effects happen to cancel out, producing just the right 
amount of investment in social innovation, there remains a second problem with patent races, 
that research efforts may be duplicative. When many different inventors work independently 
toward the same goal, society’s resources may be inefficiently channeled. Kitch himself 
recognized this danger in the ex post common pool problem with his observation that a patent 
owner can ensure that “duplicative investments are not made,”276 but the problem in research 
leading to patent awards is equally significant. The problem is similar to one often noted in 
connection with securities markets, that securities analysts will have incentives to engage in 
                                                                                                                                                             
L. REV. 351 (1992); Robert P. Merges, Rent Control in the Patent Districts: Observations on the Grady-Alexander Thesis , 78 
VA. L. RE V. 359, 376-77 (1992); and A. Samuel Oddi, Un-Unified Economic Theories of Patents—The Not-Quite-Holy Grail, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 267, 284-85 (1996). 
269 Id. at 318. 
270 Grady and Alexander develop their positive economic theory by arguing that the scope of patentable subject matter and the 
requirements of patentability are best explained by the desire to minimize rent dissipation. Id. at 322-49. 
271 As Professor Rai notes, though without elaboration, “the greater the reward associated with patent rights, the greater the 
possibility of patent races that produce excessive or duplicative investment.” Rai, supra note 26, at 199. 
272 See, e.g., supra notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
273 Shavell and van Ypersele do briefly acknowledge the problem of patent races. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 
542-43. They conclude simply that “[b]ecause the race to be first is a factor that afflicts both [patent and reward] systems, and 
because the information needed to address it under either seems to be of the same character, consideration of the race to be first 
does not seem to bear on the comparison between reward and patent.” Id. at 543. 
274 For an early formal model suggesting that there will be too little research and development activity for this reason, see 
Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE 
ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609 (R.R. Nelson ed., 1962).  
275 The result of competition may thus be technical progress that is greater than the social optimum. See, e.g., Partha Dasgupta et 
al., Invention and Innovation Under Alternative Market Structures: The Case of Natural Resources , 49 REV. ECON. STUD. 567 
(1982). 
276 Kitch, supra note 208, at 276. 
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excessive and duplicative research because the private value of such research is greater than the 
social value.277 
A third problem with patent races is that they may reinforce inefficient industrial 
structures. Richard Gilbert and David Newbery have argued, for example, that a monopolist will 
expend resources on wasteful research and development simply as a means of protecting its 
market position, even if potential rivals in a patent race might be more efficient.278 The problem 
is most prominent in an asymmetrical race, in which the monopolist has more at stake than any 
other inventors.279 In such a race, a potential competitor may be deterred from even participating, 
“because the strategic interactions between the players are such that the incumbent would outdo 
any reasonable effort made by the challenger in order to stop the challenger being first to reach 
the finishing line.”280 Anticipating a lack of competition, the monopolist will proceed at the pace 
it would have taken in the absence of any competition. 281 This outcome may be desirable, as 
redundant research is eliminated. Whether one favors it depend in part on one’s confidence in 
Joseph Shumpeter’s observation that monopolists are necessary for innovation but ultimately 
will be overcome by a process of “creative destruction.”282 
Even in a patent regime, patent holders may avoid some of the harmful consequences of a 
patent race by disclosing some or all of their research activities. In a pathbreaking recent 
article,283 Gideon Parchomovsky argues that “in many patent races the superior strategy for one 
or more of the competing firms would be to prevent other firms from winning the race by 
publishing their research findings.”284 A laggard in a patent race might not have developed 
sufficient research findings to support a patent, but these research findings may be sufficient to 
make a competitor’s minor improvements over them insufficient for patenting. By preemptively 
publishing, the laggard may help its “financial ability to engage in other research projects in the 
future” and allow the laggard to “use the information it published in future projects at no cost.”285 
                                                 
277 The seminal article making this point is Jack Hirshleifer, The Private and Social Value of Information and the Reward to 
Inventive Activity, 61 AM.  ECON.  REV. 561, 563-66 (1971). See also Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? 
Disagreement, Market Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 667-71 (1995) (providing a useful discussion of 
Hirshleifer’s argument). As Jules Coleman similarly explains, “From an individual’s perspective, the value of new information, 
and hence of investing in generating it, derives from technology, gains from allocating resources more efficiently, and 
distribution, wealth transfers that follow from the price change.” JULES COLEMAN, RISKS AND WRONGS 151 (1992). Hirshleifer 
offers a brief but incomplete application to patent law, noting that even in the absence of a patent regime, inventors might be able 
to profit by speculation, so that, for example, Eli Whitney might have sold cotton futures. See id. at 570-72. 
278 Richard J. Gilbert & David M.G. Newbery, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, 72 AM. ECON. REV. 514, 
518 (1982). For a critique of the model, arguing that the possibility of licensing will undermine “preemptive patenting,” see 
Stephen W. Salant, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly: Comment, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 247 (1984). Salant 
argues that “[i]f such transactions are permitted, entrants who can develop technologies more efficiently than the incumbent 
always win the patent race, preemptive patenting never occurs, and—while production will again be monopolized—there is no 
more reason to expect that the incumbent will acquire the entrant’s patent than that the entrant will acquire the incumbent’s 
patent.” Id. at 247. 
279 See, e.g., Christopher Harris & John Vickers, Patent Races and the Persistence of Monopoly, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 461 (1985). 
280 Id. at 461. Harris and Vickers acknowledge that challengers will not always be deterred, for example because they may have 
some offsetting advantage relative to the monopolist. Id. 
281 For a model showing that the winner of a patent race will proceed as if the only player in the race, see Christopher Harris & 
John Vickers, Perfect Equilibrium in a Model of a Race, 52 RE V. ECON. STUD. 193 (1985). 
282 JOSEPH SHUMPETER,  CAPITALISM,  SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY  83-84 (3d ed. 1950) (referring to innovation as part of a 
process of “creative destruction” in which on dominant leader eventually is overcome). 
283 Gideon Parchomovsky, Publish or Perish, 98 M ICH. L. REV. 926 (2000). 
284 Id. at 927. 
285 Id. at 930. 
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The possibility of preemptive publication may even lead the leader in a patent race to publish 
first, what Parchomovsky refers to as “the double preemption twist.”286 
Parchomovsky’s thesis is controversial. Douglas Lichtman, Scott Baker, and Kate Kraus 
argue that because American patent law awards a patent to whoever is the first to conceive of an 
invention, laggards in a patent race are unlikely to publish preemptively. 287 The same principle, 
however, leads them to observe that leaders in a patent race may strategically disclose 
information before filing a patent application, because “while such disclosures hurt the leader, 
they also benefit him by driving laggards out of the race and in that way decreasing the chance 
that one of those laggards will leapfrog the leader and win the patent.”288 Rebecca Eisenberg, 
meanwhile, has argued that preemptive disclosure is more likely by potential users of an 
innovation, such as pharmaceutical companies hoping to use DNA sequences, than by competitor 
producers.289  
Regardless of the ultimate resolution of this debate, strategic disclosure does not 
eliminate the patent race problem, for two reasons. First, while strategic disclosure may prevent 
some duplicative research effort prospectively, it does not eliminate any research redundancy 
occurring prior to the strategic disclosure itself. Second, Parchomovsky recognizes that the net 
social welfare effects of strategic disclosure may be equivocal. On one hand, Parchomovsky 
argues that strategic disclosure “circumvents the troublesome tradeoff” that leads to patents but 
also to deadweight loss.290 At the same time, however, “[t]he availability of preemptive 
publication reduces the expected average payoffs of the race participants and may consequently 
diminish, in some cases, the ex ante incentive to engage in R&D.”291 If strategic disclosure were 
to occur and prevent patents in all cases, the patent system’s incentives to innovate would be 
eliminated altogether. 
The possibility of early disclosure of patents is thus a promising antidote to one of the 
patent system’s ills, but one that the patent system itself may be unable to promote fully. Prize 
systems, however, may offer an answer. Conceivably, a prize system could be used to 
compensate parties for releasing information even if that information would be insufficient for 
patentability. 292 If researchers have the option of obtaining a reward by releasing preliminary 
information, research could become more of a cooperative process than a competitive one.293 As 
long as the eventual reward for an innovation is distributed among contributors to it based on 
information released by those contributors, researchers will have incentives to release 
information immediately, rather than waiting to achieve the threshold of completeness that the 
patent system requires. 
                                                 
286 Id. at 950-51. The benefit of doing so is that the patentee may then file for a patent within one year of publication. See 35 
U.S.C. § 102(b) (1994). 
287 Douglas Lichtman et al., Strategic Disclosure in the Patent System , 53 VAND. L. REV. 2175, 2178-79 (2000). 
288 Id. at 2179. 
289 Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Promise and Perils of Strategic Publication to Create Prior Art: A Response to Professor 
Parchomovsky, 98 M ICH. L. REV. 2358 (2000). 
290 Parchomovsky, supra note 283, at 944. 
291 Id. Parchomovsky also argues that strategic disclosure may lead to inefficient expenditures by race participants on 
“monitoring competitors’ research activities,” which, while “not entirely wasteful, … is an additional cost that will slow down 
the development of new products and processes.” Id. at 944-45. 
292 See supra notes 244-246 and accompanying text. 
293 Calandrillo makes a distinct but related point. “Kitch’s discussion of the patent system implies that the negative effects of 
socially wasteful duplicative effort can be mitigated if property rights (or rewards) are bestowed relatively early on in the process 
so as to shorten the period of simultaneous investment by multiple parties.” Calandrillo, supra note 19, at 353. 
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This step may not eliminate the redundancy of a patent race altogether, because it might 
create a number of smaller research races. Thus, researchers would compete for the prize for 
each part of a larger project. Different researchers, however, might be able to specialize in 
different parts of a project that could lead to only a single profitable patent, either by explicit 
agreement or by implicit cooperation. 294 Moreover, a prize system might penalize researchers 
who fail to cooperate by reducing the overall level of the prize to just enough so that only one 
team of researchers (or whatever number of teams provides an optimal balance between the goals 
of fostering competition and reducing redundancy) would have an incentive to work on it. This is 
analogous to imposing a sufficiently large tax on oil extraction so that the optimal amount of oil 
extraction from a common pool occurs, or to letting the person who picks low-lying fruit keep 
only half the apples so that a second person will have an incentive to climb a ladder rather than 
fight for the more accessible apples. Alternatively, a prize system might reduce the level of the 
prize if the party that should have bowed out of the patent race turns out to win it, though this 
approach would require some way of identifying the rightful team, which might well not be the 
first team to begin the research. 
Some proposals for patent rewards would be more conducive to encouraging cooperation 
by sharing prizes and discouraging redundancy by reducing prizes than others. It would seem 
difficult to integrate this approach with Kremer’s system, for example, because the patent holder 
in his system receives the full social value of the patent. It is more plausible as an adjunct to the 
Shavell-van Ypersele approach, as the government agency responsible for rewards could 
calculate the overall demand for an innovation and then distribute rewards among all 
contributors. The task of determining how much to give to each contributor is not a trivial one, 
however, and the task of determining an appropriate penalty for failure to cooperate or reduction 
in the optimal size of a prize is still more difficult to model. Anticipation of inefficient choices in 
distributing rewards among participants might hamper efficient allocation of research spending. 
In the end, shared rewards and reduced prizes in common pool situations may be more 
appropriate in some contexts than in others. Shared rewards, for example, may be superior to 
rewards that give the entire prize in a patent race to a single winner when the amount of 
duplication in research is likely to be high and when determining relative contributions is 
relatively straightforward. Winner-take-all prizes may be superior in other situations, as well as 
when patent race competitors may be able to eliminate some of the problems of a patent race 
through private bargaining.295 The proposals for patent prize systems explored in Part I cannot be 
faulted relative to the existing patent systems for causing redundant research. But they can be 
faulted for failing to exploit an opportunity to overcome a weakness of the patent system. An 
ideal prize system would allow for shared rewards in contexts in which shared rewards are more 
efficient than the alternative. 
                                                 
294 Such division of the market potentially could raise antitrust concerns. See, e.g., United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 
(1972) (striking down as per se illegal a division of territories by members of a cooperative association). Antitrust law, however, 
is often sensitive to efficiency justifications. See Timothy J. Muris, The Federal Trade Commission and the Rule of Reason: In 
Defense of Massachusetts Board, 66 ANTITRUST L.J. 773, 775 (1998) (characterizing an FTC decision not as claiming “that 
conduct is never per se illegal” but as saying “that the courts should always listen to justifications”). Congress in any event could 
specify in the legislation creating a prize system that such agreements are permissible.  
295 See, e.g., Parchomovsky, supra note 283, at 948-50 (discussing the effect of private bargaining on a patent race). 
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2. Inventing Around 
The problem of inventing around has much in common with the problem of patent races. 
Imagine a patent race in which two different companies are seeking to achieve the same practical 
goal—say, developing a cure to a disease. Now, change the hypothetical in two different ways. 
First, the companies are pursuing different means, for example by pursuing medicines based on 
different perceived vulnerabilities of an infectious agent.296 Second, one company has already 
won the race, having received a patent on its invention and commercialized its invention, 
charging monopoly profits. If the other company continues its work, it may be said to be trying 
to “invent around” the first company’s patent, trying to produce the same benefit but in a new 
way. The phenomenon of inventing around is thus the same as the phenomenon of a patent race 
except that one participant has already won the race and the other participant is seeking to 
achieve the same goal in another way. Inventing around presents similar problems of excessive 
and functionally redundant innovative activity as patent races. 
Some commentators have treated the problem of inventing around as benign. The Federal 
Circuit has even trumpeted inventing around as a benefit of the patent system, reasoning that 
patent protection stimulates innovation by encouraging inventing around.297 Accordingly, 
inventing around is permitted, although under the doctrine of equivalents, infringement cannot be 
avoided by insignificant changes to the patent.298 This may reflect an appropriate balance in 
patent policy, 299 but commentators have been skeptical of the claimed social benefits of inventing 
around. Louis Kaplow, for example, notes that “[s]uch invention provides no social benefit if the 
new invention is no better than the first.”300 Even if there is a possibility that the new invention 
might be better than the original one, the private benefit to the new inventor might be 
considerably greater than the social benefit and thus social resources might be channeled 
inefficiently toward reinventing the wheel and away from other research. 301 In addition, while 
                                                 
296 For example, the HIV virus might be attacked through protease inhibitors as well as vaccines seizing on different 
mechanisms. Even though protease inhibitors have shown promise in allowing many individuals infected with HIV to live normal 
lives, work continues on an AIDS vaccine, in part because of the high cost of protease inhibitor treatment. See Philip A. Leider, 
Comment, Domestic AIDS Vaccine Trials: Addressing the Potential for Social Harm to the Subjects of Human Experiments , 88 
CAL. L. REV. 1185, 1190-95 (2000) (discussing the need for a vaccine despite recent advances in treatment). 
297 See, e.g., Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., Inc., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“The ability of the 
public successfully to design around—to use the patent disclosure to design a product or process that does not infringe, but like 
the claimed invention, is an improvement over the prior art—is one of the important public benefits that justify awarding the 
patent owner exclusive rights to his invention.”), rev’d, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); State Indus., Inc. v. A.O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 
1226, 1235-36 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“One of the benefits of a patent system is its so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a 
competitor’s products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of innovations to the marketplace.”). 
298 The court has explained the distinction this way:  
Although designing or inventing around patents to make new inventions is encouraged, piracy is not. Thus, where an 
infringer, instead of inventing around a patent by making a substantial change, merely makes an insubstantial change, 
essentially misappropriating or even ‘stealing’ the patented invention, infringement may lie under the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
299 On the relationship between the doctrine of equivalents and inventing around, see Paul N. Katz, The Doctrine of Equivalents 
and Its Impact on “Designing Around,” 4 FED. CIR. B.J. 315 (1994). One reason to allow inventing around is that otherwise there 
might be a perverse incentive to seek out nonobvious solutions to problems when obvious solutions were possible. Patent law 
would be more difficult to administer if a patent’s validity depended on whether there were any obvious solutions to the relevant 
problem, rather than on whether the particular means of solving the problem was nonobvious.  
300 Louis Kaplow, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1813, 1869 (1984). 
301 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 450, 455 (1969). A potential 
counterargument is that funds allocated to inventing around would not necessarily have been allocated to other research and 
development activities. If research and development has large social benefits that inventors are unable to internalize, inventing 
around conceivably could on average have benefits larger than costs. Encouraging inventing around, however, is a crude means 
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inventing around ultimately may result in lower prices to consumers, “there might be a serious 
diminution in incentive to come up with the [original] invention in the first place.”302  
Despite theoretical models suggesting that the possibility of licensing should make 
inventing around rare,303 empirical evidence indicates that inventing around is widespread304 and 
costly. 305 A prize system, at least on initial inspection, promises to ameliorate the problem. If a 
patent is placed in the public domain, then there will be no incentive to invent around it. To be 
sure, there will remain an incentive to invest research funds in possible improvements, for 
example in pharmaceutical products that have fewer side effects or that serve different segments 
of the population, though the incentive will be less than before. Private incentives should be 
aligned more closely with social ones, as inventors will pursue research if and only if it improves 
upon what is already in the public domain. 
There are, however, two significant concerns. First, a prize system may increase the 
incentive to invent around a patent that has not been placed in the public domain, for example 
because the original inventor decided not to opt in to an optional prize system. If a prize system 
pays an inventor more than the monopoly profit than she could earn on an invention, 306 as 
suggested by some of the reward proposals, the incentive to invent around will be greater than it 
otherwise would have been. Anticipating this outcome, the original inventor may invest less in 
research, anticipating a reduction in appropriable benefits from innovating. As Kremer has noted, 
allowing the original inventor to opt for the prize system once the substitute product is invented 
may provide one solution. 307 The solution is an imperfect one, though no worse than the existing 
patent system. The creation of a perfect substitute, for example, would mean that the original and 
subsequent inventors each would receive half of the prize. Thus, wasteful inventing around will 
still occur, and this inventing around will decrease ex ante incentives to innovate. 
An alternative, though messier, solution would be to provide smaller or no rewards for 
those who have invented around. For example, if the inventor of a perfect substitute sought a 
reward, no reward would be appropriate, because there would be no social benefit from the 
research. Although placement of the perfect substitute into the public domain would lower prices 
for consumers and eliminate deadweight loss, it would hurt the original inventor and thus 
decrease that inventor’s innovation incentives, which the patent system presumably optimized. A 
partial substitute, such as a product that was better in some ways than the original, would receive 
some reward, but a lesser one. Assuming it is possible to calibrate rewards based on such criteria, 
the prize system at least will not increase incentives to invent around, though many inventors 
presumably would respond by not opting out of the patent system, if given the choice. The patent 
prize proposals discussed in Part I, however, would need modification to allow such calibration. 
Second, while placing a product in the public domain eliminates the incentive to invent 
around, it may lead to inefficient excessive research into improvements on the initial invention. 
We are now full circle back to the common pool problem and to the observation that if an 
                                                                                                                                                             
of encouraging research and development. 
302 Kaplow, supra note 300, at 1870. 
303 See, e.g., Martin J. Adelman, The Supreme Court, Market Structure and Innovation: Chakrabarty, Rohm, and Haas, 27 
ANTITRUST BULL. 457, 464 (1982). 
304 See Edwin Mansfield et al., Imitation Costs and Patents: An Empirical Study, 91 ECON. J. 907 (1981). 
305 For figures on the costs of inventing around, see Richard C. Levin et al., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research 
and Development, in 3 BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 783 (Martin N. Baily et al. eds., 1987). 
306 Or, more accurately in this context, more than the duopoly profit that the inventor would earn, since the inventor will have to 
compete with the original patent holder. 
307 See Kremer, supra note 20, at 1154-55; supra text accompanying notes 161-163. 
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improvement on the initial invention is promising, there may be excessive research that 
dissipates the rent achievable from such improvement s.308 Patents allow the monopolist to limit 
the amount of subsequent innovation, but placing patents in the public domain eliminates this 
ability. Conceivably, the inefficiency from excessive investment in improvements could offset or 
even swamp the efficiency benefits of the prize system for a particular innovation. The only 
proposal that does not suffer from this problem is Lichtman’s coupon scheme, though we have 
seen that this approach may be inferior to patent buyouts in some instances.309 Thus, the common 
pool problem once again indicates that an ideal prize system would lead to patent buyouts in 
some instances and coupon schemes in others. And even where a patent buyout is optimal, an 
ideal patent buyout scheme would calibrate prizes so that any economic loss from excessive 
investment is deducted from prizes.  
 
C. The Adverse Selection Problem 
While the common pool problem affects both patent and prize systems, the creation of a 
regime in which inventors may choose between patent protection and prizes, as the prize system 
proposals reviewed earlier suggest,310 presents a new problem, that of adverse selection. 311 
Inventors presumably will choose the system that will offer them the highest returns, taking into 
account as well the relative uncertainties of remuneration in both systems.312 Inventors may 
choose prizes because they believe, possibly on the basis of information not available to the 
administrators of the prize system, that their returns from the prize system will be unusually high 
relative to the patent system. The result is similar to what George Akerlof observed of the used 
car market, that the selection effect will produce a high number of “lemons.”313 The following 
sections explore two ways that a prize application might be a lemon. 
1. Prizes for Commercially Unattractive Inventions 
The most obvious aspect of the adverse selection problem is that prizes might be paid to 
inventors with commercially unattractive inventions.314 As with all adverse selection problems, 
                                                 
308 See supra text accompanying note 260. 
309 See supra notes 191–192 and accompanying text. 
310 All of the proposals discussed in Part I are opt-in, though Shavell and van Ypersele note that a mandatory system might have 
advantages over an optional one. See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 539-40; supra notes 102–105 and accompanying 
text. 
311 “Adverse selection” is a phrase common in the insurance context. See KENNETH S. ABRAHAM,  DISTRIBUTING RISK: 
INSURANCE , LEGAL THEORY , AND PUBLIC POLICY 15 (1986) (defining “adverse selection” as “the process by which low-risk 
insureds tend to purchase less coverage, and high-risk insureds tend to purchase more coverage than they would if prices were 
more accurate”). 
312 Uncertainty in a prize system would not be fatal to it, though a high variance of outcomes might reduce the effective prize to 
inventors. See infra notes 402-403 and accompanying text. 
313 George A. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488 (1970). 
314 Commercially unattractive inventions are not inherently problematic, if the inventions have public goods properties that 
would prevent them from being privately exploited. One criticism of current U.S. technology policy is that it sometimes allows 
private parties to both receive government grants and then obtain patents on the resulting products. See Bayh-Dole Act, Act of 
Dec. 12, 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015-3028 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-211, 307 (1994)) (allowing 
businesses to obtain patents on government-sponsored research). See generally Peter S. Arno & Michael H. Davis, Why Don’t We 
Enforce Existing Drug Price Controls? The Unrecognized and Unenforced Reasonable Pricing Requirements Imposed Upon 
Patents Deriving in Whole or in Part from Federally Funded Research, 75 TUL. L. REV. 631 (2001) (urging enforcement of legal 
requirements that inventions supported by federal funding be sold at reasonable prices); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Public Research 
and Private Development: Patents and Technology Transfer in Government-Sponsored Research, 82 VA. L. REV. 1663 (1996) 
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the greater the degree of asymmetric information, the more severe the problem.315 To consider an 
extreme example, suppose that the inventor of a drug has private information that the drug will 
alleviate the symptoms it targets for only the first year of use, but this information has not been 
made public.316 Because the administrator of the prize system does not have access to this 
information, the prize awarded presumably will be higher than it otherwise would be, given the 
importance of this information. It is possible that the effect of high prizes will be benign, if they 
simply provide generally increased incentives to engage in research and development activities. 
The excess prizes, though, consume social resources that might be targeted more effectively. 
Conceivably, moreover, anticipation of such high prizes might distort research investment, with 
funds channeled toward areas in which possession of asymmetric information is relatively likely.  
There are two basic strategies that a prize system can use to address the problem. The 
first is to take it into account by offering lower prizes than otherwise would be given. Just as 
buyers of used cars implicitly take into account the lemons problem by recognizing that used 
cars often have more problems than comparably aged cars not sold on the used car market,317 the 
administrator might give lower prizes based on the possibility of asymmetric information than it 
otherwise would give. Though Shavell and van Ypersele do not discuss the adverse selection 
problem directly, their model implicitly takes it into account, awarding smaller prizes than they 
would otherwise because inventors’ asymmetric knowledge about demand will make those with 
poor prospects more likely to take the prize.318 Similarly, the government could examine market 
test results skeptically in calculating a patent buyout price in the Guell and Fischbaum scheme. 
Kremer’s approach, meanwhile, automatically would result in lower prizes, because auction 
bidders, like used car buyers, would recognize the problem of adverse selection, 319 though if 
competitors have better information than the government, the depression might be relatively 
minimal. Lowering rewards would be more difficult for Lichtman’s coupon scheme, which 
requires that the coupons be great enough to enable low-valuing users to purchase the product 
and to incentivize the monopolist to offer it at a low price. 
The second strategy is to wait for more information before awarding a prize. This 
approach is integral to Shavell and van Ypersele’s suggestion that the government might adjust 
rewards on an annual basis, basing adjustments on revised calculations of demand from actual 
sales data.320 Waiting would be more difficult with the Guell and Fischbaum approach, since 
eventually the market test must end so that actual sales of the drug can begin. As Kremer 
describes his proposal, money would be paid immediately after the auction, thus eliminating the 
                                                                                                                                                             
(arguing that allowing patentability of government-sponsored research may interfere with technological progress). In theory, such 
a regime can be justifiable if the research can be partly exploited by private parties but government grants are needed to 
complement already existing private research incentives to overcome public goods problems. See, e.g., Richard E. Romano, 
Aspects of R&D Subsidization, 104 Q.J. ECON. 863 (1989) (developing a theoretical model in which the government sometimes 
increases social welfare by subsidizing private investment leading to grants of patents). 
315 On the connection between adverse selection and asymmetric information in the securities context, see Bernard S. Black, The 
Legal and Institutional Preconditions for Strong Securities Markets , 48 UCLA L. REV. 781, 804-05 (2001). 
316 This may be unlikely given rigorous FDA disclosure requirements. See 21 U.S.C. 355(b)(1)(A) (1994) (requiring “full reports 
of investigations which have been made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use and whether such drug is effective in 
use”). 
317 For an explanation of the lemons problem concluding that “consumers do not overpay,” see Timothy J. Muris, California 
Dental Association v. Federal Trade Commission: The Revenge of Footnote 17, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 265, 288 (2000). 
318 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 539; supra text accompanying notes 100-101. 
319 In addition, Kremer emphasizes that the markup would lessen the adverse selection problem by giving even inventors with 
commercializable inventions incentives to accept prizes. See Kremer, supra note 20, at 1142; supra text accompanying notes 
134-135. 
320 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 542; supra text accompanying notes 108-110. 
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benefit of delay. Finally, Lichtman’s proposal does not allow for delay. The government must be 
able to determine in advance the size of coupons and to whom they should be awarded. 
Similarly, in the suggested modification to his proposal in which the government would agree 
with the patent holder on a set price,321 the government must be able to calculate this price in 
advance.  
In making these comparisons, my intention is not merely to add to the dizzying list of 
considerations needed to compare prize system proposals. Rather, it is to show that the list is 
dizzying, as would be any final empirical comparison of different proposals, even taking into 
account only the adverse selection consideration addressed in this section of the article. The 
analysis also suggests that sometimes, it might be worthwhile for some combination of 
approaches to be used. For example, Kremer’s proposal might be modified so that the high bid is 
just one factor, along with the success of the product once placed in the public domain, used to 
determine compensation for inventors. Similarly, the government administering a coupon 
scheme might allow the patent holder to set its own price, promising to pay an eventual cash 
prize dependent on the results achieved, or might set the ultimate value of the coupons to the 
patent holder ex post. These considerations suggest again that there will be a benefit to flexibility 
in administering a prize system, a benefit that we ultimately will balance against any costs of 
flexibility. 322 
2. Unnecessary Prizes 
The above reasoning suggests that we should be wary when someone chooses a prize 
over a patent because that may indicate that the inventor did not believe that patent protection 
would be valuable. Even if the government can address this by estimating the value of patents, 
some prize applicants might have decided not to price their products monopolistically even if the 
patents were valuable. In the extreme case, a patent holder might have released the patent to the 
public domain even in the absence of a prize system; in a less extreme case, a patent holder 
might license a patent at a relatively low cost. A patent holder might do this for reputational 
reasons, for example because the patent owner might expect criticism for fully exploiting its 
patent.323 Some such patent holders, however, might apply for prizes anyway, meaning that tax 
dollars will be spent on what otherwise would not have been a government-sponsored program. 
The flip side of the dilemma is that a company might release a patent to the public 
domain because doing so will not prevent the company from achieving monopolistic pricing. If 
the company had a patent on a complementary product as well, the company might decide to 
exploit the combined set of patents through high prices for one rather than for both. 324 Giving a 
prize to the company for releasing the patent that it otherwise would not have exploited may not 
                                                 
321 See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text. 
322 See infra Part III.A. 
323 This is hardly naïve speculation. Some pharmaceutical companies, for example, have allowed their patents to be used for free 
in third world countries without payment. See, e.g., Rachel L. Warns, Drug Makers Drop South Africa Suit over AIDS Medicine,  
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at A1 (reporting that the pharmaceutical industry bowed to “mounting public pressure” by dropping a 
lawsuit that sought to prevent uncompensated use of patents on AIDS drugs); Helene Cooper et al., Patents Pending: AIDS 
Epidemic Traps Drug Firms in a Vise: Treatment vs. Profits, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 2001, at A1 (discussing drug companies’ 
dilemma about whether to allow generic copies of their drugs in poor countries). For conflicting editorial views on patent 
enforcement by drug companies in poor countries, compare South Africa’s AIDS Victory,  N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 20, 2001, at A18, 
with Robert M. Goldberg, Fight AIDS with Reason, not Rhetoric, WALL ST. J., Apr. 23, 2001, at A22. 
324 This observation is central to Kremer’s concern that companies might be overcompensated for complementary patents under 
his system. See Kremer, supra note 20, at 1155-57; supra text accompanying notes 159-160. 
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be necessary. Similarly, a patent holder might be a natural monopoly producer of the product it 
has patented,325 or it might be able to credibly threaten potential entrants into a market with either 
predatory pricing326 or litigation. 327 If so, then the patent holder gives up nothing by releasing the 
product into the public domain, and paying the patent holder for doing so will fail to reduce 
deadweight loss. 
The welfare consequences of awarding patent prizes to the benevolent patent holder 
(albeit not so benevolent as to suggest that the government keep its own money) are equivocal. It 
may make sense to award prizes for innovations that a company for publicity reasons would 
decide not to exploit, as a way of ensuring that there are continued incentives for the 
development of research into such areas. On the other hand, the positive reputational effect of 
releasing a product into the public domain without a prize may be sufficient by itself to stimulate 
research in some cases, so the government may end up subsidizing some research that would 
have been performed even in the absence of the prize system. The welfare consequences of 
paying prizes in the case of the inevitable monopolist are less equivocal. It is possible that the 
prizes will provide companies an additional incentive to invest in research and development,328 
but such prizes will be of no help in limiting deadweight loss. Moreover, companies that have 
nothing to lose from placing a patent in the public domain will be more likely than others to seek 
prizes.  
The first three proposals discussed in Part I are not directly responsive to the problem. 
The Guell and Fischbaum proposal, for example, would base a prize on monopoly profits 
extrapolated from a test market, but the prize recipient would be able to continue to charge 
monopoly prices in other markets. In the Kremer market proposal, a bidder may bid a great deal 
for monopoly rights, which would allow exclusion of the original patent holder, even if the 
original patent holder would continue to dominate the market if the product were randomized to 
the public domain. Even the Shavell and van Ypersele proposal, while considering subsequent 
sales data, is based on calculation of the demand curve, rather than the supply curve. To address 
                                                 
325 A natural monopoly is “[a] monopoly in which the relation between industry demand and cost structure makes it possible for 
only one firm to exist in the industry.” EKELUND & TOLLISON , supra note 42, at 255. Some commentators and courts have 
analogized all patents to natural monopolies, urging that patent holders be regulated in a manner similar to the price regulation 
techniques used for utilities. See generally John W. Schlicher, If Economic Welfare Is the Goal, Will Economic Analysis Redefine 
Patent Law?, J. PROPRIETARY RTS., June 1992, at 12, 15-16 (discussing such theories). If a patent were placed in the public 
domain, however, there might or might not be a natural monopoly for the corresponding product, depending largely on the startup 
costs for building a plant to produce the product. 
326 Whether predatory pricing is in fact a viable strategy for avoiding competition is a much-debated question in the economics 
literature. Compare JOHN R. LOTT, JR., ARE PREDATORY COMMITMENTS CREDIBLE?: WHO [sic] SHOULD THE COURTS BELIEVE? 
(1999) (arguing with empirical evidence that profit -maximizing firms rarely engage in predatory pricing), with Peter H. Huang, 
Still Preying on Strategic Reputation Models of Predation, 3 GREEN BAG 2D 437 (2000) (reviewing LOTT,  supra) (presenting 
empirical analysis supporting the existence of predatory pricing). A significant early work offering a model in which predatory 
pricing might occur is Paul Milgrom & John Roberts, Predation, Reputation, and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. ECON. THEORY  280 
(1982) (offering a model in which predatory pricing might occur). 
327 Intimidation through litigation is rarely sanctionable under the antitrust laws, as a result of the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, 
unless the litigation is a “sham.” See generally Eastern R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc, 365 U.S. 127 
(1961) (finding action by trucking companies to obtain favorable governmental action not illegal under antitrust laws); United 
Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657 (1965) (holding that joint efforts to influence government are not illegal even if 
intended to eliminate competition); James B. Perrine, Defining the “Sham Litigation” Exception to the Noerr-Pennington 
Antitrust Immunity Doctrine: An Analysis of the Professional Real Estate Investors v. Columbia Pictures Industries  Decision, 46 
ALA. L. REV. 815 (1995) (exploring the “sham” exception to the doctrine). 
328 Other schemes, such as tax breaks for research-and-development expenses, might be better targeted. See generally  Stephen A 
Jones, The Danforth-Baucus Proposal to Restructure the Research and Development Tax Credit: Providing a More Reliable 
Incentive for Commercial Experimentation, 42 TAX LAW. 1089, 1093-97 (1989) (considering the strengths and weaknesses of 
R&D tax credits). 
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the problem, all of these proposals would have to be modified to allow some ex post check that 
the product’s placement into the public domain has had a meaningful effect. 
The problem, though, would not affect the Lichtman proposal at all. After all, the 
Lichtman proposal imagines that a single seller would continue to sell the product. If a single 
producer has a natural monopoly, eliminating deadweight loss demands that the government 
provide appropriate incentives to the producer, rather than use a mechanism that would allow 
others to join the market. Thus, ironically, Lichtman’s proposal, which was least flexible in 
addressing the adverse selection problem discussed in the previous section, is best insulated from 
the adverse selection problem addressed in this section. This observation underscores the 
difficulty of identifying a single best proposal. Moreover, the severity of the problem discussed 
here might vary from market to market, applicable more to industries with high fixed costs and 
to products with high marginal costs of production. This emphasizes again the virtues of a 
system that encourages different approaches depending on which is the most efficient in the 
particular context. 
D. Costs of a Prize System 
A prize system cannot be assessed merely by examining the prizes ultimately rewarded 
and determining whether those awards will tend to encourage or discourage innovative activity. 
The costs of operating any prize system must also be considered. The government will incur 
costs from paying prizes, of course, but it also may incur costs in the administration of the prize 
system. Indirect costs incurred by inventors also are relevant. These include the costs of any 
litigation that results from disputes over prizes, as well as money that investors will spend in 
political rent-seeking activities. The patent system, of course, may result in costs in some of 
these categories, and prize system costs will be additional to the patent system’s unless the prize 
system lessens the costs of the patent system. This section considers the implications of these 
various types of costs for a prize system.  
1. Financing Costs 
For government prizes to substitute for monopoly power in rewarding innovation, the 
government must pay money for innovations. At first glance, the government necessarily comes 
out ahead. When giving putative patent holders what would have been their monopoly profits, 
the government saves consumers this amount, plus what would have been deadweight loss to 
boot. A dollar spent thus achieves more than a dollar in benefits, thus seeming to pass a 
rudimentary cost-benefit analysis.329 The problem with this analysis is that, under the traditional 
economic wisdom,330 a proper evaluation of a social program should count a dollar as more than 
                                                 
329 Some commentators might argue that because patents on products like drugs involve health, cost-benefit analysis is an 
inapprop riate, commodificationist tool. See, e.g., ELIZABETH ANDERSON,  VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS (1993). Several 
scholars in recent years have defended cost-benefit analysis against this line of critique. See Matthew Adler, Incommensurability 
and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 146 U. PA. L. RE V. 1371 (1998); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit 
Analysis, 109 YALE L.J. 165, 194-225 (1999); Lewis A. Kornhauser, On Justifying Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 
1037 (2000); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059 (2000) (arguing that cost-
benefit analysis is best justified as a tool for helping to overcome biases due to cognitive heuristics). 
330 Concern with the relevance of the distortionary effect of taxation for funding of public goods dates at least to ARTHUR C. 
PIGOU, A STUDY IN PUBLIC FINANCE  33-34 (3d ed. 1947). Some of the most important subsequent work, however, ignored the 
problem. Paul Samuelson, most notably, simply assumed a lump sum tax that would impose no economic distortion. See Paul A. 
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 RE V. ECON. & STATS. 387 (1954). 
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a dollar, because government funds cost money to raise. Taxation causes economic distortions.331 
Taxing apples will lead consumers to eat fewer apples and more oranges; taxing income may 
lead taxed entities to make less of it.332 In addition, greater levels of taxation lead to increased 
expenditures on tax avoidance, such as through hiring of accountants and tax lawyers.333 
Governments can finance expenditures with deficit spending instead of taxation, but this has its 
own problems.334 The possibility of various means of fundraising cannot escape the need to 
consider the distortionary cost of each additional dollar in federal spending. 
 The distortionary effect of taxation is integral to Lichtman’s analysis. Recall that 
Lichtman showed how a coupon scheme might achieve the same decrease in deadweight loss as 
a patent buyout at a fraction of the cost.335 One might ask, though, why the difference in costs 
matters. The reduced costs to the government in Lichtman’s scheme come at the expense of 
consumers, who provide the rest of the funds needed to make up what would have been 
monopoly profits, so the total amount being paid by the government plus consumers remains the 
same. The answer is that the government’s expenses are of greater concern because of tax 
distortions. Lichtman guesses that the deadweight loss attributable to tax collection is 30 cents on 
the dollar.336 Because the deadweight loss from monopoly under his assumptions would be 50 
cents on the dollar, a patent buyout would save 20 cents per dollar relative to the patent system, 
but a properly implemented consumer subsidy of only about four cents per dollar.337 The precise 
estimates that he uses are not relevant. As long as there is some distortionary effect of taxation, a 
program that results in less government expenditure, even at the expense of consumer 
expenditure, should be preferred. 
A recent literature, however, emphasizes that while the tax system as a whole is 
distortionary, some increases in taxes may not be.338 One reason is that while taxation may distort 
relative prices, once an economy is already distorted by taxes, the adoption of a new tax 
conceivably might bring relative prices more closely into line.339 If, for a simple example, the 
investment tax credit is distortionary, then repeal of the credit may both raise revenue and 
                                                 
331 A policy-induced economic distortion is a government policy that causes individuals to alter what would otherwise be their 
preferred behavior. For a useful vocabulary and typology of distortions, see Richard S. Markovits, The Allocative Efficiency of 
Shifting from a “Negligence” System to a “Strict-Liability” Regime in Our Highly-Pareto-Imperfect Economy: A Partial and 
Preliminary Third-Best-Allocative-Efficiency Analysis , 73 CHI.-KENT L. RE V. 11, 30-33 (1998). 
332 An income tax causes distortions in individuals’ allocation of time between work and leisure, while a consumption tax also 
distorts individuals’ allocation of income between savings and consumption. See Daniel N. Shaviro, An Efficiency Analysis of 
Realization and Recognition Rules Under the Federal Income Tax, 48 TAX L. REV. 1, 24-25 (1992) (concluding that a 
consumption tax nonetheless may be less distortionary than an income tax). 
333 See, e.g., DAVID F. BRADFORD , UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX 175 (1986) (emphasizing the high costs of such tax avoidance). 
Higher taxes also might induce more tax evasion. See, e.g., Nehemiah Friedman et al., A Simulation Study of Income Tax 
Evasion, 10 J. PUB. ECON. 107 (1978) (offering a simulation in which higher tax rates produce more tax evasion). See generally 
FRANK A. COWELL, CHEATING THE GOVERNMENT: THE ECONOMICS OF EVASION (1990). 
334 A seminal article exploring the benefits and costs of deficit financing is Robert J. Barro, On the Determination of Public Debt, 
87 J. POL. ECON. 940 (1979). 
335 See supra Lichtman, supra note 21, at 135; see also supra text accompanying notes 190-191 (arguing that a coupon scheme 
sometimes might be more expensive than a patent buyout). 
336 Lichtman, supra note 21, at 133 & n.26 (citing Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The Endangered Species Act : A Case Study in 
Takings & Incentives , 49 STAN. L. REV.  305, 355 (1997), which estimates the deadweight loss from a marginal increase in taxes 
to be between 17 and 56 cents per dollar raised). Thompson in turn obtains these numbers from Charles L. Ballard et al., General 
Equilibrium Computations of the Marginal Welfare Costs of Taxes in the United States , 75 AM. ECON. REV. 128 (1985). Later 
work by Ballard, however, has called these conclusions into question. See infra notes 338–341 and accompanying text. 
337 Lichtman, supra note 21, at 135 & tbl.5. 
338 For an overview of this literature, see Charles L. Ballard & Don Fullerton, Distortionary Taxes and the Provision of Public 
Goods, 6 J. ECON. PERSPECTIVES 117 (1992). 
339 See, e.g., Jean Drèze & Nicholas Stern, Policy Reform, Shadow Prices, and Market Prices , 42 J. PUB. ECON. 1 (1990). 
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improve efficiency. 340 This analysis, however, is presumably relevant only if a proposal for a 
prize system were accompanied by a specific tax proposal. The second reason is generally 
applicable to income taxes. It is that an increase in income taxes may lead workers to work more 
rather than less,341 if the income effect of the tax (the tendency of workers to work more because 
the lower wage decreases demand for normal goods, including leisure time) outweighs the 
substitution effect (the tendency of workers to work less because the tax decreases the 
opportunity cost of leisure).342 Intuitively, a worker who is paid less may work more to maintain 
a given standard of living.343 
For at least two reasons, the recent literature should not encourage complacency about the 
distortionary effects of taxation. First, the literature generally places aside the tax system’s 
administrative and compliance costs,344 the latter of which in particular plausibly might be 
impacted by tax rate increases. Second, the literature does not explicitly consider that the 
provision of a public good itself may have a negative effect on labor supply. People care about 
their income because their level of income will affect their ability to purchase goods. If suddenly 
a number of goods become free (or much cheaper), income will be less significant. To take a 
reductionist example, suppose the only two goods in the economy were food and prescription 
drugs. If prescription drugs suddenly became free, then there would be a reduced incentive to 
work, because the money previously spent on drugs might make a smaller contribution to utility 
if spent entirely in the food category. How strong this effect is in a real economy depends on the 
context.345 
In the absence of a consensus that in our actual tax system increases in taxes will 
decrease tax distortions, it thus would be hazardous to disregard the concern about the potentially 
distortionary effect of increased income taxes. At the least, it seems a reasonable premise that 
government programs costing less should, all else being equal, be preferred to government 
programs costing more. One possible response to the distortionary effect might be to tax 
specifically those who benefit from a patent prize system in a particular context. As Louis 
Kaplow shows, if a public good is funded by a tax allocated to the benefit each individual 
                                                 
340 See Ballard & Fullerton, supra note 338, at 129 (citing Don Fullerton & Yolanda K. Henderson, The Marginal Excess Burden 
of Different Capital Tax Instruments , 71 RE V. ECON. & STATS. 435 (1989)). Another example is that of “a Pigouvian, externality-
correcting tax.” Id. (citing Charles L. Ballard & Steven G. Medema, The Marginal Efficiency Effects of Taxes and Subsidies in 
the Presence of Externalities: A Computational General Equilibrium Approach (1991) (unpublished manuscript, available from 
Michigan State University)). 
341 See Joseph E. Stiglitz & Partha S. Dasgupta, Differential Taxation, Public Goods, and Economic History, 38 RE V. ECON. 
STUDS. 151, 159 (1971); see also Ballard & Fullerton, supra note 338, at 122-24. 
342 On income and substitution effects, see NICHOLSON, supra note 87, at 135-37. For a review of the literature suggesting that 
the elasticity of labor supply may be negative for certain groups of earners, see Gary Burtless, The Work Response to a 
Guaranteed Income: A Survey of Experimental Evidence, in LESSONS FROM THE INCOME M AINTENANCE EXPERIMENTS (Alicia H. 
Munnell ed., 1987). 
343 Whether this is true for a particular worker may depend on the current income of that worker, if the labor supply curve is 
“backward-bending.” See generally GEORGE J. BORJAS, LABOR ECONOMICS 43 (1996) (explaining backward-bending labor supply 
curves). 
344 See Ballard & Fullerton, supra note 338, at 118-19 (“Although these costs are doubtless important, they have generally been 
ignored by the economists studying the marginal cost of public funds since the 1970s.”). 
345 A relevant part of the context is whether individuals care more about their ability to purchase goods because these goods are 
inherently valuable to them or because these goods are valuable to them primarily because others possess them. Robert H. Frank 
has argued that the answer depends on the goods at issue and has used the terms “nonpositional goods” (in which category he 
includes education and health care) and “positional goods” to refer to the respective types. See, e.g., ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY 
FEVER: WHY M ONEY FAILS TO SATISFY IN AN ERA OF EXCESS passim  (1999); see also Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-
Benefit Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 370-71 (2001) (exploring the significance of the distinction for 
cost-benefit analysis). Frank’s identification of health care as a nonpositional good suggests that free distribution of drugs would 
not have as great a negative effect on the supply of labor as it would if it were a positional good. 
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receives from it, then there is no tax distortion from it.346 Of course, if a patent buyout were 
funded by an excise tax, the tax would defeat the purpose of the buyout, raising the price of the 
product back to the monopoly price.347 On the other hand, the government might fund a patent 
prize system by relying on proxies indicating who would benefit from it. For example, to fund a 
patent prize system designed to buy out patents on agricultural technology, the government 
might tax all farmers, regardless of whether they subsequently decided to purchase products 
containing the technology. Such taxes often will be politically unattractive, however, because in 
the absence of excellent proxies, they will result in heavy levies being imposed on some 
individuals who do not benefit at all. 
Prize systems thus ordinarily would likely be funded from general tax receipts, with some 
presumed tax distortion effect. In comparing any particular prize system proposal, however, an 
individualized evaluation of any redistributive benefit from the proposal should accompany an 
analysis of the distortionary tax effect. Louis Kaplow observes that a prime reason that income 
taxes are distortionary relative to a hypothetical lump sum tax is that they are progressive.348 “But 
if this assumption is to be made,” Kaplow argues, “the distributive benefit of the more 
progressive tax/expenditure system should be included in the final account.”349 Even apart from 
the point that redistributive benefits should be counted at least insofar as they offset distortionary 
costs,350 redistributive benefits are potentially relevant to an assessment of a patent prize system. 
Although many commentators urge that redistribution should generally be accomplished through 
the income tax, 351 patent prize proposals may accomplish redistribution other than Robin Hood 
reallocation of resources from the rich to the poor. For example, a patent prize system for 
prescription drugs might redistribute from the healthy to the sick, and it might accomplish this 
goal more efficiently than an alternative tax provision aimed at this goal could.352  
Two general points, potentially offsetting, flow from the above analysis. First, 
Lichtman’s observation that cheaper means of eliminating deadweight loss should be preferred is 
                                                 
346 Kaplow explains this intuition by imagining an individual for whom a public goods program produces benefits exactly equal 
to one percent of income, where the program is funded by a one percent tax: 
For each additional dollar an individual might earn, he will have one cent less than otherwise available for private 
consumption, 69 cents instead of 70 cents. However, the individual will benefit in an amount worth one additional cent 
due to the availability of the public good, raising his aggregate marginal benefit from earning a dollar back to 70 cents. 
That is, his net utility benefit from earning an additional dollar will be precisely what it was before—without the public 
good and the tax adjustment. Because each individual’s net benefit from any level of labor effort is thus unchanged, 
labor supply will be unaffected and each individual’s utility will be the same as it was before. 
Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Supply of Public Goods and the Distortionary Cost of Taxation, NAT’L TAX J., Dec. 1, 1996, at 513, 
515. 
347 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 544 (noting that “commodity taxation . . . is essentially equivalent to granting 
intellectual property rights”). The patent buyout program must pay the patent holder monopoly profits. Thus, if the program is to 
be funded by purchases of the product, each purchaser must pay monopoly profits divided by the number of purchasers. The 
number of purchasers will be the same as the equilibrium under monopoly, since the next marginal potential consumer would not 
be willing to pay the excise tax required. 
348 Kaplow, supra note 346, at 521. 
349 Id.  
350 In a separate work, written with Steven Shavell, Kaplow has emphasized the importance of concerns about the distribution of 
income to welfare economics. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare, 114 HARV. L. REV. 961, 989-98 
(2001). 
351 See, e.g., id. at 993 (“[W]hen legal rules do have distributive effects, the effects usually should not be counted as favoring or 
disfavoring the rules because distributional objectives can often be best accomplished directly, using the income tax and transfer 
(welfare) programs.”). 
352 Ann Alstott has analogous argued that institutional constraints on the tax system may make the earned income tax credit a less 
appealing alternative to welfare programs than it might at first appear. See Ann L. Alstott, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Limitations of Tax-Based Welfare Reform, 108 HARV. L. REV. 533 (1995). 
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probably a useful generalization, but with the awareness that the importance of the effect can be 
exaggerated. Second, more expensive alternatives nonetheless should be considered if they 
produce redistributive benefits. Even if a buyout program were eight times more expensive than 
a coupon scheme, and I have shown that this will be unlikely,353 it might be desirable for the 
government to adopt the costlier proposal. The difference in social cost, which depends on the 
distortionary effect on taxation, will likely in any event be considerably less than the difference 
in the government’s costs. Of course, redistributive benefits may vary from program to program, 
or even patent to patent. A patent buyout for a “lifestyle drug” might be viewed as having neutral 
or even negative redistributive consequences.354 Once again, these observations suggest 
skepticism about a one-size-fits-all patent buyout program. 
2. Administrative Costs 
In addition to paying prizes themselves, the government would need to pay the costs of 
running the administrative agency overseeing the prize system. Consideration of these costs may 
seem to make more attractive proposals that invest little discretion in the agency. We have seen, 
however, that none of the proposals can be implemented in a truly mechanical way, if basic 
problems are to be overcome. The test market results from Guell and Fischbaum’s proposal 
would need to be considered individually before being extrapolated to other geographical areas 
and into the future.355 Shavell and van Ypersele derive a formula, but an administrative agency 
would be needed to consider an individual patent’s contribution to a product.356 Similarly, in 
Kremer’s proposal, the agency would need to identify complementary products.357 While 
Lichtman identifies on an economic chart which consumers should receive coupons, the 
procedure for figuring out who these consumers are almost surely necessitates great 
administrative discretion. Finally, if the government agency is to consider many of the factors 
considered in this Part, it is difficult to imagine a statute specifying just the right mechanical 
procedure to follow. 
Thus, if the government were to consider adopting a proposal that binds an agency to 
calculating prizes in some predetermined way, such as one of the ways suggested by the 
proposals discussed in Part I, it would presumably be for some reason other than administrative 
cost. Once bureaucrats are involved in making some individualized considerations for particular 
prize applications, the cost savings from formalizing the overall process seem unlikely to be  
great. A process that specifies the means by which government officials should consider each of 
a hundred factors easily could be more expensive than one that orders the officials simply to 
consider all relevant factors. The empirical comparison is uncertain, of course, but there is little 
theoretical reason to favor complex mechanical formulas to open-ended decisionmaking on cost 
grounds. Even if a mechanical formula could be devised, the government agency at least would 
                                                 
353 See supra text accompanying notes 186-191. 
354 In the United Kingdom, critics of the National Health Service have argued that it should not devote resources to Xenical, an 
anti-obesity pill that they claim is a lifestyle drug. See Valerie Hannah, Drug Giant Under Investigation over Side Effects of 
Cholesterol Pill, HERALD (Glasgow), Sept. 5, 2001, at 3, available at 2001 WL 26585561. Of course, there is considerable debate 
about which drugs are lifestyle drugs. Dave Hill, Viagra Nation,  INDEPENDENT (London), July 15, 2001, at 22, available at 2001 
WL 23539167 (quoting a doctor as saying that calling Viagra a lifestyle drug is “deeply insulting to those men and their partners 
who find this condition very distressing”). 
355 See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text. 
356 See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text. 
357 See supra notes 165-166 and accompanying text. 
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need some latitude to verify the correctness of data submitted to it, such as industry sales figures 
used to justify a claim for a large prize, thus reducing the benefits of automation. 
While Congress would surely need to consider the costs of operating an administrative 
agency to distribute patent rewards, there is little reason to think that some proposals for 
structuring an agency will be cheaper than others. A government truly intent on reducing costs 
might offer a fixed allocation to the agency, perhaps even making part of the  agency employees’ 
compensation contingent on finishing the job assigned.358 Perhaps of greater import is the effect 
of different proposals on the Patent and Trademark Office, whose costs are not trivial,359 without 
even considering the cost to firms of prosecuting patents before the Office. Proposals that require 
applicants to obtain patents before buyouts will not affect the operation of the Office. Proposals, 
by contrast, that would allow compensation for innovations without demanding receipt of a 
patent could save the government administrative costs. There would be benefits to requiring 
prize applicants to obtain patents, particularly verification of nonobviousness and adequacy of 
disclosure, though the patent administrative system is designed to provide such verification 
functions only in conjunction with the patent litigation system.360 For some patents, these 
benefits would likely be worth the cost in the prize context, while for others, they might not be. 
A patent system that did not require applicants to obtain patents conceivably could result in net 
administrative cost savings. 
3. Litigation Costs 
Reasonable people might disagree about how large a prize an applicant should receive, 
and such disagreement might be resolved through some type of litigation process. For example, 
an applicant disappointed with a prize might be allowed to sue the agency in federal court,361 and 
the agency itself might offer some form of appeals process.362 Alternatively, a prize system might 
encourage private whistleblowers to reveal fraud in prize applications.363 Regardless of the form 
of the system adopted,364 the costs of such litigation, including both the cost to the parties and the 
cost to the executive and judicial branches, are social costs that offset any benefits of the prize 
system. Whether these costs are worthwhile depends on the benefits litigation offers, for example 
in improving the accuracy of the prize system, in preventing excessive rewards based on faulty 
data, or even in assuring the due process rights of prize applicants.365 
                                                 
358 Agencies often miss statutory deadlines. While one commentator has responded by proposition the abolition of such 
deadlines, see Alden F. Abbott, The Case Against Federal Statutory and Judicial Deadlines: A Cost-Benefit Appraisal, 39 
ADMIN. L. REV. 171 (1987), an alternative approach would be to create compensation-based incentives. 
359 The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks recently complained that the PTO’s final fiscal year 2000 budget of $871 
million was too low. See Remarks of Q. Todd Dickinson at PTO Day Annual Conference on Patent & Trademark Office Law and 
Practice, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 219, 226 (2000). 
360 See supra Part II.A.2 (explaining the importance of having a system for screening valid from invalid patents). 
361 If the organic statute establishing the prize agency did not establish a standard for review, the courts would presumably apply 
the relatively deferential substantial evidence test in reviewing agency decisions. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (1994) (setting forth 
the “substantial evidence” test); cf. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 152 (1999) (requiring the Federal Circuit to evaluate fact-
finding by the Patent and Trademark Office using the substantial evidence test rather than the clearly erroneous test used to assess 
fact finding by district courts). 
362 A model might be the appeals process used by the Social Security Administration. See 42 U.S.C. § 405 (1994). 
363 The design of a suitable whistleblower system itself is not a simple matter. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Rescuing the Private 
Attorney General: Why the Model of the Lawyer as Bounty Hunter Is Not Working, 42 M D. L. REV. 215 (1983) (critiquing the 
operation of whistleblower programs). 
364 See infra Part III.I (discussing one approach to structuring litigation). 
365 I am skeptical of the need to be concerned for the due process rights of prize applicants, aside from the formal need for any 
proposal to pass constitutional muster. The reason for my skepticism is that the dignitary rights of inventors are less important 
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Because the authors of patent prize proposals have not described whether and what type 
of litigation over patent prizes would be permitted, comparison of their proposals is difficult. 
Some may have simply assumed that decisions by the agency charged with granting patents 
would be so formulaic as to be uncontroversial. We have seen, though, that no patent prize 
system can be entirely mechanical; judgment calls must be made.366 Even patent prize systems 
that provide a formula to be used for calculation of a prize will need factfinders to determine the 
value of variables to be plugged into the formula. More mechanical proposals, in any event, need 
not necessarily produce greater litigation than more unstructured proposals. For example, if a 
statute implementing Lichtman’s coupon proposal gave an agency a lump sum to spend on 
coupons for prescription drugs, current law would allow little latitude for challenges.367 A statute 
permitting litigation over the size of prizes surely could lead to large litigation costs, but the size 
of such costs will depend more on the rules governing litigation than on the rules governing 
prizes. 
Different patent proposals, however, may differ in the extent to which they reduce 
litigation associated with the existing patent system. If a prize system produces patent buyouts 
placing the patents in the public domain, there ordinarily will be no need for a prize recipient to 
enforce its patent with infringement litigation. 368 Although a patent buyout system might not 
substantially reduce litigation in some situations, for example when only one of several related 
patents is placed in the public domain, the overall potential savings are considerable.369 Prize 
systems that encourage release of information about innovations without requiring acquisition of 
patents also might reduce litigation, though litigation could ensue should someone else 
subsequently obtain a patent arguably derivative of the earlier innovation. 370 Proposals that 
encourage price reduction by patent holders, by contrast, would not necessarily reduce litigation. 
Thus, consideration of the effects on future litigation adds yet another variable to the mix needed 
to compare various approaches. And again, the optimal solution may depend on the properties of 
the particular innovation, as some innovations may be less likely than others to produce the type 
of confusion or ambiguity that would lead to litigation. 
4. Rent-Seeking Costs 
We have already seen that a patent system can dissipate rents, as potential patent holders 
compete to win a patent race,371 and can prevent dissipation of rents, by consolidating ownership 
of improvements on an invention in a single monopolist.372 In these examples, the “rent” is either 
the monopoly profit that a patent holder can capture or the social wealth that competitors can 
                                                                                                                                                             
than, say, the dignitary rights of Social Security applicants. Cf. Jerry L. Mashaw, The Supreme Court’s Due Process Calculus for 
Administrative Adjudication in Matthews v. Eldridge: Three Factors in Search of a Theory of Value, 44 U. CHI. L. REV. 28 
(1976) (criticizing the Supreme Court for not considering the importance of dignitary rights in defining due process). 
366 See, e.g., supra notes 355–357 and accompanying text. 
367 See, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 193-94 (1993) (holding that decision on how to spend a lump sum appropriation was 
“committed to agency discretion by law” and therefore unreviewable). 
368 See Calandrillo, supra note 19, at 333 (noting criticisms that the patent system, unlike reward systems, produce “litigation and 
accompanying administrative costs”). 
369 The average patent infringement case costs an estimated $1.2 million to litigate. See Dee Gill, Defending Your Rights: 
Protecting Intellectual Property Is Expensive and Often Crucial, WALL ST. J., Sept. 25, 2000, at 6 (referring to an unidentified 
“industry survey”). 
370 Even if unpatented, however, information released would be relevant as prior art to defeat a subsequent patent. See 35 U.S.C. 
§ 103(a) (1994) (detailing the prior art requirement). 
371 See supra Part II.B.1. 
372 See supra notes 258–260 and accompanying text. 
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capture, and competition tends to erode the benefit. There is another, more familiar type of rent-
seeking that can be associated with a patent system or with a prize system: rent-seeking through 
regulation. 373 Given the possibility of receiving a government benefit, whether a patent or a prize, 
private companies might invest resources toward influencing the government’s decision. Such 
activity in itself is socially wasteful, and it may generate additional waste as government officials 
compete for such resources or because the rent-seeking activity causes some distortion in the 
economy, for example by altering innovation incentives.374 These costs offset the social benefits 
of the patent or prize system, and if the costs entailed in a prize system are sufficiently high, they 
might outweigh the benefits of a prize system relative to a patent system. 
The problem of rent-seeking should neither be ignored nor exaggerated. On the former 
point, as just one example, several studies have shown that political contributions by companies 
seeking protectionist legislation have a significant effect on legislators’ votes.375 The patent 
system itself is arguably a good example of the latter point. Considerable resources are 
expended, of course, on patent prosecution and patent litigation. 376 The relative independence of 
the Patent and Trademark Office, however, makes direct lobbying unlikely, though industry as a 
whole may affect the selection of high-ranking agency officials.377 Similarly, and interestingly, it 
is rare for a company to lobby Congress to enact legislation extending a patent term, and when 
such efforts are made, they are at least ostensibly based on the ground that there is some fairness 
reason for an extension. 378 Given the potential benefits from an extension, this lack of activity 
suggests a perception that Congress ordinarily will not grant one, probably because legislators 
view the patent system as the exclusive means of obtaining monopoly power in exchange for 
innovation. 379 
Patent prize systems similarly might escape the most blatant rent-seeking abuses. Once 
an agency is established to award prizes, Congress presumably would be skeptical of requests for 
                                                 
373 For an overview of rent-seeking in general and this form of rent-seeking in particular, see DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC 
CHOICE II at 229-38 (1989). 
374 See James M. Buchanan, Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in JAMES M. BUCHANAN ET AL., TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-
SEEKING SOCIETY  3, 12-14 (1980) (discussing these socially costly effects of rent-seeking). 
375 See ROBERT E. BALDWIN & CHRISTOPHER S. MAGEE , IS TRADE POLICY FOR SALE? CONGRESSIONAL VOTING ON RECENT TRADE 
BILLS (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 6376, 1998); Cletus C. Coughlin, Domestic Content Legislation: 
House Voting and the Economics of Regulation, 23 ECON. INQ. 437 (1985); Suzanne C. Tosini & Edward Tower, The Textile Bill 
of 1985: The Determinants of Congressional Voting Patterns, 54 PUBLIC CHOICE 19 (1987); see also MUELLER, supra note 373, 
at 242 (discussing various studies). 
376 See supra note 369; see also Albert F. Bower, The Independent Inventor: In Which a Practitioner Shares Some Highly 
Practical Advice for Safe-Guarding the Products of Intellectual Labor, DEL. LAW., Mar. 1989, at 24, 25 (“A major cost in 
patenting is incurred in preparing and filing the application, mainly because of the attorney time required to make an adequate 
disclosure.”). 
377 Richard L. Revesz, Specialized Courts and the Administrative Lawmaking System , 138 U. PA. L. REV.  1111, 1149 (1990) 
(noting that interest groups may be able to control the selection of officials and judges in relatively specialized agencies and 
courts). 
378 See, e.g., Shailagh Murray, Senate Mulls Bill to Extend Drug Patents , WALL ST. J., Aug. 5, 1999, at A3 (noting that 
proponents of Schering-Ploug’s attempt to obtain legislative extension of the patent for Claritin “argue the extensions are only 
fair, considering delays in the federal approval process for the drugs”); see also Charles R. Babcock, Patent Fight Tests Drug 
Firm’s Clout: Claritin Maker Goes All Out in Congress, WASH .  POST, Oct. 30, 1999, at A1 (noting Schering-Plough chief 
executive’s claim that the company just wants a fair hearing). Critics, of course, will dispute the fairness reason. See, e.g.,  
http://www.citizen.org/congress/drugs/factshts/indexclaritin.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2001) (criticizing Schering-Plough’s 
attempt). 
379 Even if Congress does grant such an extension, the courts might strike it down. See Robert Patrick Merges & Glenn Harlan 
Reynolds, The Proper Scope of the Copyright and Patent Power , 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 45, 65 (2000) (arguing that courts should 
scrutinize term extensions, especially if the extensions benefit only a small number of inventors, as potentially violative of the 
Copyright and Patent Clause). 
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prizes outside the system. 380 Greater concerns are the potential for lobbying over the appointment 
of agency officials and the potential for seeking to influence statutory formulas in ways 
beneficial to individual companies and industries. These concerns suggest a tradeoff. On one 
hand, more mechanical proposals entail the risk that special interests may succeed in influencing 
Congress to adopt an inferior formula or algorithm because it is particularly likely to benefit 
them. We have seen the danger that a poorly motivated government official could apply a 
formula in a perverse way, but this danger may be secondary to the possibility of government’s 
adopting a bad formula that prevents even a well-motivated bureaucrat from efficiently 
distributing prizes. On the other hand, more flexible proposals may increase rent-seeking 
designed to influence who will make agency decisions. The challenge is to avoid both dangers. 
III. DESIGN PRINCIPLES FOR PATENT PRIZES 
This Part develops a proposal for a patent prize system by considering a variety of design 
issues. This organization is designed in part to emphasize that one need not agree with my 
assessments on every issue to produce a prize system that would improve social welfare by 
decreasing deadweight loss. Indeed, even a proposal that flouts every one of my 
recommendations, such as a developed version of one of the proposals in Part I, might well offer 
an improvement over the status quo. The existence of deadweight loss implies that even a very 
inefficient prize system conceivably might be an improvement. Nonetheless, some of the design 
issues are more central to my thesis than others, and I have tried to present those that I view as 
most important—and most counterintuitive—first. Though all of the recommendations can be 
considered independently, some of them are complementary. For example, my argument for an 
unconstrained agency becomes more persuasive once my subsequent argument for delay is 
accepted, because delay helps avoid many of the problems associated with unconstrained 
agencies. Similarly, my argument for an independent rather than an executive agency is 
particularly persuasive if the earlier argument for an unconstrained agency is accepted. 
While my proposal will be developed gradually, I will offer in the next few paragraphs an 
overview that encapsulates all of my central recommendation: Congress, by statute, would 
establish a government agency to distribute patent prizes as a complement to the existing patent 
system. The agency would receive substantial flexibility in making awards, guided by only a 
brief specification of the purpose of the prizes.381 The statute, however, would not result in the 
immediate formation of the agency. 382 Applicants for government largesse would receive only a 
claim that would be resolved at some later date, years away, after the agency is created. In the 
interim, the government would appropriate funds for the project, presumably a relatively small 
amount of money at least in the early years of the program, and invest those funds.383 Applicants 
for prizes could obtain immediate payment by selling their rights to prizes to third-party 
investors, in which case the purchasers would be as entitled to a prize as if they had themselves 
performed the acts to be rewarded.384 
Once formulated under the terms of the statute creating the system, the agency would 
make decisions on what prizes to grant to individual applicants. Prizes would be available for 
any actions that applicants took years earlier to reduce the monopoly effects of the patent system, 
                                                 
380 See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
381 See infra Part III.A. 
382 See infra Part III.B. 
383 See infra Part III.C. 
384 See infra Part III.D. 
 PATENT PRIZES 69 
including placing patents in the public domain, lowering prices, and providing coupons either for 
the applicant’s own products or for a third party’s. The statute likely would not cover all patents, 
but would specify a particular area of inventive activity (such as prescription drugs for seniors) 
for which the fund is to be used.385 The agency would distribute the fund among all applicants, 
not just to a single or small group of top applicants,386 though the agency would have discretion 
to deny an applicant a prize altogether. 
The agency itself would be independent rather than executive, ideally with selection of 
the agency’s members made by the judiciary rather than by the President.387 To provide a 
counterweight to extravagant claims, the agency would use adversary proceedings.388 An 
adversary could be selected by the prize agency or by means of an auction, with the adversary 
provided a financial incentive to seek to ensure that the applicant receives as little money as 
possible. For example, both the applicant and the adversary might be given an opportunity to 
suggest a fair prize, with the adversary receiving in exchange for the auction payment a 
percentage of the difference if its suggestion were chosen. The applicant and adversary would be 
permitted to settle for a prize between their suggestions, though in the absence of settlement the 
decisionmaker would be required to choose between the applicant’s and adversary’s 
suggestions.389 
Even in its most developed manifestation, this proposal is considerably simpler than any 
of the proposals sketched in Part I would need to be in order to be workable. Nonetheless, it is in 
several aspects unconventional, and I will now proceed to justify its various features. 
A. Constrained vs. Unconstrained 
It is natural to seek certainty in legal affairs,390 and it may seem even more natural in the 
design of a prize system. 391 Scholars have often claimed that the patent system aspires to 
certainty, 392 with uncertainty decreasing confidence in inventors’ abilities to recoup their 
                                                 
385 See infra Part III.E. 
386 See infra Part III.F. 
387 See infra Part III.G. 
388 See infra Part III.H. 
389 See infra Part III.I. 
390 Concern with certainty dates at least to Blackstone’s treatment of the law of custom. Blackstone explained that for a custom to 
be enforceable despite contrary common law, the custom (among other requirements) had to be certain. See 1 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE,  COMMENTARIES *78; see also David J. Bederman, The Curious Resurrection of Custom: Beach Access and 
Judicial Takings, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1375, 1389 (1996) (noting that Blackstone’s focus on certainty was influenced by earlier 
commentators). 
391 Achieving certainty indeed was a primary aim of Polanvyi’s early patent prize proposal. Polanvyi criticized patent law, 
stating, “Hard cases occur of course under the operation of every law; but the patent law seems to form a veritable labyrinth of 
hazards for the interests governed by it.” Id. at 70. Polanvyi continues that patent law “is essentially deficient.” He explains: 
[I]t aims at a purpose which cannot be rationally achieved. It tries to parcel up a stream of creative thought into a series 
of distinct claims, each of which is to constitute the basis of a separately owned monopoly. But the growth of human 
knowledge cannot be divided up into such sharply circumscribed phases. Ideas usually develop gradually by shades of 
emphasis, and even when, from time to time, sparks of discovery flare up and suddenly reveal a new understanding, it 
usually appears on closer scrutiny that the new idea had been at least partly foreshadowed in previous speculations. 
Id. at 70-71. I am skeptical of Polanvyi’s claim that patent law is inherently more ambiguous than other areas of law. 
Nonetheless, Polanvyi is convincing in showing that a patent system, no less than a prize system, is in some ways an artificial 
construct without complete correspondence to intuitively appealing principles. This helps rebut the argument that patent law is 
inherently more natural than a prize system because in the former, inventors simply have a monopoly over their own discoveries. 
The task of determining patent scope may be as artificial as the task of determining monetary awards for individual discoveries. 
392 For a recent and articulate defense of the importance of certainty in patent law, see Erik S. Maurer, Note & Comment, An 
Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Patentable Subject Matter , 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1095 (2001) (“[T]he 
risk of committing Type I error by subjectively narrowing the interpretation of patentable subject matter justifies the current, 
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investments.393 The patent system offers a mostly decentralized way of encouraging inventors to 
pursue whatever projects are most likely to increase social wealth, and skepticism about 
benevolent government’s ability to match the invisible hand is well placed. If a prize system is to 
match the patent system, it might seem that the government must provide some form of 
guarantee. A sufficiently rigid formula or algorithm can serve this purpose, assuring the inventor 
of profit for innovation. Without such a guarantee, the government might do a poor job in 
distributing prizes, awarding unmeritorious inventions over meritorious ones. Why invest 
billions of dollars on a project when some bureaucrat capriciously might decide that the 
invention is not sufficiently beneficial for society? 
Given the intuitive appeal of this argument, it is hardly surprising that commentators on 
prize systems seem to be engaged in a search for the best approach. The argument, however, 
overstates both the certainty that the patent system provides394 and the importance of certainty in 
a prize system.395 Some of the uncertainty in the patent system itself is embedded in requirements 
that inevitably will require some judgment. Though concepts like nonobviousness receive 
detailed treatment in case law, 396 no matter how much explanation of the concepts is provided, 
application ultimately requires some human judgment.397 As in law generally, the existence of 
litigation suggests that litigants sometimes have different predictions about the law, whether 
about patent validity or about patent scope.398 There can be more or less uncertainty and more or 
less litigation, but the high reversal rate in patent cases suggests that there are at least some 
difficult cases.399 
More importantly, even in the absence of any doubt as to the validity and scope of a 
patent, inventors face considerable uncertainty about the commercial success of the innovation. 
A product may face unexpected competition, regulatory hurdles, or consumer indifference. These 
                                                                                                                                                             
broad, and objective interpretation adopted by the courts and the PTO.”). As Thomas Landry points out, the creation of the 
Federal Circuit reflects a belief that certainty and predictability in patent law are even more important than in other areas. See 
Thomas K. Landry, Certainty and Discretion in Patent Law: The On Sale Bar, The Doctrine of Equivalents, and Judicial Power 
in the Federal Circuit, 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1152 (1994); see also Harry F. Manbeck, Jr., The Federal Circuit—First Ten 
Years of Patentability Decisions, 14 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 499, 503 (1992) (arguing that “[t]he added certainty provided by the 
Federal Circuit is beneficial to both patent applicants and the PTO itself, since it allows for reliable decisions by all concerned in 
the patent application process”). 
393 Interestingly, the goal of certainty is often equated with the economic goals of the patent system. For example, David Cohen 
notes that “economic concerns were of little importance in the formation of German patent law,” explaining that in Germany 
“legal certainty is only one factor to be balanced against the needs of justice for the inventor.” David L. Cohen, Comment, Article 
69 and European Patent Integration, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 1082, 1126 (1998). 
394 For articles arguing that the patent system is not as certain as might appear, see Landry, supra note 392, at 1159-1203, which 
provides case studies of patent doctrines, and Craig Allen Nard, Certainty, Fence Building, and the Useful Arts , 74 IND. L.J. 759, 
763-64 (1999), which argues for greater deference to the PTO as a way of creating greater certainty. 
395 For a recent article questioning the importance of certainty in patent law, see Ayres & Klemperer, supra note 198. Ayres and 
Klemperer argue that the level of innovation can be kept constant if the government compensates for less certainty in patents by 
offering longer patents. See id. at 989-93. 
396 See, e.g., Para-Ordnance Mfg., Inc. v. SGS Importers Int’l, Inc., 73 F.3d 1085, 1093-94 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (detailing secondary 
considerations to be considered in considering whether an invention was obvious). 
397 The Federal Circuit has itself recognized the futility of creating a wholly objective test, holding that objective evidence of 
nonobviousness is not necessarily required for patentability. See Custom Accessories, Inc. v. Jeffrey-Allan Indus., Inc., 807 F.2d 
955, 960 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
398 Economic analyses of settlement predict that cases will settle unless parties are mutually optimistic about outcomes. See, e.g., 
Lisa Bernstein, Understanding the Limits of Court-Connected ADR: A Critique of Federal Court-Annexed Arbitration Programs, 
141 U.  PA. L. REV. 2169, 2225-26 (1993); George Loewenstein et al., Self-Serving Assessments of Fairness and Pretrial 
Bargaining, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 135, 135 (1993). See generally  John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts , 2 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 279, 281-86 (1973) (providing an economic model of litigation and settlement). 
399 For a comprehensive study demonstrating that district courts err in a large number of patent cases, see Kimberly A. Moore, 
Are District Judges Equipped to Resolve Patent Cases?, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH . 1 (2001). 
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uncertainties may damper innovation somewhat, but probably not too much. The magic of 
capital markets allows companies to make speculative bets. Because the  public holds a diverse 
array of securities, the risk of the failure of any one product produced by one company is 
insignificant, for that failure will be balanced by other successes.400 A product that has a 50% 
chance of producing a billion dollars profit and a 50% chance of being worthless will not be 
worth quite five hundred million dollars, because even companies and shareholders are 
somewhat risk averse.401 For holders of a diversified portfolio, however, the costs of risk are 
quite small. And so, companies invest in research and development despite uncertainty about 
ultimate commercialization prospects, even placing aside uncertainty about the results of 
research and development. 
Even gross uncertainty in a prize system is thus unlikely to have a substantial effect on 
innovation. Lichtman recognizes, “It does not matter if one innovator is over-compensated and 
another is under-compensated, as long as the average payment is approximately correct.”402 The 
possibility that what would have been a company’s billion dollar drug may end up producing 
zero or two billion will have little effect on the company’s incentive to produce the drug. A 
decision by the prize agency might come more quickly and suddenly than a decision in the 
marketplace, thus producing potentially large stock volatility,403 but the prospect that a drug 
might turn out to be a failure sooner rather than later is not troublesome. Reduced uncertainty 
may have some benefits; we would not, after all, be indifferent to companies’ gambling millions 
on roulette, even with fair odds. These benefits, though, are modest, an insufficient basis to make 
a strong policy case for constraint over a discretion. 
The greater concern with giving an agency wide flexibility in distributing prizes is that 
the government might make errors. For example, the agency might ignore market data about the 
importance of patents yielded into the public domain, instead seeking to reward companies that 
have helped the agency pursue its own agenda. Perhaps the government would seek to reward the 
developer of a technology that promises to reduce air pollution in automobiles even if that 
technology has deficiencies that make it unattractive commercially.404 An agency might be 
inclined to give large awards to a company producing an innovation that has received favorable 
attention in the popular press, even if the innovation suffers from obvious deficiencies. 
Government has a poor record at picking “winners” in industrial policy, 405 and if there is reason 
to suspect that an agency systematically will pursue an agenda instead of rewarding innovation, 
that suspicion will distort investment.  
I will not develop a full answer to this concern until the next section. But a preliminary 
answer is that errors in prize decisions usually do not matter. The decisions that matter from a 
                                                 
400 See, e.g., Paul G. Haskell, The Prudent Person Rule for Trustee Investment and Modern Portfolio Theory, 69 N.C. L. REV. 
87, 108 (1990) (“[U]nder portfolio theory, the well-diversified portfolio may have a low level of risk despite the presence of 
individually volatile components.”). See generally Harry M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77 (1952) (providing a 
seminal approach to portfolio theory). 
401 Companies may be more risk averse than their shareholders because of agency problems. See, e.g., SCHERER & ROSS, supra 
note 55, at 46 (discussing the phenomenon of “empire building”). 
402 Lichtman, supra note 21, at 132. Lichtman adds that “[e]rror in and of itself raises distributional, but not efficiency, 
concerns.” Id.  
403 On the significance and sources of stock market volatility, see Clifford W. Smith, Jr., Market Volatility: Causes and 
Consequences, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 953 (1989). 
404 I use this as an example because of criticisms that federal attempts to reduce pollution have focused excessively on command-
and-control approaches despite their lack of success in efficiently reducing pollution. See, e.g., Eric W. Orts, Reflexive 
Environmental Law, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1227, 1235-41 (1995). 
405 See supra note 60. 
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social perspective are the investors’ decisions whether to invest and whether to opt for a prize 
instead of full exploitation of a patent. Governmental errors in awarding prizes will affect these 
decisions only if the errors are predictable in advance. This is counterintuitive, because in most 
contexts, the prospect that the government might make bad decisions counts as a mark against 
these programs. Usually the government spends money to accomplish something in the future, 
but when the government ultimately distributes money in a prize system, it rewards activity in 
the past. Thus, while flawed governmental decisionmaking in awarding prizes might increase 
risk slightly, it is otherwise of concern only if the government’s biases are predictable in 
advance. 
The possibility that inventors would be able to predict some bias in a prize system is less 
worrisome than the certainty that a constrained system would have biases built- in. We have seen 
that each of the various patent proposals ignores data that ought to be relevant to decisions about 
prizes. The Guell and Fischbaum proposal ignores sales data after the initial market test,406 while 
the Shavell-van Ypersele approach assumes that a patent will have no value as a foundation for 
subsequent innovations.407  The Kremer mechanism will lead to overcompensation for 
complementary patents not identified by the government agency, 408 and the Lichtman approach 
risks providing coupons without limiting deadweight loss.409 In addition, none of the proposals 
would lead the government agency to consider any social loss that release of a patent might 
cause through rent dissipation in development of follow-on innovations.410  
Moreover, because each of the proposals necessarily would entail some subjective 
decisionmaking, there is no guarantee that even a constrained system will prevent an agency 
from being biased. An agency might, for example, estimate demand curves in such a way as to 
advance the projects that it prefers,411 or award large coupons as a means of rewarding a 
company without consideration of whether the coupons are provided to the correct individuals to 
lower deadweight loss. Thus, constrained proposals inevitably prevent the government from 
making appropriate adjustments, while failing to ensure that bias will not contaminate 
administrative outcomes. Of course, an agency might use its discretion in a constrained system to 
take into account some legitimate factors not explicitly addressed in a constrained system, such 
as rent dissipation. To the extent that this makes a constrained system more like an unconstrained 
one, such discretion may make the proposals closer. Nonetheless, incorporation of legitimate 
factors in a prize system not designed to accommodate them would be messy at best, while 
general bias for or against an applicant would be easy to achieve simply by estimating individual 
variables in a biased way. 
Perhaps the greatest advantage of a flexible system over a constrained one is that it would 
allow different approaches to reducing deadweight loss to be used in different circumstances. We 
have seen that a variety of factors affect which approach to reducing deadweight loss is best. 
Where government information is sufficiently good, a coupon scheme might be preferable to a 
patent buyout.412 Where a product market is unlikely to be competitive regardless of whether a 
patent is released into the public domain, the best solution may be a reduction in price by the 
                                                 
406 See supra text accompanying notes 74-76. 
407 See supra text accompanying note 112. 
408 See supra text accompanying notes 165-166. 
409 See supra text accompanying notes 188-189. 
410 See supra Part II.B. 
411 See supra text accompanying notes 124-125. 
412 See supra text accompanying note 191. 
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patent holder.413 Even if a patent buyout is optimal, different methods of valuing the patent may 
be appropriate. When there is a one-to-one relationship between a patent and a product, the 
Shavell-van Ypersele formula may prove useful.414 On the other hand, when a substantial portion 
of the value of a patent is as a foundation for follow-up innovations, the Kremer market scheme 
may be more accurate, especially if the patent is not complementary with any others.415 
Similarly, we have seen that sometimes it may be optimal to obtain a patent and then release it to 
the public domain, while at other times it may be preferable to provide prizes for companies 
skipping the patent process altogether.416 In theory, it might be possible to create a complex 
formula to determine the optimal approach for each patent, but the number of considerations is 
so staggering that it seems unlikely that an effective formula could be developed in advance. 
A system in which agency officials are unconstrained helps accomplish this by allowing 
patent holders to choose whatever means of reducing the effects of monopoly that they wish and 
then permitting agency officials to tailor awards based on the benefit of the scheme chosen.417 
For example, if a company decided to reduce the monopoly effects of its patent by giving 
coupons, the agency nonetheless might conclude that no decrease in deadweight loss resulted if 
the coupons simply allowed the monopolist to charge more than it otherwise would have. As 
long as potential prize applicants anticipate that the agency will base prizes on reduction in 
deadweight loss accurately on average, applicants will have an incentive to select the method 
that will achieve the greatest benefit at lowest cost. The same logic goes for any other factor that 
the agency ought to take into account. The agency, for example, might reduce prizes when 
release of a patent into the public domain leads to inefficient rent dissipation. Although it might 
be difficult to calculate the extent of this inefficiency, 418 as long as the agency’s adjustments are 
on average correct, patent holders will have optimal incentives in choosing an approach, if any, 
to eliminating or reducing deadweight loss. 
Similarly, patent holders choosing to release their patents into the public domain would 
have incentives to accede to procedures for valuing the patents when doing so would be efficient. 
A holder of a patent that would be relatively difficult to value by examining sales could accede 
to Kremer’s scheme. Even without government involvement, a private group might perform a 
similar function, auctioning off patents using the same randomization procedure that Kremer 
recommended. Presumably, there would be some cost in doing so, but a patent holder might do 
so as a way of certifying results to the government agency. Similarly, a patent holder might hire 
an independent accounting firm to estimate the value of a patent being placed in the public 
domain. These methods might increase the confidence that an agency will have in its ultimate 
                                                 
413 See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text. 
414 See supra notes 115-119 and accompanying text. 
415 Bidders would have incentives to calculate the value of the patent, regardless of the extent to which this value stems from 
direct sales of a product or licensing or exploitation of the patent for follow-up inventions. See supra note 129 and accompanying 
text. 
416 See supra text accompanying note 360. 
417 Such a system also might discourage patent holders from taking any actions to reduce deadweight costs if those actions would 
increase other costs. For example, one commentator has developed a model suggesting broad patent protection for antibiotics 
may be beneficial, because excessive use of antibiotics may lead to resistance, thus making them less valuable in the future. See 
RAMANAN LAXMINARAYAN & GARDNER M. BROWN,  ECONOMICS OF ANTIBIOTICS RESISTANCE : A THEORY OF OPTIMAL USE 
(Resources for the Future Discussion Paper No. 00-36, 2000). 
418 Such calculations would not be impossible. Cf. Grady & Alexander, supra note 213, at 313 (suggesting that criticisms that the 
patent system simply could not take into account variables like the difficulty of developing an invention are overstated). One 
might consider different companies’ investments in follow-up inventions and the profits from those inventions. If the profits tend 
to amount only to a fair rate of return on capital, rent dissipation has probably occurred. Such a conclusion would be bolstered by 
evidence of redundant research by competing companies. 
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prize assessment and thus reduce the amount by which the agency would decrease prizes as a 
way of accounting for the adverse selection problem. 419 Of course, using these procedures entails 
costs, but these costs may be worth undertaking in some cases if not in others.420 
That a system in which agency officials are given flexibility is superior to one adopting a 
single approach does not necessarily mean that the agency should be given no guidance 
whatsoever. The statute creating the agency usefully might catalogue some of the considerations 
that should be taken into account in calculating prizes. By explicitly indicating that an agency 
should take into account a particular factor, Congress could avoid the danger that companies 
might believe that the agency will ignore a factor even though that factor seems important to 
economic efficiency. That danger also could be lessened by requiring the agency to document its 
calculations and to explain why it rejected any arguments for considering a factor suggested by 
the applicant or an adversary. The virtue of requiring such explanations is similar to that of 
requiring appellate judges to produce written opinions,421 providing the decisionmaker with a 
reputational incentive to demonstrate consideration of all relevant factors. 
Of course, I may not have anticipated all potentially relevant factors, and Congress might 
do no better. Ultimately, though, this is an argument for flexibility, not an argument against it. 
Indeed, one virtue of allowing flexibility is that it might stimulate further research into when it is 
efficient to grant prizes and how large prizes should be. If an agency simply applies a formula, 
academic commentators might urge reforms and changes, but private parties would have little 
incentive to do anything other than plug projections into the government-mandated equation. 
With a flexible agency, prize applicants will be incentivized to advertise any way in which the 
efforts they make improve social welfare. Similarly, if an adversary system is used to resolve 
prize claims,422 the adverse parties would have an incentive to point out any inefficiencies that 
should offset prize awards. These analyses might be useful beyond individual cases in promoting 
understanding of the value of prizes. 
Some issues about valuing prizes might remain controversial even after considerable 
debate. Consider, for example, the issue of whether a payment for a patent buyout should 
approximate the private benefit that the monopolist would have received from the patent or the 
full social benefit of the invention. On one hand, paying a monopolist just the private benefit 
would provide cost savings, as prizes would be the minimum necessary to induce release of 
patents in the public domain. On the other hand, paying the social benefit may provide additional 
                                                 
419 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 539-40 (optimizing the amount by which prizes should be lower than the 
anticipated social surplus); supra text accompanying notes 103-104, 121. 
420 Sometimes, it might seem, a patent holder would have excessive incentives to provide verification of patent value, because 
the benefit in terms of a greater prize accrues solely to the patent holder. In theory, though, the agency might punish excessive 
spending on administrative costs by reducing the prize. See infra notes 563-564 (discussing the possibility of penalizing 
excessive spending in pursuit of prizes). Once again, as long as the agency makes the appropriate reduction on average, 
companies will have appropriate ex ante incentives. 
421 “The publication of written opinions provides judges with an opportunity to criticize colleagues, and allows members of the 
bar and academia to criticize sitting judges when the authors of published opinions fail to abide by their own stated principles in 
fugure cases.” Maxwell L. Stearns, Standing Back from the Forest: Justiciability and Social Choice, 83 CAL. L. RE V. 1309, 1349 
(1995). Commentators interested in improving the quality of decisionmaking have called for requiring written opinions in various 
contexts. See Martha J. Dragich, Will the Federal Courts of Appeals Perish if They Publish? Or Does the Declining Use of 
Opinions to Explain and Justify Judicial Decisions Pose a Greater Threat?, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 757 (1995) (arguing for written, 
published opinions in the federal appellate courts); Christopher B. Kaczmarek, Public Law Deserves Public Justice: Why Public 
Law Arbitrators Should Be Required to Issue Written, Publishable Opinions, 4 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP . POL’Y J. 285 (2000) 
(arguing that arbitrators should issue written opinions). For articles assessing the importance of written opinions more broadly, 
see Frederick Schauer, Opinions as Rules, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 1455 (1995); and James Boyd White, What’s an Opinion for?, 62 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1363 (1995). 
422 See infra Part III.H. 
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incentive to innovate.423 The economic question is whether the deadweight loss associated with 
additional taxation outweighs the marginal benefit of higher prizes in stimulating research. 424 A 
constrained approach based on a formula or algorithm would demand an ex ante resolution of 
this question, but a flexible approach need not. If different people would disagree about the 
proper answer, inventors would anticipate that rewards would reflect a weighted average. 
Hedging based on disagreement and uncertainty may be a more efficient approach than 
resolution through a majority vote or other means,425 especially because the weighted average 
could change over time as the case for one answer or the other becomes clearer.426 
To some, the notion of simply giving a government agency money to spend, while not 
unheard of, 427 is utopian and foolish. We know, the argument goes, that the government simply 
will not do a good job of spending it, and there is a good reason that we do not generally give 
agencies large amounts of money to dispose of based on the whims of individual 
decisionmakers. Retrospective prizes, though, are different from other government programs, 
because what matters from a social perspective is not individual prize decisions themselves, but 
predictions about those decisions. We cannot be satisfied if some social security recipients 
receive twice what they should and some deserving receive nothing. 428 But with prizes, if the 
average governmental decisionmaker will be expected to get it right, that is good enough. 429 If 
someone contemplating releasing a patent into the public domain anticipates that he might 
receive twice his estimate of the social benefit half the time and nothing at all half the time, he 
still might release the patent.  
Prize systems may not be unique among legal institutions in being able to achieve an aim 
well even if decisions are noisy. Tort scholars have pointed out that the tort system could provide 
the appropriate amount of deterrence even if individual decisions are variable.430 For example, 
                                                 
423 See supra Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 532; notes 87-88 and accompanying text. 
424 Advocates of the various prize proposals offer different answers. Kremer, for example, explicitly advocates a “markup” so 
that inventors can receive the social value of their inventions. See Kremer, supra note 20, at 1141; see also supra notes 132-133 
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425 For an extended argument in favor of compromise verdicts, in which jurors resolve uncertainty by awarding partial damages, 
see Michael Abramowicz, A Compromise Approach to Compromise Verdicts , 89 CAL. L. REV. 231 (2001). 
426 I lean toward compensation based on the social benefit of an innovation, especially if a fund is used to encourage innovation. 
See infra text accompanying notes 480–483 (explaining that using social benefit as a basis for distributing a fund produces a 
socially beneficial selection effect). 
427 Agencies are often given considerable freedom whenever they are given lump sum appropriations. See Kate Stith, Rewriting 
the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-Hollings, 76 CAL. L. REV. 593, 612-13 (1988) (documenting the increasing 
prevalence of lump sum appropriations over the twentieth century). 
428 Some level of incoherence and inconsistency in the operation of such a program, however, may be inevitable. See JERRY L. 
MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 49-78 (1983). 
429 If looking only at the universe of settled civil cases, achieving justice on average may be good enough too, since settlements 
reflect expected values of verdicts. This logic suggests that settled cases may achieve a higher level of justice than litigated cases, 
in which there is a possibility that the court might err significantly. See, e.g., Joshua P. Davis, Toward a Jurisprudence of Trial 
and Settlement: Allocating Attorney’s Fees by Amending Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 68, 48 ALA. L. REV. 65, 122 (1996) 
(“Settlement for the expected outcome may not yield perfect justice, but neither will it yield perfect injustice.”). 
430 Louis Kaplow, for example, explains, “Accuracy in the assessment of damages is relevant primarily because of how it affects 
the precision with which legal rules control behavior.” Louis Kaplow, The Value of Accuracy in Adjudication: An Economic 
Analysis, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 307, 399 (1994). If there is simply a fifty percent chance of receiving zero damages and a one 
hundred percent chance of receiving double damages, the expected damage, at least for a risk-neutral party, is unaffected. Thus, 
inaccuracy matters only to the extent it affects ex ante expectations and imposes risk costs on risk-averse parties. As Kaplow and 
Steven Shavell explain: 
[A]ccuracy in the assessment of harm cannot influence the behavior of injurers—and is therefore of no social value—to 
the degree that they lack knowledge of the level of harm they might cause when they make their decisions. Thus, if, 
when choosing his precautions, an injurer knows only that the average level of harm that would be caused in an 
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economists have argued that if punitive damages when tortfeasors are caught compensate for the 
chance that tortfeasors sometimes will not be caught, deterrence will be optimized.431 Of course, 
in tort law, many scholars argue that economic efficiency should not be the only goal,432 and 
consideration of factors other than optimal deterrence therefore might lead to systematic 
overdeterrence or underdeterrence. Disagreement over fundamental premises should be less of a 
danger in patent law. 433 In addition, while jury-based decisionmaking may make tort law difficult 
to rationalize,434 prize determinations presumably would be made by government officials rather 
than juries. 
B. Delay vs. Immediate Payouts 
The government might award prizes relatively quickly after the actions meriting the 
prizes. Once an inventor releases the patent into the public domain, the former patent ho lder 
                                                                                                                                                             
accident is $500,000, there is no point in the court’s measuring harm accurately. As long as the injurer’s expected 
liability is $500,000, his behavior will be the same as if harm were measured precisely. 
Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of Damages , 39 J.L. & ECON. 191, 192 (1996). But see  Randall R. 
Bovbjerg et al., Valuing Life and Limb in Tort: Scheduling “Pain and Suffering,” 83 NW. U. L. REV.  908, 925 (1989) (“[H]ighly 
variable, unpredictable valuations undercut the deterrence function of tort law. Where liability costs are relatively predictable, 
they can be avoided (where it is efficient to do so) or ‘built in’ to the costs of goods and services.”). The problem with Professor 
Bovbjerg et al.’s analysis is that potential tortfeasors will avoid uncertain liability at least as much as certain liability, if 
uncertainty can equally result in greater or lower damages than would be efficient. 
431 See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis , 111 HARV. L. RE V. 869, 887-88 
(1998). 
432 Jules Coleman argues that economic analysis does not even produce the best positive analysis of tort practice. See, e.g., 
COLEMAN, supra note 277 (providing a comprehensive guide to his theory of corrective justice); Jules L. Coleman, The Practice 
of Corrective Justice, 37 ARIZ. L. RE V. 15 (1995) (considering some meta-issues in articulating a theory of corrective justice). 
Similarly, some scholars argue that even if economic efficiency is the only goal, optimal deterrence may trade off with other 
efficiency concerns. See, e.g., Abramowicz, supra note 425, at 271 (noting a tension between optimizing deterrence of harm-
causing acts and optimizing incentives for firms to enter into industries membership in which might lead to erroneous findings of 
liability). 
433 The vast majority of patent law scholarship is utilitarian and economic, at least in spirit if not in form. For explicitly 
noneconomic analyses of intellectual property law, see Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and 
Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 (1993), which defends a natural rights approach 
for patent, copyright, and trademark law; and Steven Cherensky, Comment, A Penny for Their Thoughts: Employee-Inventors, 
Preinvention Assignment Agreements, Property, and Personhood, 81 CAL. L. RE V. 597 (1993), which argues that an employee’s 
personhood should be a primary consideration in law concerning preinventions assignments of property rights. A. Samuel Oddi, 
meanwhile, has argued that natural rights ideas help explain the acceptance of a universal standard of patent law even by 
countries that might not benefit from such a standard. See Oddi, supra note 58, at 417-40. Part of the reason for the dominance of 
utilitarian arguments is that scholars have generally believed that the Framers defended intellectual property using such 
arguments, but a recent intellectual history suggests that natural rights arguments were important as well. See Adam Mossoff, 
Rethinking the Development of Patents: An Intellectual History, 1550-1800 (2000) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).  
Even someone accepting a natural rights rather than an economic approach to patent law would not necessarily object 
to a prize system on the ground that such a system would deprive inventors of their natural rights. Professor Gordon’s natural 
rights analysis, for example, emphasizes that the claims of a creator of intellectual property do not necessarily trump those of the 
public to use intellectual property. See Gordon, supra, at 1544-69. Specifically, she argues “that creators should have property in 
their original works, only provided that such grant of property does no harm to other persons’ equal abilities to create or to draw 
upon the preexisting cultural matrix and scientific heritage.” Id. at 1563-64. Professor Gordon argues that this requirement might 
be satisfied by an intellectual property regime in which the right was protected only by a liability rule. Id. at 1572-76. If such a 
regime would not infringe on the natural rights of a creator of intellectual property, then a like regime in which “damages” are 
paid by society as a whole rather than by individual users of the property would not infringe the creator’s rights, at least if we 
assume the legitimacy of the taxation needed to pay the prizes. Indeed, a prize system may be more appealing under a natural 
rights approach than the existing patent system, because such a system would reduce interference with the public’s access to the 
common by increasing works placed in the public domain. 
434 One reason for this is that even where juries agree on moral desert, they exhibit high variability in translating such judgments 
into dollar figures. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Assessing Punitive Damages (With Notes on Cognition and Valuation in Law), 
107 YALE L.J. 2071 (1998). 
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could file an application, and the wheels of the government would turn as fast as they could turn. 
Intentionally delaying the ultimate payout might seem absurd, akin to increasing the wait that 
political asylum applicants must endure from the INS.435 On this view, while allowing some 
modest backlog of applications might be an efficient way of reducing personnel costs,436 there is 
no value in delay for delay’s sake.437 This section will offer the counterintuition, arguing that in 
fact delay might have significant benefits. There are three reasons, explored in each of the 
following subsections, that this is so. First, allowing time to pass will allow for the accumulation 
of data that will improve the government’s ability to value a patent. Second, delay will prevent 
inventors from devoting resources based on their perceptions of individual decisionmakers’ 
preferences. Third, delay will reduce decisionmakers’ incentive to use the prize making system 
as a vehicle for encouraging investments in particular technologies. After explaining these 
benefits, I will counter some arguments that delay might impose significant costs. 
1. Improving Government Information 
The most obvious function served by delay is that it helps to overcome the informational 
asymmetry between the government and the patent holder.438 As Shavell and van Ypersele show, 
if the government has worse information about the demand curve than the patent holder, data 
from sales subsequent to the patent’s being placed in the public domain may help.439 Indeed, it is 
conceivable that the government ex post may have as good or even better information about the 
value of a patent than the patent holder has ex ante.440 Thus, sales data can mitigate the adverse 
selection problem. A patent holder who knows that the patented product will turn out to be 
unpopular will not opt into the prize system hoping to fool the government, because low sales in 
a competitive market ultimately will reveal to the government that the product would have been 
unsuccessful. 
The government, of course, might benefit from considering a variety of information, in 
addition to sales, that would have been difficult to discern initially. The government might even 
use sales data of a competing product as a way of better estimating what the demand would have  
been for a product released into the public domain. As another example, if the agency is to 
consider whether placing the patent into the public domain led to rent dissipation, 441 this task will 
be considerably easier later rather than earlier. When a patent  is first issued, one can speculate 
about whether it will produce follow-up inventions and whether companies will invest in such 
inventions, but time will allow the government to make such assessments much more easily. If 
the goal is to determine how much research into follow-up inventions results and whether this 
research is socially excessive, which depends in part on the social benefit of the follow-up 
inventions, decisions made later should be much more accurate than decisions made earlier.  
                                                 
435 Cf. Joe Davidson, Clinton’s Move to Speed Handling of Requests for Political Asylum Raises Critics’ Skepticism, WALL ST. 
J., Mar. 30, 1994, at A18 (discussing delays in processing political asylum applications). 
436 Optimizing such problems is the task of those who study queuing theory. See, e.g., 
http://www2.uwindsor.ca/~hlynka/queue.html (last visited Sept. 14, 2001) (providing links to various queuing theory Web sites). 
437 Lawyers sometimes delay for delay’s sake, but the legal system is typically at least rhetorically hostile to such tactics. See, 
e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(1) (requiring attorneys to certify that motions are not “being presented . . . to cause unnecessary 
delay”). 
438 See supra notes 320-321 and accompanying text. 
439 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 540-41; supra notes 106-109 and accompanying text. 
440 See Shavell & van Ypersele, supra note 18, at 542; supra text accompanying note 110. 
441 See supra Part II.B. 
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Delay might be useful not only when an inventor releases a patent to the public domain, 
but also when an inventor takes some other action to reduce the monopoly effect of a patent. For 
example, if an inventor promises to charge less than the monopoly price for an invention, time is 
needed to ensure that the inventor keeps the promise. Even if there would be some legal means 
of binding an inventor to keeping the low price, there might be reasons to encourage the inventor 
to have some flexibility in pricing, for example  to reflect changes in manufacturing costs. In 
addition, delay might allow for development of information that would make it clearer whether a 
price reduction in fact was meaningful. It might be less meaningful if an inventor subsequently 
released an improved version of the product at a higher price or if the arrival of competing 
substitute products makes it apparent that high prices could not have been maintained long in any 
event. 
Finally, delay might increase private incentives to engage theoretical cons iderations 
about the best means of reducing deadweight loss. We have seen that giving the administrative 
agency flexibility will encourage private parties to furnish arguments for and against various 
approaches.442 When the government agency will not make decisions on prizes for a long time, 
the level of understanding about the costs and benefits of different approaches will be expected 
to grow by the time that decisions are made. An inventor anticipating this might be hesitant 
simply to rely on current conventional wisdom about the relative merits of various approaches. 
Thus, patent holders may devote some resources to considering carefully any existing literature 
on patent rewards as well as seeking out flaws in the literature that time ultimately would reveal. 
Because a patent holder will spend a marginal dollar on such research only if that marginal dollar 
is likely to increase the expected value of a prize by a dollar, and prizes depend in turn on social 
welfare,443 such expenditures are worthwhile from a social as well as from a private point of 
view. 
How much delay is needed to improve the government’s information is difficult to 
determine conclusively. Presumably, more delay will always allow for an increase in the amount 
of information potentially available for analysis by the prize agency. Indeed, it is possible that 
information about the social benefit provided by a patent holder taking some action to release 
deadweight loss could be developed even after the patent term would have expired. Such a 
lengthy term, however, is probably not necessary. My own sense is that a delay of a decade 
generally would be sufficient for the patent holder or other companies to introduce products 
based on the patent, for long-term consumer demand for the product to become relatively clear, 
and to assess the degree of rent dissipation through competition for improvements. A decade, of 
course, will not allow for perfect estimates, as for example a substitute product might hit the 
market unexpectedly twelve years after the initial issuance of the patent and substantially reduce 
the import of the original invention. Information that emerges after a decade, however, ordinarily 
will not have been in the possession of the patent holder at the beginning of the decade. 
Consideration of such information by the government thus would not help combat the adverse 
selection problem. Delays of ten years, by contrast, might not hurt even if they do not help, 
depending on the costs of delay. 444 
                                                 
442 See supra text accompanying note 422. 
443 It might be argued that prizes could depend on potential monopoly profit rather than on social welfare. See supra text 
accompanying notes 423-424. Even if prizes are based entirely on monopoly profits, however, producer’s surplus is a social 
benefit, and so unless this benefit comes at the expense of consumers, the conclusion in the text holds. 
444 See infra Part III.B.4. 
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2. Cloaking Decisionmakers’ Identities 
In arguing that prize systems should provide wide discretion to individual 
decisionmakers,445 I ignored one significant objection to a flexible approach. While it might be 
possible in principle to imagine that hypothetical decisionmakers will make good decisions on 
average (or, more precisely, decisions that average out to good decisions), this might become 
more difficult once actual decisionmakers exist. Suppose the head of the agency announces that 
she is particularly interested in rewarding pharmaceutical companies that he lp victims of a 
particular disease that allegedly has received insufficient attention. Or, suppose that she 
announces that she believes that rent dissipation should be irrelevant to prize determinations. Or, 
worse yet, that prizes should not be calculated on the basis of heartless economic models. Such 
announcements might affect which inventors decide to submit prize applications and, if her term 
is sufficiently long, this may in turn affect inventors’ decisions about what investments to make. 
Even without formal announcements, potential applicants could analyze prize decisions to 
identify preferences. If the prize agency had apparent biases, these biases would distort 
investment decisionmaking.  
“Why care if different decisionmakers have different priorities?” some might ask. The 
answer is that if we believe that in majoritarian decisionmaking, either as a result of democratic 
theory or because we believe that the majority is more likely to be correct than a minority, then 
we should prefer an average decisionmaker to an extreme one. The logic of the Condorcet Jury 
Theorem, which holds that larger decisionmaking bodies are more likely to produce correct 
answers than smaller ones, helps explain this conclusion. 446 If the median well- informed 
decisionmaker would recommend promising prizes of a certain amount for a particular type of 
invention, then promising prizes of a much larger or smaller amount is to adopt an extreme 
viewpoint over a moderate one. Sometimes, someone with an extreme opinion may be correct, 
but, especially when a decision is made over a continuum,447 legal institutions generally select 
moderate opinions rather than randomly select extreme ones.448 It may be the norm in politics for 
a shift in presidential administrations to lead to a shift in some policies (though certainly not all, 
because the legislative power lies in Congress), but this practical inevitability does not establish 
an ideal to be emulated.  
The concern, one might argue, can easily be overstated. The head of the prize agency 
might not control every decision. The more decisionmakers that there are, the less likely it will 
be that the agency will have systematic biases. This is not a complete answer, however, 
especially if decisionmakers are all appointed by the same person, either the President or the 
agency head.449 There is, in any event, an effective way to neutralize the biases of individual 
                                                 
445 See supra Part III.A. 
446 “The Condorcet Jury Theorem provides a justification for majoritarian decisionmaking and a potential justification for mass 
democracy if its citizenry are of at least minimal competence.” Bernard Grofman, Public Choice, Civil Republicanism, and 
American Politics: Perspectives of a “Reasonable Choice” Modeler , 71 TEX. L. REV. 1541, 1550 (1993). For a large number of 
sources on the Jury Theorem, see id. at 1550 n.27. A notable recent work on the Jury Theorem is Saul Levmore, Conjunction and 
Aggregation, 99 M ICH. L. REV. 723, 735-39 (2001). 
447 In technical jargon, anomalies are less likely to occur when decisionmakers have “single-peaked preferences.” See generally 
MAXWELL L. STEARNS, CONSTITUTIONAL PROCESS: A SOCIAL CHOICE ANALYSIS OF SUPREME COURT DECISION M AKING 72 (2000) 
(explaining the significance of unipeaked preferences). 
448 For example, the Supreme Court does not randomly select a Justice’s opinion as the majority opinion. See Michael 
Abramowicz, En Banc Revisited, 100 COLUM L. REV. 1600, 1631 (2000) (noting that “[t]his would be a functional legal system, 
but it would place less value than the existing system on ensuring that a particular legal [decision] is majoritarian”). 
449 Both methods of appointment would be constitutionally permissible. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“[The President] shall 
nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, 
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decisionmakers: delay. If decisions on prizes are made so far after the applications are submitted 
that inventors will not be able to guess the decisionmakers’ identities or political affiliations, 
then inventors will not factor existing biases into their investment plans, and potential applicants 
similarly will not weigh individual administrators’ pet preferences in considering whether to file 
an application. Delaying payment ten years, and thus at least two presidential elections, seems 
sufficient to induce potential applicants to assess how average decisionmakers will reward 
individual inventions, rather than how particular decisionmakers will do so. 
3. Reducing Individual Biases for Particular Technologies 
Delay is an answer to the concern about individual biases affecting prize allocation not 
only because it will be difficult to guess who the individuals are likely to be, but also because the 
individuals themselves are less likely to be biased. Someone who is awarding a prize for an 
effort made the previous year might hope to influence work done the next. The award of a large 
prize, even for activities past, may influence predictions about future rewards and thus the 
direction of research. A decade, though, is practically a generation in the scientific world, and 
someone awarding prizes will thus be less likely to believe that the evaluation of such old 
decisions will have much effect on new ones. This would be true even if prizes for innovations 
current at the time the first set of prizes are given are anticipated to be awarded shortly thereafter. 
It will especially be true, however, when the decisionmaker recognizes that her decisions will 
have little effect on predictions about prizes to be made yet another decade hence. 
It might seem that in the absence of an ability to affect the future, decisionmakers would 
have little incentive to make accurate decisions. After all, political scientists claim that judges 
and other government officials act in large part to advance their conceptions of the common 
good,450 so if that possibility is gone, decisionmakers might not care about the quality of their 
decisions at all. In the absence of any real effect on the world, decisions might be made entirely 
capriciously. If there were any rhyme or reason at all, the argument goes, decisions might depend 
on personal affection or spite for those seeking prizes. Or, agency officials might seek to use the 
prize system as a way of achieving a distributional benefit, not by rewarding those who have 
invented products that helped the poor, for that already is done, but by giving prizes to relatively 
impoverished claimants, irrespective of achievement. 
Quite the reverse, however, is likely to be true, for three reasons. First, the quality of 
decisions still may matter in fostering confidence among investors anticipating future prizes, and 
so decisionmakers concerned about the public good will have an incentive to produce decisions 
that will lead investors to believe that prizes will be appropriate on average. That the 
decisionmakers may now be able to improve the public good only in this narrow way is a benefit 
rather than a cost. By analogy, consider judges in common law courts. Judges may care both 
about establishing a stable and predictable system of law and about moving precedents in their 
ideologically preferred direction. 451 If suddenly a judicial decision had no ideological effect, then 
to the extent that judges care about the world, they would care only about establishing a stable 
                                                                                                                                                             
Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided 
for, and which shall be established by Law . . . .”). 
450 The attitudinal model suggests that judges vote on the basis of their “attitudes” about particular issues. See generally JEFFREY 
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH , THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL M ODEL (1993) (providing the seminal account of 
the attitudinal model). 
451 They may care about a variety of other things too. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER,  OVERCOMING LAW 119-23 (1995) 
(considering a variety of variables that judges may seek to maximize). 
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and predictable system. Similarly, in a patent prize system, if a decisionmaker believes that her 
decisions cannot steer future research in her preferred direction, because those making current 
investment decisions will realize that there will be a different decisionmaker in due time, then 
she will be concerned only with establishing the high quality of the prize system. 
Second, if affecting the world and improving one’s reputation are two sometimes 
competing goals in the decisionmaker’s welfare function, personal reputational interests will 
become relatively more important. If decisionmakers cannot turn their idiosyncratic preferences 
into research anyway, then they will place greater weight on reputation. Just as being results-
oriented is generally viewed as an epithet among judges,452 so too might shoddy analysis based 
on personal preferences harm the reputation of prize givers. While the results-oriented judge may 
be willing to take a reputational hit to achieve an ideological goal, the giver of prizes to inventors 
for inventions of years ago has little reason to do so. This argument is, of course, related to the 
first. Decisionmakers presumably advance a number of considerations in making decisions. 
Removing or lessening decisionmakers’ raw power to change the world will make them less 
likely to act in idiosyncratic ways. Because decisions still may have some importance in 
establishing the reputation of both the prize institution and the individual decisionmakers, 
decisions should get better rather than worse. 
Third, pure caprice or preferences for individual prize recipients are not significant 
concerns. It is true that if such preferences enter the decisionmaker’s welfare function, then the 
elimination of the opportunity to exercise raw power will make them relatively more important, 
for the same reason that it will make reputational incentives more important. It is hard, however, 
to imagine decisionmakers caring much about the size of the prize that any particular claimant 
receives. In tort and contract cases, judges may have strong individual senses of fairness or 
retribution that may influence them to act differently from how others might act.453 Patent prize 
applicants are less likely to seem inherently meritorious or unworthy. And, once again, even if 
some decisionmakers might care about the identity of the prize applicants, such preferences 
matter only if they are systematic and predictable. It seems unlikely that decisionmakers 
systematically would favor, for example, individual inventors over corporate ones, since some 
might have the opposite bias. Some degree of irrelevant preference might be anticipated, but it is 
likely to be small. 
To the extent that prize givers do have systematic and predictable preferences, delay will 
not help. These preferences are problematic, however, only if they are based on irrelevant data. 
Investors might anticipate a preference for a technology that has a distributional benefit relative 
to one that will disproportionately help the rich, 454 but the distributional benefit is at least 
arguably relevant. On the other hand, investors might anticipate that decisions will be affected by 
cognitive biases,455 such as insufficient concern about large magnitude, small probability risks 
                                                 
452 Judge Posner identifies “result-oriented” as one of several “all-purpose terms of judicial abuse” among legal commentators. 
Richard A. Posner, The Meaning of Judicial Self-Restraint, 59 IND. L.J. 1 (1983/1984). 
453 As one judge explained, “Within the constraints of stare decisis and the limited role of judicial decisionmaking, judges turn to 
their ‘guts,’ their inner ‘instincts,’ to verify their decisions.” Paul V. Niemeyer, Law and Conscience, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV.  
1011, 1016-17 (1994). 
454 Kremer, for example, suggests that a useful trial for patent buyouts might involve pharmaceuticals in part because “buying 
out pharmaceutical patents is likely to have benign distributional consequences, whereas buying out, say, patents for improved 
yachts will not.” Kremer, supra note 20, at 1163. 
455 Any cognitive biases, however, are likely to be less significant if the decisionmakers are expected to have a high degree of 
training in relevant fields like economics. In an interesting study, Bryan Caplan suggests that cognitive biases like the availability 
heuristic may provide one explanation for differences in the general public’s and economists’ views on the economy, with 
economic training serving as a debiasing tool. See Bryan Caplan, Systematically Biased Beliefs About Economics: Robust 
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(and thus about technology that offsets such risks).456 Such cognitive biases, however, will be 
present even if prizes are awarded without delay. Moreover, delay might reduce some cognitive 
biases, for example by making the system less susceptible to “availability cascades,” in which 
large amounts of publicity lead to government overreaction. 457 While decisionmakers might be 
affected by such cascades at the time they are awarding the prizes, such cascades cannot be 
anticipated and thus cannot be predicted. At the same time, investors likely would expect 
publicity at the time of their initial investment decisions to subside by the time prizes are 
awarded. 
4. Costs of Delay 
A long delay might seem likely to decrease incentives to innovate, or at least incentives 
to submit to the prize system rather than seek a reward through a patent. Such a worry, however, 
is unnecessary as long as a sufficient interest rate is awarded.458 Just as capital markets allow 
companies to take risks that an individual would not, so too do capital markets permit companies 
to make investments that are not anticipated to produce profits for years to come. The ample 
funding that Internet companies received reflects that investors are willing to bet on the future.459 
Closer to the subject matter here, companies often invest in research and development without 
expectations of being able to develop a commercial product as a result of such research for ten 
years or more.460 In addition, the process of determining how much to invest presumably takes 
into account revenues from a patent beyond ten years; otherwise, there would be little reason to 
                                                                                                                                                             
Evidence of Judgmental Anomalies from the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy, ECON. J. (forthcoming 2002) 
(manuscript at 22-23, on file with author). 
456 For example, suppose an inventor develops a vaccine against a potential epidemic that would be devastating to large numbers 
of people, but, in the absence of the vaccine, would have only a small chance of occurring. Sales data might be an unreliable 
guide to social benefit in such a context, especially if the vaccination of just some people provide benefits to others. See, e.g., 
Clayton P. Gillette & Paul B. Stephan, Richardson v. McKnight and the Scope of Immunity After Privatization, 8 SUP. CT. ECON. 
REV. 103, 106 (2000) (noting that vaccination entails positive externalities). Thus, one might expect the agency to consider 
directly illness and death prevented. It is possible, though, that agency decisionmakers improperly would focus too much on the 
small pre-vaccine probability of an epidemic and too little on the potential magnitude of an epidemic, because of people’s 
tendency to underestimate the significance of large magnitude, small probability risks. It is also possible, though, that 
decisionmakers will overestimate risk. Cf. Jennifer Arlen, The Future of Behavioral Economic Analysis of Law, 51 VAND. L. 
REV. 1765, 1781 (1998) (noting that because cognitive biases may work in opposite directions, it may be “difficult to predict 
whether on average people will overestimate or underestimate risk in a given situation”); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, 
Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV . 630, (1999) (recognizing the 
difficulty of distinguishing low from very low probability risks). 
457 See generally  Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. RE V. 683 (1999) 
(discussing how perceptions of salient data may create chain reactions resulting in regulatory over-reaction). One example that 
Kuran and Sunstein provide of an availability cascade is the reaction to Love Canal. See id. at 691-98. If the response to Love 
Canal occurred only years afterward, decisionmaking might have been less affected by the immediacy of the situation, and 
moreover even at the time of the event, people might have been able to predict that a delay would lead to a less vigorous public 
reaction. 
458 A sufficient interest rate would be one that provides a competitive rate of return on investment. Cf. William J. Baumol & J. 
Gregory Sidak, Stranded Costs , 18 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 835, 840 (1995) (“[I]nvestors in a free competitive market will 
provide resources to the firm only if the actuarially expectable return is at the competitive level—offering, on the probabilistic 
average, repayment of the funds provided, plus a competitive rate of return on those funds, plus a suitable payment for the risk 
entailed in the investment.”). 
459 It also suggests that investors sometimes may be overoptimistic. See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE  19-
21 (2000) (arguing presciently that Internet companies were overvalued because of public impressions not based on economic 
fundamentals). Yet there is little reason to think that overoptimism is more likely about decisions to be made in the far future than 
about decisions in the near future. 
460 See, e.g., Stephen D. Moore & Philip Revzin, Success of Ciba-Sandoz Merger Will Be Tested in the Lab, WALL ST. J., July 
30, 1996, at B4 (noting hopes that a merger would reduce drug development time from eleven years to seven). 
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have a patent term of any longer duration. Even an individual inventor unwilling to wait could 
get around the problem, for example by taking a loan against future earnings or by securitizing 
himself.461 
A second concern about delay is that information might become stale. This is, however, 
less of a concern in the development of a prize system than in other litigation, for two reasons. 
First, while individual recollections conceivably could be relevant, they presumably will have 
much less importance than in other litigation. 462 What matters to decisionmakers in a prize 
system ordinarily would not be what happened in the development of an invention, but the 
invention itself that resulted. Second, prize applicants would have ample incentive to preserve 
evidence, because they would know from the outset that a decision on a prize ultimately would 
be forthcoming. A prize applicant likely would gather available evidence at the time of the initial 
application, including for example studies showing the benefits of the invention. The applicant 
then would have incentives to preserve such evidence and update the information over time with 
more recent sales data and the like. 
A third concern is that delay might have adverse psychological consequences for 
litigation participants. Several studies of the tort process have found that plaintiffs who do not 
settle their cases suffer psychological consequences as a result of the delay. 463 Such findings may 
help to explain why commentators seek to reduce delay in civil litigation, 464 but they do not 
provide a strong argument against delay in this context. The studies focus on the effects of 
litigation, but a rule definitively delaying litigation for some period of time might have less of a 
damaging psychological effect than a litigation that drags on for the same period of time. 
Moreover, the studies on the psychological effects of the tort process may not be generalizable to 
other areas of litigation. While extended litigation may force litigants in tort cases to relive 
traumatic events, this will not be a concern with long anticipation of patent prize decisions. 
Psychiatric symptoms are particularly unlikely in the vast majority of patent cases involving 
corporate parties.465 Even though litigation may affect individuals within a corporation, 
                                                 
461 For introductions to securitization, see Lisa M. Fairfax, When You Wish upon a Star: Explaining the Cautious Growth of 
Royalty-Backed Securitization, 1999 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 441, 445-51 (1999); and Claire A. Hill, Securitization: A Low-Cost 
Sweetener for Lemons, 74 WASH . U. L.Q. 1061, 1066-77 (1996). 
462 In patent trials, inventors almost always testify, but their testimony is quite different from, say, that of an eyewitness in a 
criminal trial. As John Sganga notes, although the inventor may be “the most important witness in a patent case . . . the inventor’s 
testimony can border on expert testimony.”  John B. Sganga, Jr., Presenting the Witnesses Special to a Patent Trial, 572 PLI/Pat 
95, 98-99 (1999). Sganga explains that “the inventor should be prepared to be asked questions such as what the inventor believes 
the invention is, how the invention differs from the prior art, how to read the claims of the patent on the accused device, and the 
meanings of specific terms used in the patent.”  Id. at 99. 
463 See, e.g., Roger Culpan & Christine Taylor, Psychiatric Disorders Following Road Traffic and Industrial Injury, 7 
AUSTRALIAN & NEW ZEALAND J. PSYCHIATRY  32 (1973) (finding that about half of accident victims referred for psychiatric care 
did not improve until their cases settled); Peter G. Denker, The Progress of Insured Neurotics: A Study of 1,000 Disability 
Insurance Claims, 39 N.Y. STATE J .  MED. 238, 246 (1939) (finding diminishment of psychological symptoms following 
settlement); Henry Miller, Accident Neurosis , 1 BRIT. MED. J. 919 (1961) (finding psychiatric symptoms in only two of fifty tort 
claimants two years after settlement). One limitation of these studies is that the psychological benefits may flow as much from 
the fruits of settlement, cash awards, as from the end of litigation itself. For a useful discussion of these studies, as well as studies 
finding no beneficial psychiatric effect from settlement, see Daniel W. Shuman, When Time Does Not Heal, 6 PSYCHOL. PUB. 
POL’Y & L. 880, 886-90 (2000). 
464 The American Bar Association, for example, has issued recommendations for the speed at which civil claims should be 
processed. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION DIVISION,  STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION: 
STANDARDS RELATING TO TRIAL COURTS § 2.52(a) (1992) (recommending, for example, that 98% of cases be resolved within 18 
months of filing). 
465 Professor Shuman implicitly acknowledges that psychological concerns are less with institut ional parties in noting, “Although 
large numbers of tort defendants are institutions, in approximately half of tort cases there is an individual defendant.” Shuman, 
supra note 463, at 894. 
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individuals would probably not suffer severe symptoms as a result of delay in prize litigation, 
just as scientists presumably do not suffer such symptoms as a result of uncertainty about 
whether a product currently being developed will prove successful in a decade’s time. 
A final concern about delay, probably the weightiest one, is that it might reduce the 
expectation that any prizes will be awarded. The government might have an incentive to renege 
on an initial promise to pay inventors, for example by repealing the statute promising prizes. 
Perceptions that prizes will not be granted are significant even if the government does not in fact 
renege, because it is the anticipation of prizes that induces investment. If the government cannot 
somehow “tie its hands,”466 then the possibility that the government will renege indeed provides 
an argument against delay, or for shorter delays rather than longer ones. While it may be 
impossible for the government to provide perfect assurance,467 it may be able to come close by 
establishing with statutory language that applicants have a property right to a prize (unless their 
actions did not merit a prize), so that deprivation of the right might be seen as a Takings 
Clause468 violation. 469 
C. Fund vs. Open-Ended Program 
One way to enhance an argument that applicants have a property right would be for the 
government to provide in advance a set fund for a patent prize program rather than to make the  
program open-ended. Suppose, for example, that the government, frustrated by high monopoly 
prices on the latest mousetrap designs, decided that it wished to allocate funds to a patent prize 
system for mousetraps. Instead of promising to provide however much money turns out to be 
appropriate to however many people who apply for prizes for their mousetraps, the government 
might decide to devote a set amount of money to a mousetrap fund. For example, the government 
might decide to set aside ten million dollars for mousetrap patent prizes and place these funds in 
an interest-bearing account. The government would then promise that the entirety of the fund 
would be distributed to applicants, providing in legislation that the fund was in trust for those 
who filed applications in a certain time period.470 
This approach not only increases the confidence that inventors have that the government 
will not renege altogether on a promise to provide prizes, but also answers the concern that the 
government might underestimate the value of innovations in granting prizes. Before the recent 
literature seeking to develop formulas or algorithms that purportedly would eliminate 
                                                 
466 The challenge of obtaining government precommitment is one that appears in a variety of policy and legal contexts. See 
generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND: STUDIES IN RATIONALITY , PRECOMMITMENT, AND CONSTRAINTS (2000). 
467 Some governmental promises, however, do seem to entail no risk of repudiation. U.S. bonds are often characterized as the 
quintessential risk-free investment. See, e.g., Gregory Zuckerman, Ring in a New Bond Bellwether: 10-Year, WALL ST. J., May 3, 
2000, at C1 (“Treasury securities, backed by the full faith and credit of the U.S. government, have been viewed a risk-free 
investment with no peer. . . . [A]s long as an investor holds the bond to maturity, he or she is all but guaranteed to get the money 
back.”). One reason for this might be the belief that powerful interests would oppose repudiation and because there is a 
constitutional provision arguably preventing debt repudiation. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 4 (“The validity of the public debt 
of the United States . . . . shall not be questioned . . . .”). 
468 See U.S. CONST.  amend. V. 
469 An argument for permitting the government to renege on a promise to provide prizes might focus on Flemming v. Nestor, 363 
U.S. 603 (1960), which upheld Congress’s right to terminate Social Security benefits for specified classes of individuals. In that 
case, however, the statute itself reserved Congress’s right to make such a change. Id. at 610-11. 
470 Government may have less flexibility in acting as a trustee than it would otherwise. See, e.g., Cobell v. Babbitt, 30 F. Supp. 
2d 24 (D.D.C. 1998) (considering a class action by Indians against the Secretary of the Interior for mismanaging trust fund 
accounts); James L. Huffman, A Fish out of Water: The Public Trust Doctrine in a Constitutional Democracy, 19 ENVTL . L. 527 
(1989) (discussing the public trust doctrine of environmental law). 
 PATENT PRIZES 85 
governmental discretion, 471 the possibility of such underestimation was the foremost complaint 
among industrial organization economists about prize systems. Jean Tirole, for example, 
explained that “[b]ecause the investor’s investment is sunk at [the research and development] 
stage, the inventor is subject to the hold-up problem . . . . The administrative and jud icial bodies 
in charge of prizes generally estimate the values of inventions very conservatively.”472 Once a 
government has induced an innovation, especially if the innovation is not eligible for patent 
protection, its incentive is to provide meager prizes. If the entire fund is to be distributed to prize 
applicants, however, conservative estimations of the social value of inventions are not a matter of 
concern. As long as underestimation or overestimation is not invention-specific in a predictable 
way, underestimation of values will not affect the total size of the government subsidy. 
Aside from increasing confidence that the government will not renege on its 
commitments, the primary advantage of the set fund approach over an open-ended program is 
political. Legislators might be hesitant to create programs whose expense is highly uncertain, in 
part because if such programs use more resources than anticipated, other programs might need to 
be cut or taxes to be raised if balanced budget goals are to be reached.473 Of course, the 
government does create some programs whose budget allocation is uncertain, as, for example, 
Social Security expenditures may vary from one year to another and not be fully predictable.474 
The Congressional Budget Office routinely calculates both anticipated revenues and anticipated 
expenses to allow Congress to make budgetary choices.475 Nonetheless, Congress might be 
hesitant to create a mousetrap program if there was any chance that the program might use eighty 
million instead of ten million dollars, even if the increased expenses corresponded to higher than 
anticipated benefits of the program. Such concerns might be even greater for larger scale 
programs.  
Creating a fund rather than an open-ended program is also a useful means of providing an 
experimental program. Legislators might be interested in exploring the possibility of patent 
prizes, but sensibly hesitant to create a massive program without preliminary testing. An 
experimental program might be especially important if legislators decided, contrary to the advice 
above,476 to implement a patent prize system according to a prespecified formula or algorithm. 
An initial experimental run would allow the government and investigators to observe problems 
with and exploitations of the system and make suitable changes before expanding the program. 
Even if such an experiment ran into so many problems that the program turned out to have 
greater costs than benefits, the government might be able to fine tune it. Even the proposal 
described here could benefit from modest experimentation, both to build confidence in the patent 
prize system and to expose any unanticipated problems.477 Whatever approach is adopted, the 
government can increase the size of the fund as confidence in the program increases. 
                                                 
471 See supra Part I. 
472 See TIROLE, supra note 86, at 401. Tirole thus concludes that “[a] more serious rival to the patent system is a centralized 
solution known as the procurement or contractual mechanism.” Id. 
473 In the absence of a balanced budget amendment, however, Congress may well find ways to circumvent budget targets that it 
has established. See, e.g., Donald B. Tobin, Less Is More: A Move Toward Sanity in the Budget Process, 16 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. 
REV. 115, 123-27 (providing a history of congressional budgets targets and evasions in the 1980s). 
474 The uncertainty of such expenses may provide an affirmative benefit, complementing federal income taxation and 
unemployment insurance as automatic stabilizers that help create countercyclical fiscal policy. See generally  Alan J. Auerbach & 
Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as Automatic Stabilizers, J. ECON.  PERSPECTIVES, Summer 2000, at 37 
(estimating the importance of the federal tax system in reducing output shocks). 
475 See http://www.cbo.gov (last visited Sept. 15, 2001) (listing various recent economic reports). 
476 See supra Part III.A. 
477 The government would not have to wait until prizes were actually distributed to assess the value of the experiment. Indeed, 
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The fund approach requires some method for distributing a limited sum of money to 
claimants. A FIFO, or first- in, first-out strategy, would distribute prizes to applicants sequentially 
until the fund were exhausted. The problem with this approach is that as applications accumulate, 
the probability that the fund will be depleted before any new application is processed increases, 
and this uncertainty will decrease the expected prize to applicants once the fund is almost topped 
off. A LIFO, or last- in, first-out strategy, would solve this problem, but produce even more 
perverse incentives. All patent holders would be hesitant to be the first to apply and so 
presumably would wait to file applications until the last minute. Neither of these strategies seems 
likely to produce an equilibrium in which the total number of applications roughly exhausts the 
fund. 
Probably the simplest strategy would be to calculate prizes for all applicants and then 
increase or decrease all by the same percentage as necessary to use up the fund, including any 
interest that has accumulated on it.478 This could, but need not necessarily, be operationalized by 
awarding applicants shares in the fund. Instead of giving a million dollar prize, the agency would 
award a million shares in the fund. Regardless of how this strategy is effectuated, it should in 
equilibrium result in the applications’ roughly exhausting the fund. More precisely, the sum of 
the private benefits that the applicants could have obtained by exploiting their patents 
monopolistically will tend to equal the total amount in the fund.479 Interestingly, this proves to be 
true whether the agency calculates prizes based on the private benefit that the applicants have 
yielded or whether it does so based on the social benefit that the applicants have produced. 
To understand why, suppose first that the agency calculates prizes based on the private 
benefits forgone. A patent holder who would lose one million dollars by placing the patent into 
the public domain would be willing to do so if the expected prize were at least that much, plus 
interest. The patent holder will thus make an estimate of the prizes that other applicants will 
receive. If these prizes sum up to more than the value of the fund, then the patent holder will 
anticipate that her own prize for yielding the patent would be reduced accordingly. If these prizes 
sum up to less than the value of the fund, by at least one million dollars, then the patent holder 
will be willing to yield the patent. A slight complication is that the patent holder will consider 
not just the expected value of the prize, but also the riskiness of the prize scheme relative to the 
riskiness of market exploitation of the patent. A result, though, is that the prize scheme will tend 
to induce applications from those for whom the prize scheme is relatively safe, for example 
because market exploitation is particularly uncertain. 
Now suppose that the agency calculates prizes based on the social benefits produced, 
which we have seen may be greater than the private benefit.480 Patent holders will still compare 
                                                                                                                                                             
using the quality of actual prize decisions to assess a program might be misleading. The purpose of the program, after all, is to 
induce innovation based on anticipation of prizes, not to distribute prizes as fairly as possible. 
478 Prizes would all be calculated discounting dollars to the first date at which any applicant’s actions might have produced some 
public benefit. If a fund is distributed proportionately, however, all that matters is that all applications are discounted using the 
same method. 
479 Other distribution schemes may also produce this equilibrium. Consider, for example, a strategy in which applications are 
considered in random order and the funds are disbursed until exhausted, and any excess funds are distributed proportionately as 
in the scheme described in the text. The only difference between the two schemes is that if prizes end up adding up to more than 
the fund, in the scheme described in the text, all share the burden of the fund shortfall, while in the random scheme, the burden is 
essentially randomly placed on select applicants. The randomness of the scheme would add to the risk of submitting an 
application. As indicated above, though, inventors will invest resources in research and development even if there is some 
possibility of zero return. See supra text accompanying notes 400-401. The additional risk cost, however, seems unnecessary to 
bear, unless it is offset by the administrative savings from the agency’s not having to consider applications after depletion of the 
fund. 
480 See supra note 272 and accompanying text. 
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their expected private benefit from monopoly exploitation against the prize. For example, a 
patent holder with a private benefit of one million dollars but a social benefit from yielding the 
patent of two million dollars will be willing to yield the patent as long as the total prizes are no 
more than twice the value of the fund. Thus, the equilibrium once again will be one in which 
private benefits approximately add up to the fund value.481 This approach produces a useful 
sorting. A patent holder will yield a patent (or do something else to offset the monopolistic effect 
of a patent) if and only if the ratio of social to private benefit is higher for the patent holder than 
the ratio of total initial prize awards to funds available. If prizes are calculated according to 
social benefit, the program will attract those for whom the social benefits of releasing the patents 
are highest. Using a fund and granting prizes on the basis of social value thus effects proverse 
selection, 482 the opposite of adverse selection. 483 
When the government uses a modest limited fund instead of sponsoring an open-ended 
prize program, the program will not encourage innovation any more than the patent system. This 
might seem to furnish an argument for an open-ended system, so that the system can both 
decrease deadweight loss and increase innovation. The argument, however, is not a strong one, 
because the government could always increase the size of the fund from one year to the next. The 
larger the fund, the more patent holders will decide to participate. If the fund becomes larger than 
needed to induce all patent holders who might participate to do so, then the excess is a subsidy 
that will encourage greater research and development. Conceivably, the government could 
continue to increase the fund for a program in successive years until the marginal participant is 
one who would lose money in the patent system but could earn zero economic profit in the prize 
system, 484 assuming all inefficiencies of prizes, including deadweight costs of taxation, 485 are 
accounted for in the prize awards. In any particular case, though, the fund approach relieves 
decisionmakers of the need to calculate the deadweight cost of funding prizes through taxation, 
since the deadweight loss per dollar of prize would affect all prize recipients equally.486 
Perhaps the most significant argument against the limited fund approach is that potential 
applicants will have to estimate how many other applications are submitted. The uncertainty does 
not mean that no one will apply, but it does increase the variance of an expected prize, and this 
will make the prize system slightly less attractive than it otherwise would be. In addition, 
applicants might devote some resources to calculating the value of applications submitted so far 
and projecting how many applications may be submitted in the future,487 and this expenditure is a 
                                                 
481 The equilibrium will not be exactly this, because the ratio of social to private benefits may vary among applicants. Suppose, 
for example, that an applicant’s invention would have produced zero monopoly profits (i.e., zero private benefit from exploiting 
the patent), but there nonetheless would be one million dollars in social benefits from releasing the patent into the public domain. 
If the total fund is one million dollars, and the ratio for everyone else between private and social benefit is 1:1, then no one else 
will have an incentive to submit a patent to the fund. Thus, in this extreme case, the total private benefit foregone would be zero. 
482 On proverse selection, see, for example, Robert H. Jerry, II, Health Insurers’ Use of Genetic Information: A Missouri 
Perspective on a Changing Regulatory Landscape, 64 M O. L. REV. 759, 770-71 (1999). 
483 The proverse selection effect might offset or outweigh any adverse selection problem. See supra Part II.C. 
484 It would not necessarily be desirable to do so given the rent dissipation problem, unless this problem is taken into account in 
calculating awards. See supra note 418 and accompanying text. 
485 See supra Part II.D.1. 
486 For example, suppose that the total social benefit found for all applications to a $100 million fund is $200 million, not 
including the deadweight loss of taxation. Whether the deadweight cost of providing a $1 prize is negative, zero, ten cents, or 
sixty cents would have no effect on how much each prize applicant would receive, fifty cents for every dollar of social benefit. If 
the deadweight cost is greater than the deadweight cost of the patent system, that would provide an argument against having a 
patent prize system at all, but not an argument that would result in different discounts for different proposals. 
487 Projecting future applications may be the more difficult task. A potential partial solution is to allow different deadlines for 
different applications. For example, anyone submitting on January 1 might receive a prize of any amount, but someone 
submitting on February 1 would be allowed a prize of only up to $1 million, even if the application turned out to merit a larger 
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social cost. Both the risk and the resource reallocation in effect make opting into prizes more 
expensive than it otherwise would be. The effect is equivalent to increasing the private benefit 
foregone, since the patent holder could have avoided the costs by exploiting the patent 
monopolistically. Thus, these costs will slightly reduce the number of applications and the total 
social benefits of the program. 
These are significant concerns, but my estimation is that the advantages of a limited fund 
approach are more than sufficient to offset them. Except in very narrow contexts, I suspect that 
legislators would be unwilling to adopt the more open-ended approach anyway, at least initially, 
even if it would produce higher benefits. That may be more a concession than an argument, but it 
is coupled with the advantage of a fund in instilling confidence in prize applicants that they will 
in fact be paid if they have done something of social value. Once the fund is allocated and placed 
in an interest-bearing account, perhaps even in a private trust with the trustee instructed to 
distribute it to applicants based on the agency’s ultimate prize determinations, investors will 
recognize that the money will not disappear. With the open-ended approach, even if investors are 
confident that the prize program will not disappear, they might reasonably worry that individual 
decisionmakers might care more about the size of the government debt than about retrospective 
prizes. Using a fund eliminates that concern. 
D. Tradable vs. Untradable 
Regardless of whether prize applicants receive a portion of a fund or an amount that 
depends on the merits of their application alone, applicants should be allowed to sell their right 
to any future prize to third parties. Allowing such rights to be traded would permit independent 
inventors or small companies that have developed inventions to cash out their prizes immediately 
by finding someone to purchase the right to a prize. We have already seen that inventors in need 
of immediate cash might be able to borrow against a prize or to securitize themselves,488 but sale 
of a prize claim may provide the same benefit more easily. Allowing tradability of claims 
permits claims to flow from relatively risk-averse parties to relatively risk-neutral parties and 
thus improves allocative efficiency. Even large public corporations sometimes might be better 
off liquidating their prize claims, for example as a way of demonstrating the success of a past 
product to investors and thus inspiring confidence in future products.489 
This is a straightforward conclusion, and it provides an answer to concerns that delay is 
infeasible. Nonetheless, it may seem a surprising approach, because our legal system often 
prohibits the alienation of legal claims. While legal claims that survive the death of the claimant 
generally may be assigned,490 rules against champerty and maintenance may prevent lawyers and 
others from purchasing legal claims or marketing themselves as purchasers of legal claims.491 
                                                                                                                                                             
prize, and so on. This method effectively allows the fund to be topped off with relatively small prizes. See infra text 
accompanying notes 561-562 (suggesting a refinement of this mechanism). 
488 See supra text accompanying note 461. 
489 Presumably, the stock price of a company would reflect an asset of a prize claim, but the market valuation of a prize claim 
may be quite noisy. No one stock analyst will have sufficient incentive to research fully the value of the prize, because the analyst 
may be unable to prevent other analysts from appropriating the benefits of such research. See D. Bruce Johnsen, Property Rights 
to Investment Research: The Agency Costs of Soft Dollar Brokerage, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 75, 92-95 (1994) (discussing the 
difficulty that stock analysts have in preventing others from appropriating the benefits of their research). Sale to a single third 
party, which would have ample incentive to investigate the claim’s value, would eliminate for a firm’s shareholders any 
uncertainty about a prize. 
490 See, e.g., Annotation, Assignability of Claim for Personal Injury or Death, 40 A.L.R.2d 500 § 4 (“[T]he test of assignability 
of a claim is its survival after the death of the original holder thereof.”). 
491 On champerty and maintenance, see, for example, Susan Lorde Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New 
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Prohibitions on alienation of legal claims, however, have recently received substantial criticism 
from commentators who argue that permitting sale of claims would have substantial benefits, 
such as allowing tort plaintiffs to receive recoveries faster, without significant drawbacks.492 In 
any event, if the basis of such prohibitions is unseemliness, early cashing in of patent prizes 
seems much less troublesome than sale of tort claims. 
Sale of a right to an eventual prize is not free, in the sense that the seller is not likely to 
receive the expected value of the prize in exchange for sale.493 The price ordinarily will be less 
than this to compensate buyers in three different ways. First, buyers will demand compensation 
for the risk that they must bear, given the uncertainty of prize returns. This risk is a significant 
cost of a regime in which decisionmakers have considerable discretion in setting prizes, but, as 
we have seen, publicly traded companies are relatively risk-neutral, because they are generally 
held in diverse portfolios.494 The risk premia might be even lower with a fixed prize fund, since 
an individual company might buy up rights to a significant percentage of the fund. Second, 
buyers will demand compensation for the resources used to evaluate a patent prize application.495 
Third, sellers in effect will have to pay the anticipated legal costs that buyers of rights to prizes 
will expect to bear, along with a premium because of the uncertainty of the magnitude of such 
costs. 
E. Special Purpose vs. General Purpose 
A patent prize system could be established for patents generally (or even for patents and 
copyrights generally) 496 or for a much narrower range, such as prescription drugs.497 Creation of a 
program with a narrow range might seem to reflect an arbitrary preference, and indeed 
concentrated interest groups presumably would press for prize systems that would provide 
greater benefit for them than for others.498 Government spending, however, will presumably be 
influenced by interest groups anyway, and if a prize system spends government money more 
efficiently than some other allocation scheme, then society as a whole benefits. Interest group 
pressures to shift one source of money intended to benefit them into a prize program for their 
benefit is benign. Moreover, prize systems may be politically feasible only when there is interest 
                                                                                                                                                             
Business Opportunity?, 30 AM. BUS. L.J. 485, 486-87 (1992). 
492 See Peter Charles Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 435 (1995) (maintaining 
that allowing trading of claims would cure many ills of the tort sy stem); Marc A. Shukastis, A Market in Personal Injury Tort 
Claims, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 329, 337 (1987) (advocating the creation of a market in which injured parties could sell their claims to 
third parties); Ari Dobner, Comment, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1538 (1996) (arguing that trading of legal 
claims is fair and efficient); Teal E. Luthy, Comment, Assigning Common Law Claims for Fraud, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1001 (1998) 
(defending assignability of fraud claims). 
493 On occasion, the seller might, as a result of the winner’s curse. See supra note 134. 
494 See supra notes 401-403 and accompanying text. 
495 If a seller auctions off rights to a patent prize, auction theory suggests that the seller in effect will pay the research costs of all 
bidders. See, e.g., Kenneth R. French & Robert E. McCormick, Sealed Bid, Sunk Costs, and the Process of Competition, 57 J. 
BUS. 417, 439 (1984) (discussing common value auctions). 
496 See infra Part IV.B.1 (discussing applicability of prize system to copyright). 
497 Indeed, a prize system might be narrower still. See infra Part IV.A.1 (describing prizes for providing prescription drugs to 
seniors). 
498 In the patent area, however, interest group competition for limited funds might more or less cancel out, as presumably a range 
of inventor groups and consumer groups would be able to overcome the free rider problem that may inhibit interest group 
formation. Cf. Charles L. Gholz, First-to-File or First-to-Invent?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 891, 892 n.1 (2000) 
(providing another example of a patent issue on which competing interest groups are likely to differ). 
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group pressure, as some interest groups, such as the patent bar,499 likely would oppose prize 
systems.  
There are also practical reasons that a special purpose prize system might be superior to a 
general prize system. First, a special purpose prize system may make prize calculation easier. 
Decisionmakers would need to acquaint themselves with the complexities of one market, rather 
than the complexities of a number of markets. It would also be easier for potential applicants to 
estimate the number and strength of submitted patent applications if the number of potential 
applicants is relatively small. A pharmaceutical firm, for example, might be better situated to 
assess whether other pharmaceutical companies will submit applications than whether 
automobile companies will submit applications. Second, a special purpose prize system may help 
offset adverse selection problems.500 Adverse selection will be less of a problem the larger the 
proportion of eligible firms that decide to seek prizes. If millions of firms are eligible and only a 
small number are expected to submit applications, these may well be firms that have asymmetric 
negative information about the value of their products that they do not expect the patent agency 
to discover even with considerable delay. 
The primary disadvantage of a special purpose prize system as opposed to a general one 
is that it would bar some actions that would have great potential to mitigate deadweight loss. 
Perhaps the yachting industry does not have a sufficiently strong lobby to create a patent prize 
system for innovations in yacht design,501 even though it is possible that the deadweight loss in 
that area is large. There might be some yachting patents for which the ratio of social to private 
benefit of a patent is higher than for, say, some pharmaceutical patents, even if the ratio for 
pharmaceutical patents is generally higher. A general purpose prize system with a limited fund 
would induce applications where the ratio of social to private benefit is highest,502 and so the 
marginal ratio will be lower in a special purpose system. The ultimate cost-benefit analysis is 
thus indeterminate, though as a practical matter, it probably makes sense to start with modest 
special purpose prize systems, leaving large general purpose prize systems as a potential long-
term goal. 
F. Winner-Take-All vs. Shared 
So far, I have assumed that a prize would be awarded to each inventor who took some 
socially beneficial action to offset the deadweight loss of a patent, but that need not be so. 
Indeed, the word “prize,” perhaps more so than the alternative “reward,”503 might seem to 
suggest a set sum of money for a top contributor. In a winner-take-all system for mousetraps, the 
government might promise a set sum of money to whoever takes an action that has the greatest 
social benefit, with perhaps smaller prizes for second- and third-place finishers. Or, the 
government might establish a prize for the first inventor to achieve some specified goal—say, 
                                                 
499 A prize system need not displace the Patent and Trademark Office and thus patent prosecution. See supra text accompanying 
note 360. Nonetheless, the patent bar would presumably lose considerable money from decreased patent litigation. See supra Part 
II.D.3. 
500 See supra Part II.C. 
501 It would need a strong lobby to overcome sentiments that the public ought not pay to improve yachting technology. See 
Kremer, supra note 20, at 1163 (indicating a preference for patent buyouts in the pharmaceuticals area over such buyouts in the 
yachting area); supra note 454. 
502 See supra notes 481-483. 
503 The American Heritage Dictionary defines “prize” as “[s]omething offered or won as an award for superiority or victory, as 
in a contest or competition,” and “reward” as “[s]omething given or received in recompense for worthy behavior.”  THE 
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1442, 1546 (3d ed. 1992).  
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developing a mousetrap that works with deadly laser beams—and simply place the prize aside 
until someone finally claims it. Though none of the advocates of patent prize systems described 
in Part I advocates such an approach, it has a stronger historical pedigree than a system in which 
everyone receives a prize.504 Winner-take-all systems are also familiar in the economic 
landscape,505 including patent law, in which the first to win a patent race receives the patent.506 
Winner-take-all systems do have some significant virtues. All a decisionmaker would 
need to do is to select a single winner. Not only would this likely reduce the costs of the 
decisionmaking process, but it also might be an easier task. In addition, winner-take-all systems 
may induce relatively few frivolous applications. In a system in which everyone is eligible to 
receive something, the chance to receive even just a few dollars might induce a large number of 
applications claiming very small prizes, and the cost of processing these applications might 
exceed the social value of any services performed by the applicants. With winner-take-all, by 
contrast, relatively few would apply. Someone without the laser beam mousetrap, or at least 
something that might pass for a solution, would not submit it. Similarly, if the prize is to 
whoever provides the greatest social benefit in an area, someone who knows that another 
applicant is clearly superior probably will not bother applying. 
The vices of winner-take-all systems, however, are greater than their virtues. Consider 
first a winner-take-all system in which the prize is awarded to whoever provides the largest 
social benefit. Although it is possible that several applicants might compete for the prize, it is 
also possible that the participation of one party would scare others off. 507 Yet, it may be that the 
greatest social benefit could be achieved by having each of a number of patent holders taking 
some action to lower deadweight costs, rather than having one patent holder take a single 
dramatic action. Shared prizes could lead to a single entity taking the vast majority of the prize 
fund, if that entity is capable of producing social benefit at lowest marginal private cost, but it 
would allow for many contributions where that is more efficient. Similarly, if a winner-takes-all 
prize is to be awarded to whoever achieves some specified innovation first, someone who 
                                                 
504 See supra note 15 (providing examples of early prizes for inventions). 
505 For analyses of winner-take-all regimes, see ROBERT H. FRANK & PHILLIP J. COOK, THE WINNER-TAKE-ALL SOCIETY (1995), 
which argues that markets in many contexts are winner take all; REBECCA L. SANDEFUR & JOHN P. HEINZ, WINNER-TAKE-ALL 
MARKETS FOR LEGAL SERVICES AND LAWYERS’ JOB SATISFACTION (American Bar Found. Working Paper Series,  1999), which 
demonstrates that markets for legal services are increasingly winner-take-all; Lani Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-
Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor’s Clothes , 71 TEX. L. RE V. 1589 (1993), which criticizes winner-take-all 
congressional races; and Victor Williams & Alison M. MacDonald, Rethinking Article II, Section 1 and Its Twelfth Amendment 
Restatement: Challenging Our Nation's Malapportioned, Undemocratic Presidential Election Systems, 77 M ARQ . L. REV. 201 
(1994), which challenges the winner-take-all approach that most states take to apportioning electoral votes. 
506 For an analysis of the winner-take-all nature of intellectual property regimes, see Jonathan B. Baker, Promoting Innovation 
Competition Through the Aspen/Kodak Rule, 7 GEO. MASON L. REV. 495 (1999).  
507 This is similar to the dynamics of a patent race. See supra Part II.B.1. One reason that someone might be hesitant to join a 
race is that with a single prize, there is a risk that the race will devolve into an escalation auction. See generally Martin Shubik, 
The Dollar Auction Game: A Paradox in Noncooperative Behavior and Escalation, 15 J. Conflict Resolution 109 (1971) 
(describing an “escalation auction,” in which each of the top two bidders must pay the amount of his bid, and in which 
participants often end up bidding individually more than a dollar when a dollar is the item auctioned); Ian Ayres & Peter 
Cramton, Deficit Reduction Through Diversity: How Affirmative Action at the FCC Increased Auction Competition, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 761, 796-97 (1996) (summarizing the dynamics of such an auction). For example, if two parties have each spent one million 
dollars to win a one million dollar prize, each still might continue to spend because the marginal spending might make the 
difference in winning the prize. The result is not unlike a litigation in which both parties spend more on legal fees than the money 
at stake or a war in which countries continue to devote troops even though the total losses have already exceeded whatever 
initially might have seemed at stake. See Barry O’Neill, International Escalation and the Dollar Auction, 30 J. CONFLICT 
RESOLUTION 33 (1986) (comparing war to behavior in an escalation auction). Recognizing the possibility of an equilibrium in 
which both parties spend far more than the prize, potential competitors may be hesitant to compete. Even if escalation (and thus 
high spending to produce social benefit) results, the marginal spending might produce smaller social benefits than private costs. 
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anticipates being able to come close to the goal, but not quite achieve it, will have no incentive to 
do so.508 Winner-take-all prizes, in sum, are crude tools that are unlikely to produce just the right 
mix of private contributions. 
A more difficult question is whether prizes for individual innovations should be winner-
take-all or shared. In the patent system, a single inventor applies for a patent, with the loser in a 
patent race receiving nothing. 509 A variety of reasons make this logical for the patent system, 
including that it is difficult to divide a patent among multiple claimants,510 and that it might be 
difficult to craft doctrine establishing what one must accomplish to be a contributor. It would not 
necessarily be impossible in the prize context. Money is easily divisible, and, in the absence of a 
need for predictable doctrine, an agency could make an assessment of relative contributions to an 
innovation and distribute the prize accordingly. That the agency sometimes might misestimate, 
giving a contributor more or less credit than deserved, is of little concern, as long as the agency 
approximates contributions on average. 
The possibility of dividing prizes for single innovations may not be sufficient to justify 
the practice. We have seen, though, that it might be efficient to award a prize to someone who 
releases valuable information without developing a product, because doing so would encourage 
release of information and thus limit research redundancy. 511 On the other hand, there may be 
instances in which release of information may be socially inefficient, because a variety of firms 
will compete inefficiently to accomplish the next innovation step.512 In addition, there might be 
instances in which releasing information does not contribute to reducing the deadweight cost of 
patents, because the party that uses the information released still receives a patent and decides to 
exploit it monopolistically rather than seeking a prize. There may be other situations, however, in 
which release of information provides a social benefit by limiting the scope of any patent 
eventually obtained or by preventing another party from receiving a patent altogether.513 
A virtue of a system investing those awarding prizes with wide discretion is that, in 
contrast to any mechanical prize proposal, decisionmakers would have the option of splitting a 
                                                 
508 This problem animates Michael Kremer in his analysis of the problem of encouraging the development of new vaccines. See 
Michael Kremer, A Purchase Fund for New Vaccines: Rationale and a Proposed Design (Nov. 16, 1999) (unpublished 
manuscript, on file with author) [hereinafter Kremer, Purchase Fund]; see also Rachel Glennerster & Michael Kremer, A Better 
Way to Spur Medical Research and Development, REGULATION, Summer 2000, at 34 (summarizing the proposal); Walter 
Williams, We Can Cure World Disease by Offering Prizes , DESERET NEWS, July 19, 2000, at A15, available at 2000 WL 
24356585 (discussing the proposal); Michael Kremer & Rachel Glennerster, Creating a Market for Vaccines, N.Y. TIMES, June 
1, 2001, at A19 (advocating the proposal). Kremer notes that by providing rigid specifications that a solution must meet to 
receive a prize, the prize-giver offers no incentive to develop imperfect solutions: 
For example, if the specifications required a 90% reduction in mortality in all localities, potential vaccine developers 
might not pursue a candidate vaccine that would be likely to yield 99% protection in most regions, but only 85% 
protection in others. If it were difficult to create a vaccine delivering 90% protection in all regions, no vaccine at all 
might be developed. In order to provide appropriate incentives for researchers, the fund should pay more for superior 
vaccines; a vaccine with 90% efficiency is worth more than one with 80% efficiency, and a vaccine that requires no 
booster is worth more than one requiring boosters every five years. However, specifying a full schedule of prices based 
on characteristics of hypothetical vaccines is likely to prove impossible. 
Kremer, Purchase Fund, supra (manuscript at 24). 
509 See supra Part II.B.1. 
510 It would not necessarily be impossible. The winner might be placed in possession of the patent for the first ten years of its life, 
with the second-place finisher in possession for the last ten. It is not uncommon for real property to be split in similar ways, and 
copyright law long provided for reversion of the property right to the author after a set period of time. See R. Anthony Reese, 
Note, Reflections on the Intellectual Commons: Two Perspectives on Copyright Duration and Reversion, 47 STAN. L. REV. 707, 
727-28 (1995) (describing the origin of this regime); id. at 731 (explaining that aspects of this reversionary practice remain). 
511 See supra text accompanying notes 292-293. 
512 This is, of course, yet another example of the common pool problem. See supra Part II.B. 
513 See supra notes 283-289 and accompanying text (discussing strategic disclosure to prevent patents from issuing). 
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prize where that is efficient. At the same time, though, agency decisionmakers might decide in a 
particular circumstance that an applicant made no contribution to an innovation or that there is 
some other reason that the decision to release information does not merit a prize. For example, a 
decisionmaker should take into account that the cost of processing a prize application is a social 
cost reducing any benefits claimed and thus, if calculating prizes on the basis of social benefit, 
lower the prizes awarded accordingly. If a decision to release information is inefficient because it 
will lead to wasteful applications or disputes about relative contributions, which is particularly 
likely in areas in which it will be difficult for an agency to separate one firm’s contribution from 
another’s, the agency might award nothing. Similarly, it might decide that awarding a single 
prize for the best innovation is more efficient than awarding a multitude of prizes for various 
innovations. Once again, as long as the agency is expected to weigh such criteria the appropriate 
amount on average, inventors will make efficient ex ante decisions. 
G. Independent vs. Executive 
An important decision in the creation of any administrative agency is whether the agency 
should be independent or executive. The primary functional difference is that in an executive 
agency, the President has unlimited removal power, while in an independent agency, 
decisionmakers at the top of the agency hierarchy are removable only for good cause.514 
Appointees to independent agencies usually receive terms longer than the four years of a single 
presidential term.515 Typically, though not by definition, executive agencies, including the 
various cabinet departments, have a single head, while independent agencies have multiple 
individuals compromising the leadership and are often referred to as “commissions” or “boards” 
rather than as “agencies.”516 The reason for this correlation is that when presidential control is 
desired, having a single individual reporting to the President at the helm is advisable, while when 
an agency is intended to make decisions according to scientific rather than political 
considerations, a multi-member board often seems preferable.517 
The goals of a patent prize agency strongly argue for independence. Such an agency, after 
all, is intended not as a vehicle for steering federal policy, but rather as a vehicle for rewarding 
past inventive effort in as efficient a way as possible. If the President controlled the agency’s 
decisions, directly or indirectly, investors might worry, even with delay, that superficially 
attractive companies, for example companies working on solutions to the problems viewed as 
most pressing, would receive high rewards, independent of the amount of deadweight loss 
                                                 
514 See, e.g., GARY LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2d ed. 2001). Traditionally, as a result of the Supreme Court’s 
decisions in Myers v. United States , 272 U.S. 52 (1926), and Humphrey’s Executor v. United States , 295 U.S. 602 (1935), 
limitations on presidential removal power were considered constitutional unless the officials insulated from removal were 
executive officials. In Morrison v. Olson 487 U.S. 654, 691 (1988), however, the Court held that Congress could limit the 
removal of even executive officials, as long as the “removal restrictions are [not] of such a nature that they impede the 
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duty.” 
515 Members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, for example, receive fourteen year terms. See 12 U.S.C. 
§ 241 (1994). 
516 See LAWSON, supra note 514, at 7 n.8. An example is the Federal Communications Commission. See 47 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) 
(establishing a commission of five members, without providing for presidential removal). 
517 See LAWSON, supra note 514, at 8. Professor Lawson explains: 
There is a substantial correspondence between the single-headed/multi-member and executive/independent axes. . . . 
The theory behind these particular combinations has long been that single-headedness and executiveness both promote 
accountability (because you can blame a single administrator for the agency’s mistakes and then blame the President 
for retaining the administrator), while multi-memberness and independence both promote disinterested professionalism 
(because a group of tenured officials will presumably be less vulnerable to special-interest and presidential influence). 
Id. 
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reduced. This consideration, however, does not necessarily mean that the agency should have the 
same structure as most independent agencies. Indeed, as argued above, members’ terms should 
not be so long that the identity of decisionmakers could be predicted in advance. Terms of four 
or five years might be the optimal length, assuming a delay of ten years before prizes are 
awarded,518 balancing concerns about presidential control with concerns about making the 
identity of decisionmakers unpredictable. 
Even this approach, however, may be insufficient to combat concerns about rent-seeking. 
Someone who has filed an application for a prize might seek to influence the selection of a 
decisionmaker by giving campaign donations to the President or other officials in a position to 
affect the appointment. To solve this problem, the President and legislators could be taken out of 
the loop. One approach would be for prize determinations to be made by borrowing 
administrative law judges from other agencies, though this might reduce the benefits of 
specialization. 519 Moreover, it would foreclose the possibility of having decisionmakers with 
training appropriate to the task of awarding prizes. Training in economics is likely to be more 
important than training in law. The job of decisionmakers is to make the best economic 
calculation possible,520 especially in an agency giving such decisionmakers wide discretion, not 
to discern the current state of legal doctrine. 
Perhaps a more effective approach would be to vest appointment in the courts, for 
example by creating a three-judge panel of the D.C. Circuit or Federal Circuit charged with the 
task. Under the U.S. Constitution’s Appointments Clause,521 this is permissible as long as the 
appointees are inferior rather than principal officers,522 or presumably if they are not officers at 
all. 523 The case law in this area is controversial, as illustrated most famously by Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Morrison v. Olson,524 in which the majority found that the independent counsel was an 
inferior officer. The case law turned towards Justice Scalia’s point of view in Edmond v. United 
States,525 which emphasized that “the term ‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some 
higher ranking officer or officers below the President.”526 Because the work of the judges on the 
Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals at issue in the case was supervised by higher-ranking 
                                                 
518 See supra text accompanying note 444. 
519 The tradeoff is familiar to debates on administrative law. William Fox, for example, notes: 
 Assignment of ALJ’s to specific agencies is something that has been debated at length on the federal level. To a 
certain extent, an agency assignment still leaves the ALJs at the mercy of the agencies for things such as office 
assignments, secretarial services and staff support. By contrast, removing ALJs from individual agencies and assigning 
them to a central board which would then farm out individual judges to agencies on a case-by-case basis would 
diminish their expertise in specific areas of regulation. 
WILLIAM F. FOX, JR., UNDERSTANDING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 8.06, at 245 (4th ed. 2000). 
520 I mean to invoke welfare economics in the broadest possible sense. See Kaplow & Shavell, supra note 350, at 977-99 
(arguing that welfare economics encompasses a wide range of issues sometimes not considered to be part of efficiency analysis). 
521 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 
522 Id. (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, 
in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”). 
523 If they are not officers at all, but mere employees, the courts need not even be used to achieve independence. An agency, such 
as the Office of Personnel Management, might be charged with appointing those who would determine the size of patent prizes. 
Administrative law judges are considered employees and are appointed by the agencies that employ them. See 5 U.S.C. § 3105 
(West. Supp. 2001); Landry v. FDIC, 204 F.3d 1125 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that because administrative law judges do not 
enter final decisions on behalf of the United States, they are not officers). 
524 487 U.S. 654, 697 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia attacks the majority’s conclusion that the independent counsel 
is an inferior officer in id. at 715-21. 
525 520 U.S. 651 (1997). Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court, joined by seven other Justices. 
526 Id. at 663. 
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officers, the Court found the judges to be inferior officers.527 It made this finding even though the 
higher-ranking officials were required to uphold the judges’ rulings as long as there was some 
“competent evidence” to support the decisions.528 
Perhaps the best constitutionally permissible structure, then, would be one in which the 
agency is an independent one, with the agency members appointed by the President and not 
removable without cause. These members would be responsible for any needed rulemaking, for 
example in specifying regulations concerning how applications should be filed,529 as well as any 
other details that need not be included in the organic statute. The members of the agency, 
however, would not decide in the first instance what size prizes to award in individual cases. 
Those decisions would be made by individuals appointed by a judicial panel pursuant to 
procedures set forth in the statute.530 Prize applicants or their adversaries would be able to appeal 
decisions to the agency members, but under a very limited standard of review, such as one that 
allows reversal if the prize decision could not be justified on any reasonable theory of public 
policy. Of course, this is not the only way that the prize agency intelligently could be structured. 
The possibility of this arrangement, however, suggests that the goal of creating an independent 
agency that prize applicants would not be able to capture is an achievable one. 
H. Adversarial vs. Ex Parte Presentation 
Agencies disbursing funds, such as the Social Security Administration, typically operate 
via nonadversarial procedures, with appellants pleading their cases before administrative law 
judges.531 Even given such procedures, a case against an applicant typically already has been 
made by a caseworker who has determined that the applicant is not entitled to benefits,532 so the 
decisionmakers have information supporting both sides of the case before them. In other 
administrative contexts, the United States is officially a named party opposing particular 
applicants, either before an administrative agency or before a court.533 Finally, there are 
situations in which private parties oppose each other before an administrative agency. 534 Private 
adversarialness has the virtue of ensuring rigorous litigation of issues.535 
                                                 
527 Id. at 666. 
528 Id. at 665. 
529 Such regulations would likely be classified as “procedural rules” and thus could be made without notice-and-comment 
rulemaking. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(A) (excluding from notice-and-comment requirements “interpretive rules, general statements 
of policy, or rules of agency organization, procedure, or practice”). Congress thus need not necessarily grant the authority to 
conduct any notice-and-comment rulemaking. 
530 For an example of a statute authorizing a judicial panel to make appointments, see 28 U.S.C. § 49(a) (1994), the independent 
counsel statute itself. The law expired on June 30, 1999. Id. § 599 (1994). 
531 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.900-404.906 (2001). The Supreme Court emphasized the nonadversarial nature of Social Security 
decisions in Sims v. Apfel, 503 U.S. 103, 107-08 (2000), holding that exhaustion of issues was not required as a result for 
decisions to be challenged in court.  
532 For a discussion of the role of caseworkers, see Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 258-59 (1970). 
533 For an overview of the United States’s role as a party in civil disputes, see GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL 
GOVERNMENT 1-17 (2000). 
534 Under Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), a “legislative court” can adjudicate a private rights case as long as an Article 
III court has de novo review power over all issues of law as well as over constitutional facts. Later cases indicate more broadly 
that agencies may adjudicate private rights cases that are incident to public regulatory schemes, as long as this does not adversely 
affect “the institutional integrity of the [Article III] Judiciary.” Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 851 
(1986).  
535 The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of ensuring adversarialness in its standing jurisprudence. See, e.g., Sierra 
Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 (1972). 
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A danger in the patent prize system, similar to the danger in any other administrative 
program disbursing funds, is that prize applicants will tend to overstate the amount of monopoly 
profit that they have foregone and the amount of social benefit that they have provided. They 
might do this by shading or mischaracterizing facts, as well as by expressing any relevant 
economic theory in the way most favorable to them. Decisionmakers, of course, might ferret out 
weaknesses in prize applications, just as judges seek to expose weak legal arguments, but it 
might be useful for an agency to provide additional personnel to seek to identify problems with 
applications. For example, the agency might employ caseworkers charged with examining an 
application, investigating the assertions it makes, and making a recommendation to the 
decisionmaker. A limitation of this approach is that caseworkers have no inherent incentive to 
oppose the applicant, and so some applications might receive stronger opposition than others for 
reasons unrelated to the merits.536 
Relying on private parties to oppose patent prize applications provides the possibility of 
an energized alternative. A limited way to obtain private opposition would be by allowing 
whistleblower private prosecutors, and indeed prize applications presumably by default would be 
covered by the False Claims Act.537 The danger, however, extends beyond fraud, and allowing 
whistleblowers to sue in federal court would add cumbersome litigation to the administrative 
process. An alternative way of obtaining private opposition would be to allow prize applicants to 
oppose other prize applicants. If there are a small number of prize applicants competing for a 
limited fund, this could be effective. If there are a large number of applicants, however, then the 
success of any one will have little effect on the others, and even with a relatively small number, 
free-rider problems may lead to too few applicants opposing others, and coordination problems 
may lead to redundant opposition where several applicants together oppose another. 
An alternative approach is to ensure that there is a single party with an incentive to 
oppose each application. One strategy, unconventional but with some antecedents in legal 
practice,538 would be to auction off the right to oppose the applicant, with auction revenues being 
added to the fund. The winner of the auction eventually would receive some payment dependent 
on performance, for example receiving a prespecified percentage of all money in the fund not 
awarded to the prize applicant. This approach is not free, as bidders would offer less than they 
expect to receive, because of the cost of litigation as well as the risk of undertaking such a 
project. Nonetheless, it is a simple and efficient way for the government to identify the party best 
situated to serve as an adversary, considering any private information that the bidders might 
have, as well as the bidders’ ability to oppose applicants cheaply and effectively. 539 
                                                 
536 A similar administrative context is federal sentencing, in which probation offers make recommendations to judges. 
Commentators have suggested that probation officers have considerable discretion even within the confines of the federal 
Sentencing Guidelines, leading to disparity in treatment of applicants. See, e.g., Gerald W. Heaney, The Reality of Guidelines 
Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 161, 200-02 (1991). 
537 The Act covers anyone who “knowingly presents, or causes to be presented, to an officer or employee of the United States 
Government or a member of the Armed Forces of the United States a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.” 31 
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (1994). 
538 Some courts have conducted auctions for the right to become class counsel. See In re Amino Acid Lysine Antitrust Litig., 918 
F. Supp. 1190 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (directing the appointment of the firm with the fee structure most favorable to clients); Kathryn 
Kranhold & Richard B. Schmitt, To Rein in Fees, Some Judges Ask Attorneys to Bid, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6.,  2000, at B1 
(discussing the auction approach to selecting class counsel. For a criticism that the mechanics of some of the auctions has 
resulted in lead counsel with incentives systematically different from plaintiffs’, see John C. Coffee, Jr., Securities: Class 
Actions, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 14, 1998, at B6. 
539 Perhaps the proposal most on point is A.C. Pritchard’s to select appellate counsel in criminal cases on the basis of an auction, 
though selecting an opponent to a patent grant might be politically more palatable. See Pritchard, supra note 127. 
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I. Alternative vs. Conventional Dispute Resolution 
Making decisions on prizes will consume social resources, just as all litigation and 
decisionmaking systems do. The agency itself will have to pay salaries and overhead. Whether 
these expenses are directly paid out of the fund that otherwise will be used for prizes or are 
budgeted separately, they will have opportunity costs. In addition, applicants for prizes 
themselves will expend resources on the applications and on pursuing any means of 
administrative or judicial recourse. Up to a point, such expenditures may be socially worthwhile, 
if they can be expected to improve the quality of agency decisions.540 Past a certain point, 
however, privately optimal expenditures may be socially excessive.541 This is especially true in a 
decisionmaking environment in which all that matters from a social perspective is that prizes are 
correct on average. Presumably, increased spending on persuading decisionmakers might make 
any bias that might be anticipated less likely to occur. There would be no social benefits, 
however, to reducing noisy random errors from the social optimum. 
These considerations make it particularly important for the decisionmaking system to 
keep litigation costs low. Perhaps the most obvious response to the prospect of high litigation 
costs would be to mandate arbitration, given evidence that arbitration tends to be cheaper than 
other forms of dispute resolution. 542 Simply calling for arbitration, however, is inadequate, 
because there are many forms of arbitration. 543 In part, the term “arbitration” suggests that 
decisionmaking is privatized.544 Though potentially important, especially because privatization 
may provide entrepreneurial incentives to innovate, the issue of whether private or government-
supplied decisionmaking is superior is beyond my scope here.545 Perhaps more importantly, the 
term “arbitration” suggests that the form of decisionmaking is different from that in courts. The 
relevant question is whether there are any specific alterations to the conventional adjudicative 
model that would be particularly useful here.  
Arbitration is often thought to be more informal than judicial decisionmaking.546 Such 
informality may be particularly useful in the prize context because of the relatively low need to 
correct errors that arbitrators make.547 Level of formality, however, may not be the only axis 
                                                 
540 Spending on litigation in conventional contexts similarly may be beneficial by improving accuracy. See Kaplow, supra note 
430 (explaining the importance of accuracy in adjudication). 
541 See Steven Shavell, The Level of Litigation: Private Versus Social Optimality of Suit and of Settlement, 19 INT’L REV. L. & 
ECON. 99, 99 (1999) (noting that in the absence of intervention “the privately determined level of litigation” may be excessive 
because “[w]hen a party spends on litigation, he does not take into account the litigation costs that he induces others to incur”). 
542 See, e.g., Wayne N. Outten, Negotiating and Drafting Severance Agreements on Behalf of Employees, 548 PLI/LI T. 957, 985-
86 (1996) (“As compared to judicial litigation, arbitration is presumably faster and cheaper, though not necessarily as fair and 
just.”). Some commentators, however, have questioned whether arbitration is in fact cheaper than court-based adjudication. See, 
e.g., STEPHEN B. GOLDBERG AT AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION:  NEGOTIATION, MEDIATION AND OTHER PROCESSES 234-35 (3d ed. 
1999); Deborah R. Hensler, Does ADR Really Save Money? The Jury’s Still Out, NAT’L L.J., Apr. 11, 1994, at C2; James Lyons, 
Arbitration: The Slower, More Expensive Alternative?, AM. LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1985, at 107. 
543 For an analysis of the variety of forms that alternative dispute resolution generally and arbitration in particular may take, see 
Jack M. Sabatino, ADR as “Litigation Lite”: Procedural and Evidentiary Norms Embedded Within Alternative Dispute 
Resolution, 47 EMORY L.J. 1289, 1296-1303 (1998). 
544 See id. at 1293-94 (placing ADR in the “broader context of the increasing privatization of traditional governmental 
functions”). 
545 See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979) 
(comparing public and private provision of adjudication services). 
546 The informality of arbitration is exhibited in part by loosened attention to procedural and evidentiary rules. See, e.g., Edward 
Brunet, Arbitration and Constitutional Rights , 71 N.C. L. REV. 71, 86 (1992) (“Informality is the hallmark of arbitral 
proceedings. Formal rules of evidence are avoided by the sponsors of arbitration.”). 
547 If we assume that procedural and evidentiary rules ordinarily serve to improve the quality of decisionmaking, arbitration can 
be expected to produce a lower quality of decision. But see  Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative Dispute 
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around which adjudicative systems vary. Such systems may also vary in how they allocate costs, 
for example in whether they require the losing party to bear the costs of the winner.548 Loser pays 
rules may be useful ways of discouraging frivolous litigation, 549 though they may not be 
beneficial in the prize context for two reasons. First, loser pays rules effectively raise the stakes 
of litigation and thus increase costs in cases that are litigated550 and also may produce lower 
settlement rates.551 Second, a pure loser pays rule requires the identification of a loser, which 
might seem difficult when the only question in many cases will be how large a prize should be, 
rather than whether a prize is appropriate. 
It would, however, be possible to structure the litigation so that a winner and loser could 
be identified. If there is a prize applicant and an opponent, each side could be required to 
announce the amount of money that each side thinks that the prize applicant ought to receive. 
The decisionmaker would then be required to pick between these alternatives (but not a number 
between them). For example, if the prize applicant requested two million dollars and the 
opponent requested one million dollars, the decisionmaker would be required to award either one 
or two million, and not zero or one-and-a-half or three.552 The winner, of course, would be 
whichever party’s submission the decisionmaker accepted. This would make it easy to 
implement a loser pays rule. It also might make feasible a very different sort of rule discouraging 
excess litigation costs. For example, a rule might provide that parties may spend no more than a 
specified percentage of the amount of money sought, or no more than a specified percentage of 
                                                                                                                                                             
Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISPUTE RESOL. 211, 246-53 (1995) (considering a variety of arguments that 
ADR may produce better decisions than adjudication). If a lower-quality decision is simply a noisy decision, then arbitration may 
be more acceptable in the patent prize context than in a context in which we care about the compensation that any individual 
receives rather than just that the average prize is appropriate. 
548 Loser pays is often called the British rule, though variants of the British rule exist. On the economic choice among the various 
alternatives, see Richard D. Cooter & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Economic Analysis of Legal Disputes and Their Resolution, 27 J. 
ECON. LIT. 1067 (1989); John J. Donohue III, Opting for the British Rule, or If Posner and Shavell Can't Remember the Coase 
Theorem, Who Will?, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1093 (1991); John P. Gould, The Economics of Legal Conflicts, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 279 
(1973); William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. 
Rubinfeld, Does the English Rule Discourage Low-Probability-of- Prevailing Plaintiffs?, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 519 (1998); Richard 
A. Posner, An Economic Approach to Legal Procedure and Judicial Administration, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 399 (1973); I.P.L. P’ng, 
Strategic Behavior in Suit, Settlement, and Trial, 14 BELL J. ECON. 539 (1983); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A 
Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation of Legal Costs , 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55 (1982); Edward A. 
Snyder & James W. Hughes, The English Rule for Allocating Legal Costs: Evidence Confronts Theory, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 345 
(1990); Mark S. Stein, The English Rule with Client-to-Lawyer Risk Shifting: A Speculative Appraisal, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 603 
(1995); and Bradley L. Smith, Note, Three Attorney Fee-Shifting Rules and Contingency Fees: Their Impact on Settlement 
Incentives, 90 M ICH. L. REV. 2154 (1992). 
549 For a fee shifting proposal that seeks to avoid frivolous suits while avoiding the problems of other such proposals, see Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious 
Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL STUD. 371 (1996). 
550 See, e.g., Ronald Braeutigam et al., An Economic Analysis of Alternative Fee Shifting Systems, 47 J.L. & CONTEMP . PROBS. 
173 (1984); John C. Hause, Indemnity, Settlement, and Litigation, or I'll Be Suing You, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 157 (1989); Avery 
Katz, Measuring the Demand for Litigation: Is the English Rule Really Cheaper?, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 143 (1987).  
551 See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Comment on Donohue, 22 LAW & SOC’Y RE V. 927, 928 (1988) (suggesting that lower settlement 
rates are likely); Steven Shavell, Suit, Settlement, and Trial: A Theoretical Analysis Under Alternative Methods for the Allocation 
of Legal Costs, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 55, 65 (1982) (providing a model in which loser pays could lower settlement rates). 
552 Given such a system, the auction to pick an opponent might be modified. See supra text accompanying notes 538-539. The 
auction could occur after the prize applicant originally submitted a proposal, with the auction winner entitled to some 
prespecified percentage of any money below the amount requested that is ultimately awarded. Suppose, for example, that the 
percentage is 25% and the applicant requested two million dollars. A potential bidder would first determine the amount with 
which it would counter, say $1 million. The bidder would then estimate the probability of winning and the cost of litigating the 
case. If there would be a 50% chance of winning and a $100,000 cost, then the bidder would bid .50*.25*($2,000,000 - 
$1,000,000) - $100,000 = $25,000.  
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the difference between the two submitted amounts, on litigation costs, with significant mandated 
increases in prizes for excessive litigation expenditures.  
Though uncommon, 553 and though not traditionally used as a vehicle for enabling 
enactment of a rule that would effectively reduce litigation costs, this is not a novel system. 
Indeed, the system is used in one well-known application, arbitration decisions to determine 
salaries of arbitration-eligible professional baseball players, thus giving the system the name 
“baseball arbitration.”554 Commentators have emphasized that baseball arbitration promotes 
revelation of information and thus may facilitate settlement. In typical settlement negotiations, 
both parties have incentives to puff, claiming their positions to be stronger than they are, and 
such strategic bargaining sometimes will prevent the parties from reaching a settlement.555 With 
baseball arbitration, parties may still exaggerate, but only so much, because exaggeration 
increases the chance that the other party’s figure will be selected. Baseball arbitration cases often 
settle at the midpoint of the requests by each of the opposing parties.556 By allowing and through 
baseball arbitration encouraging settlement, the prize system could substantially reduce litigation 
costs. 
The disadvantage of baseball arbitration, of course, is that the decisionmaker must choose 
one of the two proffered options even if some other figure would better promote justice. 
Presumably, this would be the objection to using baseball arbitration in tort cases.557 The 
disadvantage, however, is not significant with prize systems, because achieving accurate 
decisions on average is all that matters. In addition, the disadvantage also can be seen as a 
strength, in that it reduces the probability of extreme outcomes. If different decisionmakers 
arrive at prize numbers from scratch, it is possible that one decisionmaker will arrive at a number 
orders of magnitude higher than the number that approximates other decisionmakers would 
produce.558 The possibility of massive aberrations is of greater concern than more modest noise, 
because such extreme decisions, if unsystematic, turn prizes into lottery tickets. Though prize 
applicants sometimes might gamble by submitting an extreme number even in baseball 
                                                 
553 It may indeed become increasingly rare in the future. See Commission Votes to Eliminate Baseball Arbitration from Workers’ 
Compensation Cases , 11 WORLD ARB. & MEDIATION REP. 241 (2000). But see Jay A. Soled, Transfer Tax Valuation Issues, the 
Game Theory, and Final Offer Arbitration: A Modest Proposal for Reform, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 283, 305 (1997) (noting the use of 
final offer arbitration in a wide range of employment disputes); Elissa M. Meth, Note & Comment, Final Offer Arbitration: A 
Model for Dispute Resolution in Domestic and International Disputes , 10 AM. REV. IN T’L ARB. 383 (1999) (advocating the use of 
final offer arbitration in a variety of decisionmaking contexts); Paul M. Gordon, Comment, Submitting “Fire Value” to Final 
Offer Arbitration, 63 U. COLO. L. REV. 751 (1992) (advocating expansion of final offer arbitration to corporate law context). 
554 The system sometimes is also called “final-offer arbitration.” For a comparison of final-offer arbitration to other forms of 
arbitration, see Jonathan M. Conti, The Effect of Salary Arbitration on Major League Baseball, 5 SPORTS L.J. 221, 230-31 (1998). 
555 As Kent Syverud explains, “Defendant may in some instances refuse the settlement demand, and inadvertently force a trial, 
even where the demand is lower than the costs of going to trial, because of a mistaken belief that further bargaining will lead to 
an even more favorable demand.” Kent D. Syverud, The Duty to Settle, 76 VA. L. REV. 1113, 1129 (1990); see also Robert 
Cooter, The Cost of Coase, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 17-29 (1982); Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A 
Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225 (1982). 
556 See, e.g., Cameron Gets 1-Year, $2.225 Million Pact, AP, Feb. 15, 2000, available at 2000 WL 7580410 (describing the 
resolution of two baseball arbitration cases, both of which settled at the midpoint). 
557 For a proposal to use baseball arbitration to determine damages in tort trials, see Jason Micah Ross, Note, “Baseball 
Litigation”: A New Calculus for Awarding Damages in Tort Trials , 78 TEX. L. REV. 439 (1999). 
558 Some commentators have argued that baseball arbitration has not been successful in inducing offers that are close together. 
See, e.g., John P. Gillard, Jr., An Analysis of Salary Arbitration in Baseball: Could a Failure to Change the System Be Strike 
Three for Small-Market Franchises?, 3 SPORTS L.J. 125, 131 (1996) (noting that by 1993, “the average differential between 
players’ requests and owners’ offers in salary arbitration was . . . $1,660,560,” with players’ requests on average 63% higher than 
clubs’ offers). Requests and offers, however, never differ by orders of magnitude, so the system has been successful if the goal is 
seen as eliminating rare but drastic errors. 
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arbitration, 559 the incentives to make reasonable suggestions seem likely to reduce the probability 
of extreme outcomes. 
It is also possible that the baseball arbitration approach will reduce legal expenses in 
cases that are not settled. The reason is that parties might choose to omit or curtail presentation 
of evidence or arguments that would have only a small effect on the decisionmaker’s calculation 
of the optimal prize. A prize applicant, for example, would have an incentive in an open-ended 
litigation system to argue for a relatively insignificant upward adjustment in a prize, as long as 
the money spent on the litigation is less than the expected upward adjustment. With baseball 
arbitration, such a minor adjustment plausibly will often have no effect on the probability that the 
decisionmaker would choose one submission or the other, a choice that will depend primarily on 
the resolution of larger disputes. Of course, there may be some cases that are so close that the 
resolution of a small issue could be just enough to tip the balance all the way from one 
submission to another, and here the parties would spend more than in open-ended litigation on 
advancing this issue. This seems likely to be the smaller effect, however, since there are likely to 
be diminishing returns to developing minor issues in a case.560 
A final virtue of the baseball arbitration approach is that it might help overcome a 
problem identified earlier, uncertainty among potential prize applicants about the likely value of 
other applications if prizes are distributed from a fixed fund.561 With the baseball arbitration 
approach, prize applicants might be required to announce prize valuations as soon as they submit 
applications, thus making possible fairly accurate estimates of the value of all applications 
submitted so far. The chief drawback of this approach is that prize applicants would not have the 
benefit of the delay in choosing an appropriate figure. This drawback, however, affects all prize 
applicants equally and thus should not significantly affect the proportion of the fund that any 
applicant will expect on average to receive. Moreover, opponents might be required to submit 
their figures early too, shortly after applications are filed, offsetting any advantage and 
encouraging settlements before the entire delay period has even elapsed.562 Alternatively, prize 
applicants might be allowed to change their submissions for a fee depending on the magnitude of 
the change, perhaps a dime for each dollar change, thus ensuring at least a modest incentive for 
accuracy when initially filing an application. 
Baseball arbitration, of course, is not the only approach that might be used to discourage 
socially excessive litigation spending. A simple alternative or supplement would be to encourage 
decisionmakers to take the patent applicant’s spending on litigation into account in calculating 
                                                 
559 For example, suppose an applicant believes that the vast majority of decisionmakers would give somewhere about $1 million. 
The applicant still might submit a bid of $100 million if more than one of every hundred decisionmakers would grant the request. 
The more risk-averse the applicant, the less likely such a go-for-broke strategy would be. Evidence for this can be seen in that the 
percentage difference between players’ owners and owners’ requests has risen dramatically from 1974 to 1993. See id. at 131-32. 
While Gillard seems to view this change as indicative of some flaw in baseball arbitration itself, this explanation makes little 
sense, given that baseball arbitration was used in 1974 too. What has changed is that salaries and team values have increased by 
so much that the participants in baseball arbitration are less risk averse. 
560 The tradeoffs are similar to those involved in the choice between all-or-nothing verdicts and compromise verdicts in civil 
litigation. With the more familiar all-or-nothing verdicts, a determination that the defendant more likely than not engaged in acts 
resulting in liability, results in full damages for the plaintiff, while compromise verdicts apportion liability to the probability of 
guilt. A system of all-or-nothing verdicts may make it less likely that a party will introduce a relatively minor issue. See 
Abramowicz, supra note 425, at 296. 
561 See supra text accompanying note 487. 
562 In effect, this approach partly neutralizes one of the benefits of delay, allowing the decisionmaker to take into account 
information emerging after the application is filed. See supra Part III.B.1. This, however, is a concern only if this better 
information ex post makes decisionmaking ex ante seem more efficient on average, for example because it offsets the adverse 
selection problem. The adverse selection problem, however, is of lesser concern when an opponent to the prize applicant is 
incentivized to consider and seek out all relevant information. 
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prizes.563 Because such spending offsets any social benefit of activity designed to decrease 
deadweight loss, a prize based on social benefit should subtract concomitant social costs. The 
logic underlying this suggestion is the same logic underlying the broader proposal, that broad 
discretion is useful when only accurate results on average need to be achieved. A decisionmaker 
might even be permitted to award a negative dollar value prize (in which case, the applicant in 
effect would pay a fee), if the administrative cost of processing an application exceeded the 
social benefit of the action performed. This would help limit frivolous applications. At the same 
time, a decisionmaker also might increase a prize (or lean toward the higher submitted value if 
baseball arbitration is used) if the opponent’s spending is excessive.564 
J. Assessment 
With the proposal developed, we can now summarize by considering how it responds to 
problems of the patent prize systems that others have proposed, after which we can consider 
anew the general hurdles for patent prize systems discussed in Part II.  
The technical problems with the proposals considered in Part I vary, but in the end all of 
the proposals fail to prevent possible large and systematic errors in patent prizes. The Guell and 
Fischbaum proposal was problematic primarily because it was underspecified, assuming that the 
government would be able to extrapolate from a “test market” without explaining how. The risk 
was thus that the government might do a poor job of estimating patent value, and inaccuracies in 
such decisionmaking might distort investment.565 The Shavell and van Ypersele proposal might 
seem at first to overcome this problem by creating a specific formula for disbursing prizes. 
Ultimately, though, it produced a similar problem, that of deliberate manipulation of the formula 
by the government, since decisionmakers would have considerable discretion in determining the 
a priori family of demand curves.566 The Kremer market mechanism sought to eliminate 
governmental discretion but in the end required considerable human intervention to counter 
collusion and other manipulations of the mechanism.567 Finally, Lichtman’s proposal risks 
providing coupons without significantly reducing deadweight loss if the government’s 
information is poor.568 We also saw that Lichtman’s argument might indirectly support some 
form of prizes for patent holders that agree to sell their products at low prices, though the 
government might err by providing too high a prize for too small a price concession. 569 
                                                 
563 Of course, the government would not need to tell decisionmakers to take this consideration into account, since decisionmakers 
might do so on their own. As argued above, however, there is a strong argument for specifically identifying factors that are 
clearly relevant but that some percentage of decisionmakers otherwise would be expected to ignore. See supra text accompanying 
note 421. 
564 The opponent’s spending, however, is less of a concern, since that can be controlled indirectly by altering the percentage or 
other incentive that the opponent has to oppose the prize application. An opponent guaranteed 25% of any savings relative to the 
prize applicant’s suggested price will invest less in litigation than one guaranteed 50%. A. Mitchell Polinsky has made a similar 
point concerning qui tam litigation, noting that if qui tam litigation would produce socially undesirable overenforcement of law 
by private parties, paying qui tam plaintiffs only some percentage of any judgment, with the remainder going to the government, 
can overcome this problem. See A. Mitchell Polinsky, Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines , 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 105, 108 
(1980) (“Regulating private enforcers by paying them something different [from] the fine for each violator detected can achieve 
the socially most preferred outcome . . . .”). 
565 See supra text accompanying note 81 (noting the danger of distorting investment decisions). 
566 See supra text accompanying note 123. 
567 See supra text accompanying notes 165-166. 
568 See supra text accompanying notes 190-191. 
569 See supra notes 192-195 and accompanying text. 
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My proposal answers these problems by giving up on the challenge of developing a 
perfect formula or algorithm. By giving great discretion and by delaying award of prizes 
sufficiently so that patent holders will not be able to predict who the decisionmakers will be or 
what formulas they will use, the government eliminates the need for creating such a formula. As 
long as inventors and patent holders cannot predict any systematic biases in the ultimate prize 
awards, the system will be as good as one that they would believe incorporates a hypothetical 
formula for providing socially optimal prizes immediately. 570 In addition, the system allows 
patent holders to choose the most efficient path for eliminating deadweight loss, including 
approaches similar to those recommended by the proposals discussed in Part I,571 and it 
encourages the patent holders who are capable of producing the greatest ratio of social to private 
benefit to opt into the system. 572 The proposal, of course, is not a free lunch. Some systematic 
biases may be predictable, and flexibility may produce uncertainty that the government indirectly 
will have to pay patent holders to bear.573  
My proposal responds to many of the general hurdles for patent prize systems by 
allowing decisionmakers to adjust prizes after taking them into account and thus indirectly by 
incentivizing patent holders and other innovators to consider them. For example, a patent holder 
will continue to invest in commercializing and promoting a product if doing so is necessary to 
receive a prize.574 This flexibility also addresses the common pool problem, as long as 
government decisionmakers will take it into account on average, for example by penalizing a 
prize applicant whose release of a patent into the public domain produced wasteful rent-
seeking. 575 In addition, because the proposal would not require an applicant to obtain a patent, it 
would encourage inventors to consider the tradeoffs between obtaining patents and simply 
releasing research results. This would reduce redundant research by competitors and encourage 
research activities that might produce social benefit even if they do not result in patentable 
discoveries. Researchers also might anticipate that decisionmakers would award less than the 
total social value of an innovation that otherwise would produce a patent race to discourage such 
an occurrence.576 
The proposal clears other hurdles identified through a variety of strategies. It 
accomplishes the screening function that Kieff deemed essential to the patent system by creating 
opponents to prize applications who would have an incentive to point out any weaknesses, 
including nonpatentability.577 The delay before patents are awarded combats the adverse 
selection problem578 and prevents a natural monopolist from obtaining a patent prize while still 
charging monopoly prices.579 Delay also may reduce the administrative and litigation costs of 
operating the patent agency, since the expense is discounted into the future.580 The alternative 
                                                 
570 See supra text accompanying note 449. 
571 See supra text accompanying notes 417-418. 
572 See supra text accompanying note 483. 
573 See supra text accompanying notes 493-494. 
574 See supra text accompanying notes 225-227. 
575 See supra text accompanying note 418. 
576 See supra text accompanying notes 294-295. 
577 See supra Part III.H. 
578 See supra Part II.C. 
579 See supra text accompanying and following note 328. 
580 This will be true unless the cost of operating the administrative agency rises by more than the interest that the fund will earn. 
That might occur if a large portion of the costs are for paying decisionmakers; because the labor productivity of such 
decisionmakers may not increase with improvements in technology, their salaries will tend to increase at a rate faster than 
inflation. Lack of improvement in labor productivity similarly explains why the cost of higher education has generally outpaced 
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dispute resolution techniques may reduce litigation costs by encouraging settlement,581 and the 
independence of the prize agency reduces the possibility and magnitude of rent-seeking costs.582 
The use of a fund, meanwhile, allows the government to budget for patent prizes, eliminating 
concern about a potentially open-ended liability.583 Even with all of these improvements, of 
course, it may be impossible to estimate precisely what the costs of operating this patent prize 
system will be, or how much adverse selection if any will survive. Nor is it possible to prove 
mathematically that the benefits of the prize system in reducing deadweight loss will be worth it. 
The large size of such deadweight losses, however, suggests that the patent prize system I have 
described will be a significant improvement. 
IV. APPLICATIONS FOR PRIZE SYSTEMS 
So far, I have developed a prize system that is likely to be both simpler to implement and 
more flexible than the prize proposals that other commentators have offered. In addition, the 
Article has shown that establishing a prize fund as an adjunct to the patent system is likely to 
have greater benefits than costs, especially because a relatively small fund will tend to induce 
actions with the highest ratio of social benefit to private cost.584 This conclusion, however, leaves 
much unanswered, especially given the argument that it may be better to adopt a prize system for 
a specific purpose than for patents or intellectual property in general. 585 Even a modest prize fund 
experiment seems more likely to come as a response to a specific need than from a generalized 
desire to tweak our intellectual property institutions. This Part describes several potential 
applications from a wide range of possibilities, with two principal considerations dictating the 
choice of examples. First, the examples all reflect current controversies and problems, 
illustrating how prize systems might be used to address specific issues of contemporary concern. 
Second, and more importantly, each of the examples presents different challenges, showing both 
the potential flexibility of prize systems and how they might be modified depending on the 
purposes for which they are used.  
 Of course, I have also chosen the specific examples because they allow for a positive 
portrayal of prize systems in general and my proposal in particular. Many governmental 
programs would not be suitable candidates for the creation of prize systems. One criterion is that 
a program be one in which the government cares more about the investments made in 
anticipation of receiving prizes than in the fairness of any awards to the ultimate prize 
applicants.586 A second criterion is that there should be no easily administrable alternative to a 
prize system. A prize system, after all, involves costs,587 and if there is a simple program that 
                                                                                                                                                             
inflation. See, e.g., D. Bruce Johnstone, Learning Productivity: A New Imperative for American Higher Education, at 
http://www.educause.edu/nlii/articles/johnstone.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2001). 
581 See supra Part III.I. 
582 See supra Part III.G. 
583 See supra Part III.C. 
584 See supra text accompanying notes 481-483. 
585 See supra Part III.E. 
586 Fairness should be a relatively small concern in the patent context if the goal of the patent system is utilitarian rather than 
natural rights. See supra note 433; see also supra note 365 (arguing that due process is not a significant goal in the prize context). 
Inventors who are concerned about arbitrary treatment may sell their claims to someone willing to bear the risk. See supra Part 
III.D. 
587 Some of these costs are discussed supra Part II.D. My proposal also introduces an additional type of cost, that of uncertainty, 
since third party purchasers of rights to prizes would insist on some compensation for the uncertainty of those prizes. See supra 
text accompanying note 494. An additional criterion to evaluate proposals would be consideration of the uncertainty involved in 
investments in an alternative regime. 
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effectively achieves social goals by inducing the government to make direct payments at the time 
the benefit is intended, there is no need to incur these costs. These criteria provide a strong 
argument against establishment of a prize system, say, for providing retirement benefits in lieu of 
Social Security. Though we could imagine allowing each retiree to request a “retirement prize,” 
we would sensibly worry about inequities in treatment, and we may feel that existing formulas 
are fairer than any subjective alternative.588 
A. Patent Proposals 
1. Prescription Drugs for Senior Citizens 
Among the most salient issues in the 2000 Presidential campaign was creation of a 
governmental program to extend prescription drug coverage to senior citizens.589 The debate was 
not on whether to create such a program, but what form the program should take.590 As an 
interim measure following his election, President Bush approved a zero-cost program to allow 
senior citizens to pool their purchasing power for prescription drugs,591 but critics have 
questioned the legality of Bush’s decision to act in the absence of new legislation, 592 and no one 
has argued that it serves as a comprehensive reform alternative. Although the September 11 
terrorist attacks may have placed the issue on the back burner,593 the apparent popularity of the 
concept makes it seem likely as a future governmental initiative.  
The problem, of course, is what form the program will take.594 President Bush’s 
announced plan has emphasized the provision of block grants to states.595 Some legislators, 
                                                 
588 Retirees in such a hypothetical program in theory could sell their claims to third parties, and third parties would have strong 
incentives to be methodical in predicting how much each retiree would be likely to receive. Thus, it is possible that among all 
retirees who sell to third parties, results could be quite consistent, or at least more consistent than the unguided administrative 
agency deciding how much each retiree deserves. One problem with relying on such sales, however, is that the endowment effect 
suggests that some retirees would be hesitant to sell their rights to retirement prizes to third parties. See generally Jack L. 
Knetsch, The Endowment Effect and Evidence of Nonreversible Indifference Curves , 79 AM. ECON. RE V. 1277 (1989) (providing 
experimental evidence of an endowment effect); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Forest Jourden, Remedies and the Psychology of 
Ownership, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1541, 1551-59 (1998) (discussing the endowment effect). Among such retirees, the prize system 
would produce considerable uncertainty. At the same time, there do not seem to be any major problems with the distribution of 
retirement benefits, aside perhaps from arguments about distribution that Congress presumably could address if it wanted to do 
so. In contrast to the various patent cases, the system does not eliminate any deadweight loss, and there thus seems to be little 
reason to adopt it. 
589 See, e.g., Poll: Prescriptions ‘Very Important’ to 6 in 10 Americans, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 16, 2000, at 8 (reporting that 60% of 
Americans considered the issue of prescription drug coverage to be “very important” in their vote for President). 
590 Governor Bush maintained in television advertisements that Vice President Gore’s plan would give too much of a role to 
“Washington bureaucrats” in deciding what prescriptions would be covered, while Gore complained that Bush’s plan would 
leave many senior citizens with no assistance and force others to obtain coverage through private companies. See, e.g., Dueling 
over Drug Coverage, http://cbshealthwatch.medscape.com/cx/viewarticle/221865 (last visited Sept. 25, 2001). 
591 See, e.g., Shailagh Murray & Laurie McGinley, Bush Plans to Propose a Discount Card to Cut Medicare Beneficiaries’ Drug 
Costs, WALL ST. J., July 11, 2001, at A2. 
592 See, e.g., Sarah Lueck, Groups File Suit over Drug Discounts , WALL ST. J., July 18, 2001, at B2; see also Sarah Lueck, Judge 
to Block White House Proposal to Issue Medicare Discount Drug Cards, WALL ST. J., Sept. 7, 2001, at B5 (reporting the 
issuance of a preliminary injunction). 
593 See, e.g., Adam Clymer, Democrats’ Wish Lists Relegated to Back Burner , N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2001, at 29 (reporting 
Senate Majority Leader’s statement that bills on issues including prescription drugs for the elderly were in a “‘maybe’ category 
or worse”). 
594 Commentators have noted the existence of a wide variety of proposals, worrying that the diversity may impede efforts to 
arrive at a consensus solution. See, e.g., Michael Pretzer, Will an Abundance of Ideas Kill Prescription Drug Legislation?, M ED. 
ECON. MAG., Mar. 20, 2000, at 51. 
595 For a brief overview, see Bill Introduces Prescription Drug Plan, ALMANAC POL’Y ISSUES, available at 
http://www.policyalmanac.org/health/prescription_drugs.shtml (last visited Sept. 25, 2001). 
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meanwhile, have supported plans that would result in the imposition of price controls on the drug 
industry. 596 A relatively modest price control requirement, called a best-price provision, would 
require drug manufacturers to sell prescription drugs to Medicare at the lowest price available to 
any private party. 597 Meanwhile, some commentators have suggested an insurance plan modeled 
on the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program,598 which allows beneficiaries to choose from 
various private providers. One such approach would rely on the use of private pharmacy benefit 
management companies, which seek to steer covered individuals toward preferred drugs, such as 
generics and other drugs specifically listed on a “formulary.”599 This approach would borrow 
these cost-saving techniques from the managed care industry while offering coverage at a 
subsidized rate.600  
Any solution that relies on explicit price controls inevitably will produce the usual set of 
problems associated with such controls.601 Perhaps of greatest concern, price controls would 
likely result in reduced research and development expenditures, which is particularly problematic 
given the concern that the patent sys tem already results in suboptimal investment.602 Critics of 
the pharmaceutical industry maintain that the industry historically has enjoyed high returns on 
investment.603 Even if the industry’s profits are “too high” in the sense that the industry would 
have made the same investments ten or twenty years ago if they could have been assured a return 
on investment lower than the one that they have actually received, that is irrelevant to future 
investment. The higher the prospective returns, the more pharmaceutical companies will invest, 
and a policy that companies must bear unexpected losses but will be forced to give up 
unexpected gains would reduce investment. It is theoretically possible that these negative 
consequences in present discounted value terms are worth the immediate benefits that price 
controls would produce, but a solution that would lower deadweight costs without reducing 
future investments would be preferable or, at the least, more politically palatable. 
                                                 
596 Congressman Bernie Sanders, Independent of Vermont, argues that “despite funding the development of these drugs, 
American consumers pay outrageously high prices for them because the government has not imposed a reasonable pricing clause 
on the industry.” Bernie Sanders, Prescription Drug Benefit Under Medicare, available at  
http://bernie.house.gov/statements/2001-08-01-Rx-Drugs_under_medicare.asp (last visited Sept. 25, 2001). 
597 Such a requirement already exists in the Medicaid program. See Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 
101-508, 104 Stat. 1388, § 4401(b)(4)(C), sec. 1927. A potential problem with this approach is that if the government is a 
sufficiently important consumer, drug companies may respond by raising their prices to private parties to the level at which they 
would like to sell drugs to the government. See, e.g., ROBERT GOLDBERG , TEN MYTHS ABOUT THE M ARKET FOR PRESCRIPTION 
DRUGS (National Center for Policy Analysis No. 230, 1999), available at http://www.ncpa.org/studies/s230/s230.html (last 
visited Oct. 16, 2001) (noting that if required to “offer all seniors the discounts now offered only to a very few government 
agencies, primarily the Veterans Administration,” then “drug manufacturers would steeply increase prices charged the VA”). For 
a statement by Congressman Henry Waxman advocating a best-price provision, see Prescription Drug Price Discrimination, 
http://www.house.gov/waxman/drugs/body_index.html (last visited Oct. 16, 2001). 
598 See, e.g., JAMES FROGUE, THREE MORE STRIKES ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS (Heritage Found. Executive Memorandum No. 683, 
2000); Citizens Against Government Waste, A Better Prescription for Seniors, available at 
http://www.cagw.org/publications/lookinglass/pubs.looking.better-prescription.htm (last visited Sept. 25, 2001). 
599 See generally Joshua P. Cohen, PBMs and a Medicare Prescription Drug Benefit, 55 FOOD & DRUG L. 311, 313-15 (2000) 
(describing the techniques used by PBMs); Kevin J. Dunne & Ciara R. Ryan, How Management of Medical Costs Is 
Revolutionizing the Drug Industry, 62 DEFENSE COUNSEL J. 177, 178-79 (1995) (describing the operation of PBMs). 
600 See Cohen, supra note 599, at 319-20 (discussing the use of PBMs in a governmental program). 
601 See, e.g., EKELUND & TOLLISON, supra note 42, at 107-10. Many economists have opposed price controls in health markets. 
See Economists: Outlook Grim Under Health Plan, ATLANTA J. CONST., Jan. 13, 1994, at F1 (reporting the issuance of a letter 
signed by 565 economists opposing medical price controls); see also Thomas W. Merrill, Constitutional Limits on Physician 
Price Controls , 21 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 635 (1994) (considering the implication of the Takings Clause and other constitutional 
provisions). 
602 See supra text accompanying note 88. 
603 See, e.g., New Report Links High Prescription Drug Prices to Marketing Costs, Profits and Enormous Executive 
Compensation, http://www.namiscc.org/newsletters/July01/DrugPrices.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2001). 
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The proposals based on some form of government subsidization of prescription drugs 
without price controls, meanwhile, impose large informational burdens on federal government 
agencies. In some proposals, a government agency would negotiate prices directly with 
pharmaceutical companies.604 Even in proposals seeking to harness competitive forces, the 
government would have to choose among prospective subsidized insurance carriers in different 
geographic areas, considering a wide range of factors.605 Such programs presumably could be 
functional and provide prescription drug benefits as promised, lowering deadweight loss by 
reducing the number of senior citizens who obtain drugs that otherwise they would not be able to 
afford. The programs, however, would necessarily spawn complex bureaucracies with little 
incentive to minimize administrative costs. While the agency presumably would seek to achieve 
the greatest social benefit at lowest possible cost in negotiating prices, it might err, for example 
by paying too much to a particular drug manufacturer or by selecting an inferior private provider. 
Missing among the proposals being considered by Congress is any form of patent prize 
system, and, at first glance, there is a good reason for this. The patent prize systems discussed in 
Part I could be used for all patents or for all patents of a particular type (such as all 
pharmaceutical patents), but none seems suitable for the narrower goal of reducing prescription 
drug costs for a particular segment of the population, senior citizens. If any of the three buyout 
proposals were used, all consumers would share in the benefits of the government’s largesse, and 
Lichtman’s proposal could channel benefits specifically to senior citizens only if that segment of 
the population happens to constitute roughly the lowest-valuing quarter of consumers of any 
particular drug. 606 Even then, the benefits of the induced lower price would be shared by all 
higher-valuing consumers. An incidental benefit to all consumers presumably would not be 
objectionable, but a principal virtue of Lichtman’s proposal is the multiplier effect that makes 
coupons a cheap way of reducing deadweight loss when the government has good information, 
and the decrease in deadweight loss cannot be directed to benefit any group more narrow than 
the users of the particular drug. 607 
                                                 
604 See, e.g., H.R. 1512, 107th Cong. § 3, sec. 1860G(b)(1)(A) (2001) (requiring the Administrator to “[e]stablish, through 
negotiations with medicine manufacturers and wholesalers and pharmacies, a schedule of prices for covered prescription 
medicines”). Another difficult task in the bill is calculation of rebates based on factors such as “increases in utilization due to 
promotion activities of the manufacturer, wholesaler, or retailer” and “launch prices of new drugs at the same or higher prices as 
similar drugs already in the marketplace (so-called ‘me too’ or ‘copy-cat’ drugs).” Id. sec. 1860I(3)(D)(ii)-(iii).  
605 See, e.g., S. 1135, 107th Cong. § 301, sec. 1860F(c)(2) (2001) (describing the information that bids would be required to 
contain, including inter alia “a proposal for the estimated prices of covered outpatient drugs and the projected annual increases in 
such prices, including differentials between formulary and nonformulary prices, if applicable” and “if the entity utilizes a 
formulary, a detailed description of the procedures and standards the entity will use for . . . adding new drugs to a therapeutic 
class within the formulary”). 
606 This seems unlikely. First, senior citizens form a significant portion of the market for prescription drugs. See, e.g., Kathi 
Fairman, Fact Sheet: High Cost Prescription Drug Users, available at http://www.express-
scripts.com/other/news_views/outcomes2001/highcost.pdf (last visited Oct. 16, 2001) (noting that about 33% of prescription drug 
expenditures are for just 2% of patients and that “46% of the highest-cost patients are age 55 or older”); Bush Introduces 
Prescription Drug Plan, available at http://www.policyalmanac.org/health/prescription_drugs.shtml (reporting that 42% of drug 
expenditures in 1998 were spent on senior citizens, who comprise 13% of the population). Second, senior citizens are not 
necessarily any poorer than other segments of the population. Cf. Robert M. Goldberg, The ‘Gerontocracy’ Won’t Swallow 
Clinton’s Drug Plan, WALL ST. J., June 28, 1999, at A26 (noting that 70% of senior citizens are able to afford prescription drug 
coverage and that “[t]he average net worth for households in the 65-to-74 age group is $331,600, about twice as high as for 
younger people”). Of course, some type of coupon scheme might result in only low-income seniors receiving coupons, but for 
this to induce a patent holder to lower the price, there would have to be a large number of such coupons, perhaps with some 
bonus pay able to the patent holder but not serving as an additional discount. See supra text accompanying notes 186-190.  
607 At least one country has used a coupon scheme that has much in common with that proposed by Lichtman, but the scheme 
was not specifically targeted at any segment of the population. See M ARK JOHNSTON & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, THE AUSTRALIAN 
PHARMACEUTICAL SUBSIDY GAMBIT: TRANSMUTING DEADWEIGHT LOSS AND OLIGOPOLY RENTS TO CONSUMER SURPLUS (National 
Bureau Econ. Research Working Paper No. 3783, 1991). 
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The incompatibility of earlier patent prize proposals with a plan to provide prescription 
drugs to senior citizens may provide a hint that the narrow restriction is unjustified. Why should 
a senior citizen be entitled to cheap prescription drugs when a younger person with the 
misfortune to suffer a serious illness is not? On the other hand, there may be some normative 
justification, albeit probably a justification sounding in fairness or distributive concerns rather 
than economic efficiency. Perhaps senior citizens deserve special treatment because of the 
investments that they have made in the past, investments that should lead to a higher standard of 
living among the younger and future generations who will be obliged to bear the tax bill for 
seniors.608 Or perhaps the limited term of patent monopolies poses an unfair burden particularly 
on senior citizens, whose lower life expectancies mean that they will not share in the benefits 
when patents pass into the public domain. 609 
Regardless of whether the plan is normatively justified or an interest-group resource grab, 
if it is to be enacted, better that the plan be more efficient than less. Providing a prescription drug 
benefit using a mechanism similar to that described in Part III likely would be more efficient 
than alternatives currently discussed and could be targeted directly at senior citizens. In 
describing the activities that would receive prizes, the government could simply provide that 
prizes would be awarded to entities improving senior citizens’ access to pharmaceuticals. 
Congress could establish a fund for actions taken in a set year, and it could promise that the fund 
would be distributed in proportion to the social benefit provided to senior citizens. This approach 
would avoid the negative effects of price controls and indeed would likely encourage greater 
research and development expenditures by subsidizing the pharmaceutical industry. At the same 
time, the proposal would avoid burdening government with the informational complexities of a 
government-sponsored insurance plan, as the only decisions to be made would be the eventual 
distribution of prize money. 610 
The flexibility provided awarders of prizes will lead companies to seek the most efficient 
way of providing benefits to senior citizens.611 Some pharmaceutical companies might directly 
release patents into the public domain, especially if the drugs patented are used largely by senior 
citizens. Because pharmaceutical companies would expect prizes to depend solely on benefits to 
senior citizens,612 however, other approaches would likely dominate. For example, 
                                                 
608 See generally LIOR JACOB STRAHILEVITZ,  SHADES OF GRAY:  INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY IN THE ERA OF ENTITLEMENT 
REFORM (1997) (considering such arguments in the context of the entitlements debate). Some who purport to advocate 
intergenerational equity, however, argue that the elderly already receive too large a portion of governmental benefits. See, e.g.,  
Paul Samuelson, Pampering the Elderly, NEWSWEEK, Oct. 29, 1990, at 61. 
609 This argument might seem to imply that all of those with limited life expectancies should be subsidized, and this in turn might 
seem to suggest that all people benefiting from prescription drugs should receive the same benefits. It is theoretically possible, 
however, that status as a senior citizen is a better proxy for limited life expectancy than a desire to take a particular drug. Status 
as a senior citizen may well be a better proxy for many drugs, either because the population taking the drug is not at significantly 
elevated risk of early death or because the drug might help provide a cure for a particular illness. If this is the justification, 
though, there would be a ground for expanding the relevant program to include, for example, drugs generally taken by people 
with terminal illnesses without offering the possibility of a cure. 
610 Commentators have noted that rules for government payment of pharmaceuticals in contexts in which the government 
purchases pharmaceuticals are extraordinarily complex. See Richard J. Wall & Christopher B. Pockney, Pricing Pharmaceuticals 
for the Government (Where Policy Quirks and Economic Realities Collide), 29 PUB.  CONT. L.J. 91, 92 (1999) (“The Federal 
Government’s pharmaceutical pricing rules are perhaps the most complex set of pricing rules imposed on a commercial company 
doing business with the Government.”). 
611 See supra notes 412-416 and accompanying text (noting that the prize approach will lead private parties to choose among 
patent buyouts and other schemes). 
612 It is possible that some awarders of prizes might ignore the specified purpose of the program and award prizes on broader 
criteria, for example by providing prizes for provision of prescription drugs to individuals other than senior citizens. The prize 
approach is thus prone to mission creep. Cf. Todd J. Zywicki, Environmental Externalities and Political Externalities: The 
Political Economy of Environmental Regulation and Reform, 73 TUL. L. REV. 845, 891 (1999) (providing an example of the 
 PATENT PRIZES 108 
pharmaceutical companies might offer discounts to either all senior citizens or to specific groups 
of senior citizens.613 Likely the most common approach would be the advent of third-party 
insurance companies that would sell plans to senior citizens at below-market rates.  
While these companies presumably would negotiate to purchase drugs from 
pharmaceutical companies at wholesale market prices much as in existing proposals, the 
companies would have stronger incentives than a government agency to minimize administrative 
and drug purchasing costs and maximize benefits to covered senior citizens. The better the 
benefits provided to senior citizens, the higher the anticipated prize, even if the government’s 
eventual decisions in awarding prizes turn out to be poor approximations of the social optimum. 
A third party also might have a stronger credible threat than the government not to include a drug 
or group of drugs in its discount program if pharmaceutical companies do not offer sufficiently 
large discounts, because an agency might feel political pressure to make available at least one 
remedy per malady. 
Adopting such an approach would save Congress from having to resolve several divisive 
issues and thus potentially could make a bill easier to pass into law. 614 For example, one debate 
in Congress is whether a prescription drug plan should cost beneficiaries $53 a month and cover 
half the cost of prescriptions or offer premiums of $30 to $35 a month with greater out-of-pocket 
costs.615 With a prize system, third parties providing coverage would have an incentive to weigh 
the costs and benefits of different approaches. Different companies might well seek to serve 
different portions of the market by offering different plans, thus allowing for some consumer 
choice. Senior citizens who could not afford a relatively high monthly fee, or who do not 
anticipate needing the benefits of a program with such a fee, might be able to enroll in programs 
that offer lower fees, in exchange for higher copayments or reduced coverage. At the same time, 
this approach substantially answers two objections, both related to the adverse selection problem, 
to providing prescription drugs through subsidization of insurance companies. 
The first objection is that any subsidization would lead to market failure, as only the 
individuals most likely to need coverage will seek to obtain it. “[P]eople are likely to know more 
than the insurance companies that cover them about their future drug costs,” argues Paul 
Krugman, continuing, “[T]his puts retirees seeking drug insurance in the same position as people 
trying to sell used cars.”616 Insurance companies would thus only offer plans with high out-of-
                                                                                                                                                             
phenomenon of mission creep). Mission creep can be seen as a cost, at least to those who would like to channel benefits to 
specific groups, or as a benefit, since mission creep would only occur when some decisionmakers believe that a specific 
limitation by Congress is normatively unjustifiable. Of course, mission creep is hardly unique to this system, as any statutory 
program leaving room for agency or judicial decisionmaking ultimately may change or expand its mission as a result of creative 
rulemaking or creative statutory interpretation.  
613 One company recently announced such a program, presumably because of the price discrimination and reputational benefits 
that it will obtain from it. See Melody Petersen & Milt Freudenheim, GlaxoSmithKline Plans Drug Discount Program for Low-
Income Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2001, at D1 (announcing the plan to reduce drug prices for low-income senior citizens by 
25% or more). Drug companies also provide benefits to a relatively small number of consumers through patient assistance 
programs. See generally GOV’T ACCTG . OFFICE, DRUG COMPANY PROGRAMS HELP SOME PEOPLE WHO LACK COVERAGE (GAO-
01-137, 2000) (describing such programs). 
614 Congress is often more willing to pass legislation when the legislation does not resolve controversial issues. For example, 
supporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 could not agree on whether the legislation should be retroactive, and passage was 
assured only by leaving the issue open. See Rivers v. Roadway Express, Inc., 511 U.S. 298 (1994) (resolving the issue by finding 
the statute nonretroactive). Of course, sometimes Congress may anticipate how an issue would be resolved if left to an 
administrative agency or to courts, and the option of leaving an issue undecided is thus not available.  
615 See Robert Pear & Robin Toner, Despite High Hopes, Drug Plan May Be Disappointing to Elderly, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 
2001, at A1. 
616 Paul Krugman, Harvest of Lemons, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2001, at 13. Krugman is referring to George Akerlof’s observation 
about adverse selection in the used car market. See Akerlof, supra note 313. 
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pocket expenses, for fear of drawing insureds who  are bad risks. The second, related objection is 
that insurance companies might “cherry pick” by seeking to cover only healthy seniors.617 They 
might do so, for example, by omitting coverage for drugs that relatively sick seniors are likely to 
need, or through stringent rules on pre-existing conditions. Although a potential answer to both 
of these objections is that the government could regulate the terms and prices of subsidized 
insurance, this eliminates much of the purpose of harnessing competition among insurance 
companies rather than offering a centralized single-payer plan. 
Adverse selection, however, is not a significant problem with the approach suggested 
here, as long as insurers anticipate that prize awarders will consider the characteristics of the 
population served, as well as examination of the drugs actually provided at discounted rates, 
rather than just the number of enrollees. Insurers should be happy to enroll bad risks if they 
expect to receive a higher prize as a result. The social benefit that a third party provides depends 
ultimately on the medical benefit provided to enrollees, and medical benefit should be easier to 
assess a decade after drugs are provided than at the time of enrollment in a plan. If a third party 
attempted to enroll only healthy individuals, or provided drugs irrespective of need, its opponent 
in prize arbitration would have a strong incentive to point this out and those awarding prizes 
would be expected to take the argument into account. Unlike any system operating according to a 
predetermined formula, this approach eliminates loopholes by granting great flexibility in 
considerations potentially relevant for the awarding of prizes.618 
At the same time, Congress would not need to decide how benefits should vary 
depending on income or wealth. Just as the prize system gives insurers an incentive to serve the 
sick as well as the healthy, so too does it give them an incentive to prioritize the poor above the 
rich. Insurers would consider to what extent prize givers on average would consider social 
benefit to be higher when the recipient of the services is poorer, and the compromise is thus what 
the average prize awarder would decide. The more limited the fund for prizes, the more third 
parties are likely to focus on serving relatively poor senior citizens. This is just a generalization 
of the point that prize funds will induce actions having the highest possible ratio of social benefit 
to private cost.619  
Expenditures on pharmaceuticals, like those on any product, produce declining marginal 
benefits. Third parties would thus anticipate the argument that the benefit provided from 
spending a dollar on an essential drug needed by someone who cannot afford the drug is greater 
than that provided by spending money on a recipient who generally can afford drugs but either 
would prefer not to pay for them or would find that the costs of a certain drug exceed the 
benefits. Even a prize awarder focusing solely on the amount of deadweight loss eliminated, 
rather than on improvement in medical outcomes, should prioritize poor senior citizens, because 
deadweight loss is eliminated only when someone who values a drug above marginal cost but 
below the monopoly price receives a discount that enables purchase.  
On this issue and others, using the prize approach will lead third parties to recognize the 
possibility of disagreement among awarders of prizes and to calculate social benefit as an 
average of what different decisionmakers would be expected to decide. If some decisionmakers 
would be expected to count social benefits from two competing uses of funds as equal while 
                                                 
617 For a discussion of and sources on cherry picking, see Andre Hampton, Markets, Myths, and a Man on the Moon: Aiding and 
Abetting America’s Flight from Health Insurance, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 987, 1003 & n.70 (2000). 
618 Cf. THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1061 (3d ed. 1992) (defining “loophole” as “[a] way of escaping a difficulty, 
especially an omission or ambiguity in the wording of a contract or law that provides a means of evading compliance”). 
619 See supra text accompanying notes 481-483. 
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other decisionmakers systematically would value one of the uses over the other, funds will tend 
to flow initially toward the favored use. Some lawmakers, of course, might prefer a program that 
would have no such bias, for example if they believe that pharmaceutical benefits should not 
depend on income at all, while others might prefer strict means testing. If there are enough such 
lawmakers, though, they could specify the restriction in the legislation creating the prize system. 
Thus, assuming that prize awarders would be expected to honor legislative restrictions as much 
as judges, using the prize system does not prevent Congress from setting criteria. If lawmakers 
cannot agree on certain issues, however, a system of retrospective prizes will effect compromise 
on controversial issues.  
Given congressional and presidential disagreement on the form that a full program should 
take, the prize system could serve as an interim solution, perhaps with relatively modest funding. 
This interim solution, however, might well prove more attractive than any alternatives, and it 
easily could be expanded simply by increasing the size of the fund for a particular year. Because 
it would induce relatively few releases of patents into the public domain, the program likely 
would not eliminate deadweight loss nearly as efficiently as a patent prize program not geared 
specifically toward senior citizens. From the perspective of consumers, the program would not 
look so different from a governmental one, with prices for pharmaceuticals lower than they 
otherwise would be. The difference would not be in the form of the program as much as in 
perceived quality, especially in reaching those most rather than least in need. 
Because the system would stimulate competition among private companies to provide 
high-quality services efficiently, rather than competition encouraging exploitation of loopholes 
and imperfections in governmental rules, the social benefit, and thus the perceived quality among 
consumers on average, would be higher per dollar spent on benefits. And while only actual 
experimentation with a prize system can provide definitive proof, the costs of the system, even 
including the amount that must implicitly be paid to third parties that will bear some risk because 
of the uncertainty of prize awarders’ decisions,620 seem likely to be less than the costs of running 
a bureaucracy charged with the gargantuan task of making ex ante decisions about benefits. It is 
simply easier to approximate how much good a particular insurance company providing drug 
coverage did than to craft rules providing funding in proportion to how much good each 
insurance company can be predicted to do. 
2. Genomics 
The above analysis indicates that the pharmaceutical market is amenable to a patent prize 
system, even if the products are targeted at particular groups of consumers, and that a prize 
system might increase the incentives to convert basic scientific research into potentially life-
saving consumer products. It might seem, however, that a patent prize system would be less 
successful at encouraging basic research itself, much of which is funded by ex ante government 
grants.621 Indeed, the patent prize proposals discussed in Part I would be difficult to modify to 
encourage basic research. It would make little sense for Guell and Fischbaum to recommend 
eminent domain seizure of the results of basic research, or for Shavell and van Ypersele to 
measure demand curves for such results, since basic research is not traded in markets, or at least 
                                                 
620 See supra note 494 and accompanying text. 
621 See generally Center for Scientific Review, National Institutes of Health, A Straightforward Description of What Happens to 
Your Research Project Grant Application (R01/R21) After It Is Received for Peer Review, at 
http://www.csr.nih.gov/REVIEW/peerrev.htm (last visited Oct. 16, 2001) (providing a description of how NIH considers grant 
proposals). 
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not in conventional ones. Similarly, while Kremer might recommend auctioning off patents on 
basic research, we would first need a patent regime that could encourage all socially useful forms 
of basic research. Coupons, finally, will do little good, because basic research is not sold directly 
to the poor. 
A prize system along the lines proposed in this Article, however, easily could be used to 
encourage basic research in particular areas, such as genomics. To understand the benefits of 
using a prize system in this area, consider first a capsule history of gene research. 622 The Human 
Genome Project was initially a congressionally funded joint effort of the National Institutes of 
Health and the Department of Energy, 623 dedicated to the task of mapping and sequencing the 
human genome.624 Many other countries soon started their own limited genome projects, which 
the Human Genome Organization helped coordinate.625 A more serious participant was Celera 
Genomics, a private concern headed by Dr. J. Craig Venter, a defector from NIH who believed 
that different techniques could lead to a more rapid conclusion of the project.626 Eventually, 
Celera Genomics cooperated with the government,627 and a joint “working draft” of the genome 
was published years ahead of schedule.628 
One lesson from this experience is that private entities may be capable of innovating and 
producing research results faster than government-sponsored laboratories. It would be hazardous 
to draw too much from a single anecdote; it is possible, after all, that some government-
sponsored projects are more successful than private ones. Nonetheless, the history shows that 
profit incentives can be powerful motivators for research, and there are high transactions costs 
associated with government-sponsored grants.629 Even if peer review is successful at identifying 
the most promising research projects,630 the recipient of a government grant has little incentive 
once a project has begun to shift course if a methodological change promises a faster route to a 
conclusion.  
Private initiative cannot be counted on to act as an effective substitute for governmental 
programs in general, at least absent some type of reform. A primary motivation for Celera, or at 
least its financiers, was the possibility of obtaining patent protection for the sequences that it had 
                                                 
622 For a more complete history, see Leslie Roberts et al., A History of the Human Genome Project, 291 SCIENCE  1195 (2001). 
623 See, e.g., Francis Collins & David Galas, A New Five-Year Plan for the U.S. Human Genome Project, 262 SCIENCE  43 (1993). 
624 Among the articles suggesting that such a project might be a useful step in advancing medical research was Renato Dulbecco, 
A Turning Point in Cancer Research: Sequencing the Human Genome, 231 SCIENCE  1055 (1986). 
625 For an early history of international involvement in the Human Genome Project, see G. Kenneth Smith & Denise M. 
Kettelberger, Patents and the Human Genome Project, 22 AIPLA Q.J. 27, 32-37 (1994). 
626 See Robert Langreth, Gene-Sequencing Race Between U.S. and Private Researchers Is Accelerating, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 
1999, at B5. 
627 See Nicholas Wade, Rivals in the Race to Decode Human DNA Agree to Cooperate, N.Y. T IMES, June 22, 2000, at A20. 
628 See Nicholas Wade, Genetic Code of Human Life Is Cracked by Scientists , N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2000, at A1. 
629 For a consideration of whether the government would be better off directly funding institutions employing scientists than 
funding particular projects selected through peer review, see Paula E. Stephan, The Economics of Science, 34 J. ECON. LI T. 1199, 
1226-27 (1996). 
630 Peer review may not be successful in doing so if it favors unambitious projects over more ambitious ones. As Thomas 
McGarity explains: 
The most frequently identified bias among the scientists interviewed for this article was the subtle bias that the 
scientific peer review bodies exert against “mavericks” who reject conventional assumptions and approaches. Several 
researchers and grant administrators interviewed in connection with this article observed the projects well within the 
“mainstream” of previously funded research have a much better chance of being funded than research that rejects 
conventional wisdom. The result can be a big fraternity of scientists all reaching the same conclusions and not testing 
each others’ hypotheses. 
McGarity, supra note 37, at 40. 
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discovered.631 Some types of basic research, however, might not be amenable to patent 
protection, because the research, though potentially useful to the scientific community at large in 
identifying relatively fruitful areas of research, might not point directly to any particular 
patentable product or process. It would have been difficult to imagine an intellectual property 
regime that could have given James Watson and Francis Crick the power to exclude others from 
taking advantage of their discovery, 632 despite its importance to future scientific development. 
Even the patentability of naked DNA sequences, absent a specific claim to utility, is now 
suspect,633 even though such sequences may be useful as scientific building blocks. Intellectual 
property can protect some forms of research, but venture capital will flow only to such uses. 
While governmental decisionmakers at least in principle would consider the social benefits from 
different forms of innovation, private researchers will focus on potential profits. They thus will 
eschew forms of research that would produce social benefit but little possibility of private 
benefit.  
A prize system in which prizes are given based on social benefit, regardless of whether 
the underlying research is patentable, provides a way of harnessing private incentives to innovate 
while still giving incentives to choose projects providing the greatest social returns. Investors in 
search of prize money will seek to engage in research that has the highest expected social 
benefit, as long as they cannot predict any biases in the eventual distribution of the prize money. 
This observation also addresses an early critique of the Human Genome Project, that it was not 
prudent to seek to sequence the entire genome instead of focusing on interesting parts.634 With 
hindsight, some argue that sequencing even the “junk” portions of DNA has paid dividends,635 
but this does not answer the criticism that the project was too ambitious based on information 
available at the time. Had the prize system that I have described been used to reward genomics 
research, scientists and investors would have had incentives to try to anticipate whether intensive 
analysis of certain portions of the genome would be likely a decade later to have seemed more 
cost-efficient than comprehensive sequencing of the entirety. The answer to that question might 
have changed over time, and investors and scientists might have changed course accordingly. 
The limitations of the Human Genome Project approach are interesting as more than a 
matter of history. Even once a final draft of the human genome is published, work on genomics 
will continue on a variety of fronts. For example, researchers are seeking to identify the 
approximately 300,000 single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs), the locations on the genome 
where humans differ in their genetic code,636 and the task of identifying the structure of proteins 
coded for by genes is just beginning.637 In addition, even entities that have released results of 
their DNA sequencing have maintained as trade secrets annotated versions providing 
                                                 
631 See, e.g., Justin Gillis, Gene Researcher Draws Fire on Filings, WASH . POST, Oct. 26, 1999, at E1 (reporting that Celera had 
filed over 6500 patent applications). 
632 See generally JAMES D. WATSON, THE DOUBLE HELIX (1968) (describing the discovery of the structure of DNA).  
633 See infra text accompanying notes 654-656.  
634 See, e.g., Smith & Kettleberger, supra note 625 (“Is extracting 2-5% information from the entire genome worth this mammoth 
sequencing effort at such an exorbitant cost?”). 
635 See Gretchen Vogel, Why Sequence the Junk?, 291 SCIENCE  1184 (2001) (arguing that some of the most significant 
discoveries may come from the “junk” portion of the human genome). 
636 See generally Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research: Intellectual Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NW. 
U. L. REV. 77, 105 (1999) (describing research into SNPs). 
637 Identifying how proteins “fold” requires extraordinary computational resources. See generally ALAN FERSHT, STRUCTURE AND 
MECHANISM IN PROTEIN SCIENCE : A GUIDE TO ENZYME CATALYSIS AND PROTEIN FOLDING (1998); Andy Patrizio, Protein Fiends 
Join the Fold, WIRED NEWS, Sep. 26, 2000, available at http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,1282,39035,00.html (last 
visited Oct. 8, 2001). 
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supplemental information. 638 The government might seek to subsidize research in all of these 
areas or to induce private entities to release any research results that they have already produced 
into the public domain. A prize system could accomplish this, even if (indeed, especially if) the 
government is ill situated to decide today which of various potential avenues of research is most 
promising. The lower our confidence in governmental decisions on funding science, including 
decisions on when to shift course, the higher the likelihood that a prize system will be superior to 
funding through grants. 
The choice, however, is not just between a prize system and a grant system. Intellectual 
property law also might be used to encourage research, at least for some types of investigation 
into genomics. It is easy to imagine, for example, a regime in which the first researchers to 
identify an SNP would be entitled to prevent anyone from offering a product pertaining to that 
SNP. The law could provide that a third party sale of any cure, remedy, or diagnostic test 
targeting the specific SNP would be an infringement of the intellectual property right. The 
question is thus whether patent law, or some actual or hypothetical alternative form of 
intellectual property, is sufficient. If intellectual property protection could provide adequate 
incentives for research, than any further government subsidization of research would be 
excessive. Social resources would be better spent in other ways.639  
A preliminary answer is that a prize system might be useful, at least as a supplement to 
intellectual property protection, for the same reason that it is useful in other areas. Unless 
researchers can exploit their inventions to receive the full social benefit that they have produced, 
they will underinvest in research, and there will be deadweight loss attributable to high licensing 
fees.640 A possible rejoinder is that researchers who obtain intellectual property protection may 
be able to price discriminate more effectively than the sellers of consumer-oriented products, 
because the number of contracts to negotiate might be quite small and the value of the discovery 
to potential purchasers might be readily apparent. Such price discrimination would offset both 
problems.641 It would, however, increase the cost of developing downstream products,642 and the 
prices of such products might be higher as a result. Because a prize system, by contrast, results in 
the placement of discoveries into the public domain, the costs of one stage of discovery will not 
cumulate into the next stage. 
If prices of downstream goods are above marginal cost, however, the problem could be 
solved with a prize system for the downstream market rather than for the initial discovery 
                                                 
638 See, e.g., Pioneering on the Genomics Frontier , http://www.merck.com/overview/98ar/p17.htm (last visited Oct. 8, 2001) 
(“Merck Gene Index has placed the majority of available information on human gene sequences in a public database for all 
scientists to use.”). 
639 Some critics might argue that the government should spend more on research and development than revealed preferences of 
consumers would suggest because the health benefits of genomics are incommensurate with other economic goods. See Lewis A. 
Kornhauser, No Best Answer?, 146 U. PA. L. REV.  1599, 1621 (1998) (noting that advocates of incommensurability generally 
seek to defend judicial autonomy in areas such as health and safety, rather than conclude that because choices are 
incommensurable, they should be left to legislative resolution). See generally, e.g., Matthew Adler, Law and Incommensurability: 
Introduction, 146 U. PA. L. RE V. 1169 (1998) (discussing a variety of views on the concept of incommensurability). But see Leo 
Katz, Incommensurable Choices and the Problem of Moral Ignorance, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 1465 (1998) (providing a skeptical 
account of incommensurability). Even if we accept the incommensurability argument, however, there are a variety of potential 
projects to benefit public health that might be better areas for government spending, if intellectual property protection were 
adequate. See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 1533 (1996) (explaining that even if the 
only policy maximand is health, administrative agencies should carefully consider the health consequences of different policy 
options). 
640 See supra text accompanying notes 87-88. 
641 See supra text accompanying notes 171-172. 
642 See, e.g., Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Registration 
Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735, 789-92 (2000). 
 PATENT PRIZES 114 
market. Pharmaceutical companies may have to license genomic data, but in theory the 
government can compensate for this by offering generous buyouts of the patents protecting the 
drugs that they produce. There are, however, three reasons to think that intellectual property 
protection will be particularly problematic in the market for the products of basic research, even 
assuming that unambiguous property rights in such products could be established.  
The first problem is a holdup problem. 643 In some cases, a researcher may not be able to 
determine who the appropriate licensor is until after considerable research. For example, 
researchers seeking to identify the gene associated with a particular disease would not be able to 
determine before beginning the research who has a patent on the underlying sequence.644 Once 
research is invested, however, the firm “is more susceptible to opportunistic behavior from the 
patent holder,”645 who can charge more than would have been possible if negotiation occurred ex 
ante. This problem exposes a weakness in assurances than intellectual property clearing houses, 
similar to those used for copyrighted music, would allow for efficient licensing of genomic 
patents.646 A radio station could survive without the right to play any given song, but a researcher 
investigating a particular disease cannot simply decide to work on a different gene after having 
spent time locating the gene of interest.647 
The second problem is an “anticommons” problem. An anticommons problem occurs 
when each of a number of parties has a right to exclude a third party from use of property. 
Michael Heller’s classic example of an anticommons problem was the widespread presence of 
empty storefronts in Moscow, because “almost any use of [a] storefront requires the agreement 
of multiple parties.”648 As Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg point out, a similar problem may exist 
in the genomics area, if a project cannot proceed without approval from each of a large number 
of rightsholders.649 For example, a single gene may subsume or overlap with various portions of 
the genome sequenced by different groups.650 Though it may be possible for researchers to obtain 
licenses from owners of every Expressed Sequence Tag (EST), such negotiations will be 
difficult, because each owner effectively has the power to terminate the project. Often, 
                                                 
643 See, e.g., Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction-Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22 J.L. & ECON. 
233, 234 (1979) (discussing holdup problems that may exist when investments depending on continuing access to certain 
resources have already been made). 
644 “A biotechnology company cannot know which ESTs are on the same gene until it or some other firm sequences the entire 
gene.” Holman & Munzer, supra note 642, at 786. 
645 Id. at 779. 
646 Robert Merges has shown how collective rights institutions can and often do arise in settings involving repeat players in 
intellectual property transactions. See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996) (arguing that the existence of such institutions exposes a flaw in 
arguments for compulsory licensing). Professor Merges, however, recognizes that Congress sometimes must “create the 
conditions for private parties to bargain into contractual liability rules.” Id. at 1391. Those conditions may not exist, and arguably 
may not be capable of creation, in the genomics context. 
647 There are other reasons as well to believe that such institutions will arise. Maureen O’Rourke explains: 
Because the rights are spread broadly across both public and private institutions that vary widely in their interests and 
abilities to negotiate, accumulating the required rights is particularly difficult. Moreover, valuation difficulties may 
prove intractable as the rights cover a large range of technologies, and cognitive biases lead patentees to overvalue their 
own inventions and undervalue another’s. The net result is that the combination of high transaction costs and strategic 
behavior may prevent licensing from occurring. 
Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1177, 1237 (2000). 
648 See Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets , 111 HARV. L. 
REV. 621, 639 (1998). 
649 Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 
SCIENCE 698, 699 (1998). 
650 For further discussion, see Alexander K. Haas, The Wellcome Trust’s Disclosures of Gene Sequence Data into the Public 
Domain and the Potential for Proprietary Rights in the Human Genome, 16 BERKELEY TECH L.J. 145, 159-61 (2001). 
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agreement will be reached, but sometimes aggressive negotiating by one or more rights owners 
seeking to obtain as great a portion of the rent from the project as possible may cause 
negotiations to break down. 
The third problem, a familiar one,651 is the possibility that excessive research will 
dissipate rents. Though competition in sequencing the genome may have accelerated completion 
relative to the initial approach, the redundant sequencing of genes may have been socially 
inefficient.652 As Matthew Erramouspe notes, a patent race also occurred in an effort to find a 
gene involved in breast cancer.653 Though patent races may occur in any area of inventive 
activity, they may be particularly likely to occur in the genomics area. The challenges of 
genomics, such as identifying SNPs associated with certain illnesses, are often fairly clearly 
defined, and because some discoveries are likely to be considerably more profitable than others, 
researchers may decide to race rather than work on separate tasks. In addition, if there is a single 
correct answer to a particular problem, then researchers will be likely to be working on precisely 
the same solution, rather than on discovering slightly different solutions to the problem. A race 
for patents on antidepressants at least results in the creation of a variety of antidepressants that 
may have different benefits and costs for different patients. 
The patent system can respond to these problems principally by changing the scope of 
protection. Indeed, the Patent and Trademark Office recently issued guidelines concerning when 
examiners should grant patents on genomic discoveries, specifying that to obtain a patent on a 
gene or EST, an inventor must establish a specific and credible way in which the gene is useful, 
rather than simply spelling out the genetic code.654 The tougher criteria may well mitigate the 
holdup, anticommons, and rent dissipation problems, but they are more a compromise rather than 
a solution. On one hand, the guidelines may provide insufficient incentive for research unlikely 
to lead directly to discovery of useful functions, and Celera might well not have invested in 
sequencing had the guidelines been in place earlier.655 On the other hand, the guidelines do not 
solve these problems altogether, especially given criticisms that the PTO has set too low a 
threshold for the utility requirements.656  
A prize system, by contrast, is directly responsive to the concerns. If adequately funded, 
such a system can provide incentives for research at whatever level is deemed desirable, 
including research for which there currently would be no reward under the patent system. At the 
same time, because the prize system results in discoveries being placed in the public domain, 
holdup and anticommons problems will occur less often. In addition, the prize system could 
mitigate the problems associated with patent races.657 Groups that would be competitors in a 
                                                 
651 See supra Part II.B.1. 
652 Michael Malinowski and Professor O’Rourke suggest that federal government initiatives might succeed in eliminating the 
duplication of effort, and, if complemented by vigorous antitrust enforcement, in ensuring public availability of genomic 
information. See Michael J. Malinowski & Maureen A. O’Rourke, A False Start? The Impact of Federal Policy on the 
Genotechnology Industry, 13 YALE J. ON REG. 163, 232 (1996). 
653 See Matthew Erramouspe, Staking Patent Claims on the Human Blueprint: Rewards and Rent-Dissipating Races , 43 UCLA 
L. REV. 961, 996 (1996). “[N]umerous teams involving hundreds of researchers raced to stake their claims and capture the 
coveted prize.” Id. 
654 See Utility Examination Guidelines , 66 Fed. Reg. 1092, 1098 (2001). The Federal Circuit has not yet ruled on the validity of 
the guidelines. 
655 Wall Street has become increasingly skeptical of genomics firms’ ability to generate profits. See David Malakoff & Robert F. 
Service, Genomania Meets the Bottom Line, 291 SCIENCE  1193 (2001). 
656 See, e.g., Mattias Luukkonen, Note, Gene Patents: How Useful Are the New Utility Requirements, 23 THOMAS JEFFERSON L. 
REV. 337, 338 (2001) (“[T]he current utility guidelines, when applied to gene patents, allow patent applications to be granted 
without a substantial demonstration or disclosure of a gene’s actual utility.”). 
657 See supra notes 292-294 (explaining how a prize system could mitigate the problems associated with patent races). 
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patent system might instead effectively work collaboratively by releasing information as it is 
developed, rather than waiting to file a patent application, and by specializing, either through 
explicit or implicit agreement, in different parts of a given task. When prizes can be shared, 
companies will no longer need to arrive at a complete solution first or expect such a first-place 
finish to result in the whole prize. The prize system also reduces the danger that cooperative 
research programs will lead to litigation over ensuing patent rights.658 
3. Business Methods 
The example of genomics suggests that a prize system may be useful in an area in which 
patent law helps provide incentives for research but creates a market that may inhibit the 
transformation of research into useful products. Business methods potentially present the 
opposite problem, given the concerns of many commentators that the patent system would be 
better off without business method patents at all.659 Commentators have suggested that many 
business method patents issued are, at least in the lay sense, obvious. Margo Bagley, for 
example, suggests that the problem with business method patents stems from decisions by the 
Federal Circuit and the Patent and Trademark Office to be generous to patent applicants and 
holders in determining whether an earlier reference invalidates a patent.660 For example, the PTO 
awarded Amazon.com its controversial “1-click” patent on a method for online purchasing using 
just a single click of the mouse without considering potentially invalidating references from the 
bricks-and-mortar world of commerce.661 Unless the PTO responds to such critiques by looking 
more broadly for prior art,662 the courts respond by construing prior art broadly in patent cases 
litigated,663 or Congress passes legislation restricting business method patents,664 then many e-
commerce patents that simply involve the translation of common business techniques onto the 
Web will raise the cost of doing Internet business. 
Whether the costs of business method patents exceed the benefits is difficult to gauge. As 
Robert Merges has noted, the long history of innovation in commercial affairs may make these 
patents seem unnecessary. 665 Professor Merges, however, also observes that provision of patent 
protection might increase the quantity of innovation, perhaps even dramatically: “[I]f we thought 
                                                 
658 See Malinowski & O’Rourke, supra note 652, at 224 (describing a controversy over ownership of intellectual property rights 
after a joint research effort). 
659 See sources cited supra note 6. 
660 See Margo A. Bagley, Internet Business Model Patents: Obvious by Analogy, 7 M ICH. TELECOMM. TECH . L. REV. 253, 263- 
78 (2001) (explaining why business method patents generally clear the novelty and nonobviousness hurdles). 
661 See Amazon.com, Inc. v. Barnesandnoble.com, Inc., 239 F.3d 1343, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (vacating the district court’s ruling 
in favor of Amazon.com, but providing that validity was for resolution at trial”). As Professor Bagley points out, the e-commerce 
1-click approach is not so different from familiar methods in commerce: “Take for example the experience of a frequent visitor to 
a high-end hotel. Such guests, known by sight to the concierge, whose address and credit card information is on file and available 
to the hotel, are able to implement single-action ordering of goods and services throughout the hotel.” Bagley, supra note 660, at 
272-73. 
662 Criticism of the Patent and Trademark Office for awarding business method patents too easily ultimately led the Office to 
appoint more examiners with business training and slow down the issuance of awards. Applications are now reviewed by two 
examiners rather than one, and examiners receive more time to consider applications than in other fields of invention. See 
William M. Bulkeley, Fewer Patents on Methods Get Clearance,  WALL ST. J., March 21, 2001, at A3; Kent Hoover, Legislation 
to Curb Abuse of Business Method Patents , M EMPHIS BUS. J., April 13, 2001, at 13.  
663 Professor Bagley recommends that courts consider prior art broadly and apply the doctrine-of-equivalents narrowly to cure 
some of the problems of business method patents. See Bagley, supra note 660, at 265-85. 
664 Congress has amended the Patent Code to allow a prior use exception for business method patents, but the exception is quite 
limited. See American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, § 4302, 113 Stat. 1501A, 1501A-555 (1999) 
(codified at 35 U.S.C. § 273). 
665 See ROBERT P. MERGES, PATENT LAW AND POLICY : CASES AND M ATERIALS 156 (2d ed. 1997). 
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entrepreneurs rapidly introduced new ideas such as overnight package delivery and 1-800-
Flowers without patents, then Watch Out!, because we haven’t seen anything yet in this field!”666 
While the apparent lax enforcement of the non-obviousness requirement may lead to awards of 
patents for some business methods that would have been introduced even in the absence of a 
patent system,667 it also might lead to patents protecting some business methods that would not 
be introduced in the absence of a patent regime.668 Even with time, a final assessment of the 
relative costs and benefits will be difficult to conduct, because it is impossible to determine 
which business methods would have been introduced in the absence of patent system protection. 
Nonetheless, there is a strong argument that even if patent protection for business 
methods is desirable, the patent system is not optimally calibrated for encouragement of 
experimentation with new business models. On this theory, the scarce resource in the bus iness 
field is not ideas but willingness to experiment. Vincent Chiapetta argues that “the majority of 
competitive arts innovations will be readily amenable to lower-cost emulation, making 
investment in such innovations self-defeating.”669 Second-mover advantages may be sufficiently 
robust to outweigh first-mover advantages in the absence of patent protection, 670 especially in the 
Internet context, where potential consumers can conduct searches to obtain the most competitive 
prices from a range of merchants who might copy the business model of the original innovator.671 
Patent doctrine, however, does not directly consider first- and second-mover advantages. 
Tightening the nonobviousness requirement might prevent patents on some ideas that would 
have been brought to market, but it also might leave some ideas with no one willing to take a 
chance on them in the absence of assurances of being able to capture the upside rent if the ideas 
turn out to be successful. 
In theory, of course, Congress could modify the patent law to place more emphasis on 
relative first-mover and second-mover advantages. It might even do so in the business method 
context alone, though many commentators are wary of having customized patent law for 
different areas.672 Any such step seems unlikely, however, in part because of the difficulty of 
                                                 
666 Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent 
System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 577, 582-83 (1999). 
667 Glynn Lunney, for example, argues: 
The traditional perspective identified and assigned nonobviousness a central role of separating those inventions where 
the patent bargain made sense from those where it did not. In contrast, nonobviousness appears to have no sensible role 
under the simply -property perspective [adopted by the Federal Circuit]. . . . [T]o promote allocative efficiency, we 
should extend patent protection only to those e-commerce inventions not likely to have occurred but for the expectation 
of a patent. 
Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., E-Obviousness, 7 M ICH. TELECOMM. TECH . L. REV. 363, 421 (2001). Professor Lunney recommends an 
objective test for nonobviousness, assessing the percentage of resources invested in research and development that are 
attributable to creative production factors. Id. at 413 (“[T]he dominant consideration should be the creativity invested in the new 
product or process as a fraction of the invention’s total cost as marketed (the ‘creative investment fraction’).”). 
668 The question is thus whether the patent system’s errors are worthwhile. See generally Maureen A. O’Rourke, Evaluating 
Mistakes in Intellectual Property Law: Configuring the System to Account for Imperfection, 4 J. SMALL & EMERGING BUS. L. 167 
(2000) (discussing the problem of and responses to mistakes in various areas of intellectual property law). 
669 Vincent Chiappetta, Defining the Proper Scope of Internet Patents: If We Don’t Know Where We Want to Go, We’re Unlikely 
to Get There, 7 M ICH. TELECOMM. TECH . L. REV. 289, [TAN 159] (2001).  
670 On first-mover and second-mover advantages, see supra text accompanying notes 205-217. 
671 But see Erin White, Comparison Shopping: No Comparison, WALL ST. J., Oct. 23, 2000, at R18 (reporting that Internet 
comparison-shopping services have not undermined more traditional approaches to e-commerce). 
672 See, e.g., John J. Doll, The Patenting of DNA, 280 SCIENCE  689, 689 (1998) (“[N]ew areas of technology do not create the 
need for a whole new specialized patent law.”). But see Himanshu S. Amin, The Lack of Protection Afforded Software Under the 
Current Intellectual Property Laws, 43 CLEV. ST. L. RE V. 19 (1995) (suggesting a sui generis form of protection for computer 
software); Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright, Common Law, and Sui Generis Protection of Databases in the United States and 
Abroad, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 171-76 (1997) (arguing for a distinctive form of protection for databases); J.H. Reichman & 
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producing a definitive test. Even if the non-obviousness test is more an art than a science, there 
are a standard set of factors that courts consider, including prior art, differences between the art 
and the claimed invention, the level of ordinary skill in the art, and secondary considerations 
such as commercial success.673 The relative weight of first-mover and second-mover advantages 
is more difficult to reduce to a similar test, because it is based on predictions of consumer and 
market reactions to new developments. The PTO and courts presumably would make a large 
number of errors in assessing these factors, thus producing only modest gains over the existing 
regime.  
Decisionmakers in a prize system, however, would be able to consider whether a prize 
applicant deserved a prize as a result of taking a chance on a risky business venture susceptible 
to copying. In part this is because prize systems, in which final decisions are based on dollar 
amount approximations, can take into account factors like first-mover and second-mover 
advantages more easily than a legal system that must make binary determinations. More 
importantly, decisions could be made ex post rather than ex ante, with a delay that would allow 
the prize decisionmakers to assess fairly objectively the relative weight of first-mover and 
second-mover advantages. A prize applicant that introduced a successful business method but 
was unable to make a corresponding profit because of copying would receive a prize to 
compensate for the contribution. In contrast, a prize applicant who reaped large first-mover 
advantages or who introduced a business method that produced no commercial or social value 
would receive a much smaller prize, if a prize at all.  
Such a prize system would also be useful for the same reason that other patent prize 
systems are useful, contributing to the reduction of deadweight loss as the cost of using building 
blocks for e-commerce and other purposes would decline. There is a strong argument, however, 
that such a prize system, if adopted, should be mandatory rather than opt-in. An opt-in system 
would allow encouragement of the development of business methods that would not be pursued 
in the absence of a patent or prize system, but it would no t eliminate the false positive problem 
of a patent being granted unnecessarily. A mandatory system, by contrast, would allow prize 
decisionmakers to focus on the variables most relevant to encouraging innovation in business 
methods, and thus would lead potential innovators in business methods to anticipate what those 
variables are likely to be. More generally, mandatory systems will be relatively attractive in any 
context in which the private returns from patents do not correlate well with the social benefits 
provided. A drawback of mandatory systems is that Congress may be more hesitant to adopt 
them because of those who would lose as a result, but if the fund supporting such a prize system 
is sufficiently large, such opposition might be overcome. 
B. Beyond Patent 
1. Copyright in Digital Recordings 
Although I have focused so far on patent law, much of the analysis applies comfortably to 
copyright law as well. 674 Though perhaps receiving less scholarly attention, 675 deadweight loss 
                                                                                                                                                             
Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. RE V. 51, 130-37 (1997) (considering the implications of a 
sui generis database regime). 
673 See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). 
674 Others have recognized the potential applicability of a prize system to copyright. See, e.g., Shavell & van Ypersele, supra 
note 18, at 545 (“[T]he price of computer software is generally nontrivial even though its marginal production cost is essentially 
zero (it can be downloaded from the Internet), and similar statements can be made about CD recordings, cable TV broadcasts, 
and first-run movies.”); Calandrillo, supra note 19, at 334-36 (discussing problems with the copyright system that might justify a 
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will arise from a copyright monopoly as much as from a patent monopoly. Once a movie is 
produced, for example, the marginal cost of distributing and exhibiting it is lower than the cost of 
a typical seat at a movie theater, with the differential allowing producers to recoup the costs of 
making the picture. With a copyright prize system, a movie could be placed in the public 
domain, and theater tickets would be cheaper, as would be premium cable stations like HBO. 
With marginal cost pricing of movies, books, computer games, and music, consumers who 
would value these products at great than marginal cost would happily indulge. Though these 
products may be substitutes for one another, total consumption of these forms of entertainment 
would rise, and the corresponding increase in these individuals’ utility would rate as a social 
benefit.676 
While the relevant theory is the same, some considerations empirically may differ from 
the patent context to the copyright one, though it is difficult to determine whether these 
considerations make the case for copyright prizes stronger or weaker than that for patent prizes. 
It may be, for example, that price discrimination is more likely with some copyrights than would 
usually be the case with patents, as lower-valuing viewers can wait longer to see a particular 
movie or attend the theater at a relatively inconvenient time.677 On one hand, this might weaken 
the case for a copyright prize system, because price discrimination helps to eliminate deadweight 
loss.678 On the other hand, price discrimination conceivably could decrease allocative 
efficiency. 679 For example, an increase in movie price for relatively convenient showtimes and a 
decrease for inconvenient ones will reduce the consumer surplus of high-valuing users and will 
produce less consumer surplus for low-valuing users than paying marginal cost at a convenient 
showtime. 
In addition, the common pool problem may be more severe in a copyright regime than in 
a patent regime. The relative narrowness of rights in copyright reduces the possibility of a 
copyright race but increases the possibility that largely redundant copyrighted works will be 
published.680 If you and I are both writing articles on patent prizes, each of us may wish to obtain 
the prestige and first-mover advantages associated with publishing first, but the first to publish 
will not be able to stop the other from publishing too.681 Thus, while the prospect of losing a 
                                                                                                                                                             
prize approach).  
675 For an article that pays close attention to the issue of deadweight loss, see Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and Price 
Discrimination, CARDOZO L. RE V. (forthcoming 2001). 
676 At least this is so if there are no negative externalities in consumption of these products, though some critics would argue that 
increased consumption of products like violent movies will have negative consequences for society that consumers do not 
internalize. See, e.g., Jonathan Selden, Comment, Scream-ing For a Solution: Regulating Hollywood Violence: An Analysis of 
Legal and Legislative Remedies, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1010 (2001) (recognizing the existence of such externalities, but arguing 
that tort liability is an inappropriate response). A counterargument is that the consumers most likely to copy behavior in violent 
movies will tend to be high-valuing consumers of those movies and thus not affected by the prize program, but it is conceivable 
that low-valuing consumers might be affected on the margins. 
677 This is a form of second-degree price discrimination, which applies when a seller separates buyers whose valuations are 
hidden, typically by altering some aspect of the quality of the product sold. See Meurer, supra note 675 (manuscript at 13).  
678 See supra note 171 and accompanying text. 
679 See Meurer, supra note 675 (manuscript at 35) (noting that price discrimination by copyright owners can reduce allocative 
efficiency). 
680 See Edwin Baker, Giving the Audience What It Wants , 58 OHIO ST. L.J. 311, 339 (1997) (noting the existence of the rent 
dissipation problem in copyright); Meurer, supra note 675, at 32 (noting that “the duplicative investment by competing producers 
is wasteful”). 
681 This will be so even if by extraordinary coincidence each of us chooses to express our ideas in the same way. See 17 U.S.C. § 
102(a) (1994); Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (L. Hand, J.) (“[I]f by some magic a man 
who had never known it were to compose anew Keats’s Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if he copyrighted it, 
others might not copy that poem, though they might of course copy Keats’s.”).  
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patent race sometimes may discourage a party from even participating, the possibility of a prize 
for even the second-place finisher in a copyright competition may be sufficient to encourage 
duplicative effort. Increased variety presumably has some benefit, but how many of us needed to 
see both Armageddon and Deep Impact?682 Whether the increased severity of the common pool 
problem argues for or against a copyright regime is unclear. A prize system, particularly of the 
opt-in variety, might exacerbate already excessive spending of resources in these areas, but it 
also might make the problem less severe. 
Perhaps the most significant difference between the cases for a prize system in patent and 
copyright, however, is the increased difficulty of detecting infringement in copyright. If I 
photocopy a book that you have purchased, in all likelihood no one will ever know. 683 Patent 
infringement, by contrast, in general will be detectable and potentially lead to litigation. 
Moreover, the problem of copyright infringement is becoming more significant with the advent 
of peer-to-peer networked computer programs, which allow copying of music files and 
increasingly can be used to copy even full- length movies.684 Although legal action by recording 
companies succeeded in eliminating most infringement on the Napster network,685 these 
companies may be less successful in stopping infringement in networks like Gnutella, which 
does not operate via a centralized index. 686 This makes a contributory infringement case more 
difficult to win,687 and more significantly it makes the network more difficult to shut down. 688 
Unless copyright owners are successful in developing effective copy-protection technologies,689 
we may end up in a world in which only the scrupulous pay for copyrighted products rather than 
infringe. 
Production of copyrighted material might continue to exist in such a world. The 
possibility of earning revenues through concert performances might be sufficient to keep the 
music scene almost if not quite as vibrant as today, losing perhaps not much more than the 
Backstreet Boys and the Spice Girls. In addition, advertising might become more prominent, 
though technologies allowing consumers to skip advertisements in television programs place the 
soundness of this model in question too.690 Perhaps product placement could fill the void, and a 
                                                 
682 See DEEP IMPACT (Paramount Pictures 1998) (depicting a heroic effort to save the world from an oncoming comet). But don’t 
see ARMAGEDDON (Touchstone Pictures 1998) (depicting a heroic effort to save the world from an oncoming comet). 
683 For an assessment of the economic implications of sharing of copyrighted works, see Yannis Bakos et al, Shared Information 
Goods, 42 J.L. & ECON. 117 (1999), which emphasizes that sharing of goods may increase profit for sellers. 
684 See, e.g., John Markoff, Disputed Software to be Used for Online Film Distribution, June 14, 2000, at C16 (noting the 
increasing distribution of movies on peer-to-peer networking services). 
685 See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) (granting of preliminary injunction against Napster 
service). 
686 See Lee Gomes, Renegade Gnutella May Become a Web Standard, WALL ST. J., May 29, 2001, at B6 (explaining the 
difference between Napster and Gnutella). Perhaps the most significant barrier to Gnutella is not legal but economic, as many 
downloaders free-ride off the relatively small number of users who upload copyrighted material. See John Markoff, Many Take, 
but Few Give on Gnutella, Aug. 21, 2000, at C4. But see Strahilevitz, supra note 8 (arguing that peer-to-peer services have been 
able to develop norms that lead to sufficient uploading). 
687 See Gomes, supra note 686 (“Gnutella software developers aren’t believed to be at legal risk, because their programs can be 
used for many things, and because, unlike Napster, they don’t maintain any sort of database of copyrighted material.”). 
688 “Those considering legal action against Gnutella . . . would not have the luxury of an easy target to sue, since the infringers 
and their computers may be located around the world and could number in the millions.” Damien A. Riehl, Peer-to-Peer 
Distribution Systems: Will Napster, Gnutella, and Freenet Create a Copyright Nirvana or Gehenna?, 27 WM. M ITCHELL L. REV. 
1761, 1778 (2001). 
689 For discussion of technological solutions, including encryption and digital watermarks, see id. at 1790-92. One problem with 
these solutions, is that even if they prevent unauthorized digital duplication, there is no way to stop someone from playing the 
music or movie and rerecording it with a different device, such as a camcorder. Rerecording may diminish quality, but with 
sufficiently sophisticated equipment, this obstacle could be overcome. 
690 See N’Gai Croal, 2001: A Tech Odyssey,  NEWSWEEK, Dec. 4, 2000, at 48 (discussing digital video recorders featuring 30-
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world in which the next Beethoven produces an Ode to Joy™ Dishwashing Detergent might not 
be so bad.691 But such a world might seem unfair to those who dutifully follow copyright law, 
and government may have an interest in encouraging production of copyrighted goods that 
advance democratic goals.692 If so, and if the death of copyright is near,693 the establishment of a 
copyright prize system might be the only solution. 
If a prize system is to be established because of infringement, the patent prize proposals 
discussed in Part I would not readily be adaptable, especially if infringement reduces the cost of 
infringed works to near zero. The Shavell-van Ypersele approach, for example, presumably 
would need to be modified to require the government to estimate the hypothetical demand curve 
for the product that would have existed in a world of copyright without infringement. The 
government, moreover, would not be able to use sales data to improve their estimates, at least for 
products for which there would be no more sales. Similarly, the Kremer approach would result in 
the vast undervaluation of work, because if a copyright were randomized to the public domain, 
infringement would make it worth little. Although Kremer could propose increasing the 
multiplier across-the-board as long as there are still some consumers who will honor a copyright, 
the percentage of users who pirate a work might vary considerably from one work to another, 
making such estimates precarious. Finally, a coupon scheme along the lines of Lichtman’s 
proposal will do no good for works that in effect have become free. 
A copyright prize system similar to the patent prize system proposed in Part III, by 
contrast, could function despite widespread infringement. Decisionmakers on prizes might not be 
able to estimate the value of works by examining marginal cost purchases as they likely would in 
the patent context, but they would be able to rely on other types of statistics reporting uses of 
copyrighted products. For example, they might consider how many people saw a particular 
movie, either in theaters, on videotape, or on computer. Such factors could be taken into account 
with a formulaic system as well, providing a set government subsidy per estimated user. The 
prize system described here, however, provides decisionmakers with an incentive to scrutinize 
numbers provided. Such scrutiny might help prevent fraud, since decisionmakers would be 
expected to reduce prizes as a result of such fraud. Moreover, decisionmakers might be able to 
estimate the importance of the work to individual users, providing perhaps a greater per user 
subsidy for well- leafed biochemistry textbooks than for equal length romance novels. Finally, 
decisionmakers might consider whether a work is original or substantially duplicative of others, 
thus discouraging rent dissipation. These are considerations that would be difficult to incorporate 
into a prize system utilizing any particular formula. 
2. Anti-Terrorism Intelligence  
Animating proposals for both patent prizes and copyright prizes is concern about 
deadweight loss, as the possibility of eliminating monopolistic pricing makes prize systems 
particularly attractive in these contexts. Prize systems, however, exist in areas in which 
monopolistic pricing is not a concern as well. Perhaps the most obvious example is programs that 
offer rewards for information leading to the capture of fugitives.694 A prominent recent variant of 
                                                                                                                                                             
second skip-forward buttons that allow users to skip advertisements on recorded television programs). 
691 I am grateful to David Bernstein for pointing out the possibility of product placement. 
692 See, e.g., Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 341-64 (1996). 
693 Cf. Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., The Death of Copyright: Digital Technology, Private Copying and the Digital Millenium Copyright 
Act, 87 VA. L. REV. 813, 814 (2001) (concluding that “copyright is dead,” though only in its present form). 
694 The Federal Bureau of Investigation, for example, offers specific rewards for each of its top ten most wanted fugitives. See, 
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such a program is the Department of State’s Rewards for Justice program,695 which provides 
rewards not only for information leading to specific arrests,696 but also for any information that 
might stymie a terrorist attack.697 Prize decisions are made by the Secretary of State, based on 
recommendations from an interagency committee consisting of representatives from a variety of 
governmental organizations and chaired by the Director of the Diplomatic Security Service.698 
The theory of the program presumably is that it sometimes may be easier for the 
government to infiltrate terrorist organizations by giving incentives to those who have 
connections to such organizations than by making payments in advance to covert operatives. The 
contrast is similar to that between patent prize systems and grant systems for funding scientific 
research. 699 In both contexts, the case for a prize system is stronger the more difficult it is for the 
government ex ante to identify fund recipients who are most likely to provide useful information 
and results in exchange. The difficulty may be more profound in the terrorism context, however, 
because the challenge is not only identifying which of many plausible infiltrators will provide the 
best information for the buck, but also making contact with and communicating with potential 
informers. The Rewards for Justice addresses the former obstacle by giving rewards only when 
information turns out to be accurate or useful, and it addresses the latter by giving infiltrators an 
incentive to contact the government. 
Restructuring the program in accordance with some of the recommendations of Part III, 
however, might improve the program. One problem with the program is that the total amount of 
money distributed has been relatively small, “over $6 million in approximately 20 cases.”700 That 
is over $300,000 per case, hardly trivial, but perhaps not enough to induce some people with 
information to turn in their acquaintances, perhaps violating their own moral principles in the 
process and risking retaliatory action should their involvement become known. The amount is 
still less impressive considering that it is unknown how many people have given information and 
received no prize at all. In part, the paltry funding may reflect that the program was a relatively 
low priority, and that may change given the sense that a failure of human intelligence contributed 
to the Sept. 11 terrorist attacks.701 It also, however, may reflect that the Secretary of State has 
                                                                                                                                                             
e.g., http://www.fbi.gov/mostwant/topten/fugitives/felix.htm (last visited Oct. 17, 2001) (“The FBI is offering a $50,000 reward 
for information leading directly to the arrest of Ramon Eduardo Arellano-Felix.”). The word “directly” may diminish the chance 
that someone would offer information that would lead to an arrest only indirectly. 
695 The statutory authority for the program is 22 U.S.C.A § 4821 (West Supp. 2001), which authorizes the Secretary of State to 
“establish a Diplomatic Security Service, which shall perform such functions as the Secretary may determine.”  
696 A Department of State press release states that “[p]erhaps the program’s greatest success is the February 1995 arrest of Ramzi 
Yousef, the mastermind of the World Trade Center Bombing.” Richard Boucher, Rewards for Justice Program: Prevention of 
Terrorism Advertising Campaign, available at http://secretary.state.gov/www/briefings/statements/2000/ps001214.html (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2001); see also David Johnston, World Trade Center Suspect, One of F.B.I.’s Most-Wanted, Is Captured in 
Pakistan, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 12, 1995, § 4 (Week in Review), at 2 (reporting that Yousef “was tripped up by a tipster apparently 
anxious to cash in on the State Department’s $2 million reward”). 
697 The Program’s Web site offers rewards  
for information preventing, frustrating, or favorable resolving acts of international terrorism against United States 
persons or property, or leading to the arrest or conviction of terrorist criminals responsible for such acts, those aiding or 
abetting in the commission of such acts, or those conspiring or attempting to commit such acts. 
Diplomatic Security Service, U.S. Department of State, Counter-Terrorism Rewards Program , 
http://www.dssrewards.net/english/background.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). 
698 See id. (“The Director of the Diplomatic Security Service, or his/her designee, chairs an interagency committee which reviews 
reward candidates and then recommends rewards to the Secretary of State.”). 
699 See supra text accompanying notes 629-630. 
700 See Fact Sheet: Rewards for Justice Program: Prevention of Terrorism Advertising Campaign, 
http://www.state.gov/www/global/terrorism/fs_001214_rewards.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2001). 
701 See, e.g., Greg Miller & Bob Drogin, Overhaul Sought for Spy Agencies’ Intelligence, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2001, at A1 
(reporting that the government’s estimated $30 billion intelligence budget is likely to rise after the perceived failure of human 
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little incentive to spend money, which could be used for other departmental purposes, when it 
already is in possession of information. The government’s promise to provide “up to $5 million 
for information”702 is akin to the jar of mixed nuts that promises up to 10% cashews. Using a 
fixed fund, as recommended above,703 would solve this problem by committing the government 
to distribute a predetermined amount of money among the various information providers. 
An adequately funded prize system not only might lead individuals with information to 
reveal that information, but also might cause individuals to take steps, perhaps over multiple 
years, to be in a position to obtain such information. If it became clear that informants received 
prizes averaging, say, $1 million each, it is plausible that someone who otherwise might not 
associate with a terrorist organization would choose to infiltrate it, without entering into any 
prior arrangement with the United States. It is also possible that third parties might seek to bribe 
terrorists or their associates for information that the third parties could use in turn to obtain a 
portion of the fund. How much information the government would obtain is impossible to 
determine in advance, but such a program might well produce information that the government 
would not obtain through conventional approaches to intelligence gathering and the existing 
rewards program. The program also might lead terrorists to accept fewer members into their 
ranks, which would decrease the probability of uncovering their plans but also would decrease 
their ability to carry out attacks. 
The government, of course, might make modifications to the approach described in Part 
III if using prizes to reward terrorist infiltrators. An obvious change is that the system would 
have to allow for confidentiality. As a result, using an adversarial approach to screen applications 
might not be practical. 704 In addition, a delay of ten years might be too long for potential terrorist 
infiltrators. While potential individual inventors in a patent prize system could sell their right to 
an eventual prize,705 such sales might be less practical in the terrorism context, and thus capital 
markets arguably cannot be trusted to provide liquidity based on anticipation of future prizes. In 
any event, such a long delay might not be necessary. While some delay would help assure the 
accuracy of information provided, two years would probably be sufficient. The other principal 
benefit of delay in the patent context, cloaking the decisionmakers’ identities,706 is less likely to 
be significant in this context as well. While we might worry in the patent context that individual 
government officials might distort research incentives by encouraging some areas of endeavor 
rather than others, there is little concern that prize decisionmakers would have pet preferences 
for stopping one kind of terrorism rather than another. 
3. Social Services by Faith-Based Organizations 
That existing governmental prize systems in an area outside intellectual property usefully 
might be restructured is a relatively modest claim. This section will offer a more radical and 
admittedly more speculative claim, that a prize system usefully might substitute for existing 
government spending programs. That is, instead of making spending choices in a particular area 
ex ante, the government might choose to give retrospective prizes for actions providing social 
                                                                                                                                                             
intelligence). Even at existing aggregate funding levels, the Rewards for Justice program is a miniscule portion of the total 
budget. 
702 Diplomatic Security Service, supra note 697. 
703 See supra Part III.C. 
704 See supra Part III.H. 
705 See supra Part III.D. 
706 See supra Part III.B.2. 
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benefit of a particular type in a manner similar to the patent prize system described in Part III. 
Because such a program would not eliminate deadweight loss, concerns about the cost of the 
program, in the form of the risk premia that in effect must be paid to those who will bear 
uncertainty about prizes,707 may be weightier. Nonetheless, there are substantial potential public 
choice benefits to such a scheme if there is a concern that government otherwise would not make 
good ex ante funding decisions or that government involvement in such decisions is inherently 
problematic.  
Though a number of spending programs could illustrate the point, a timely example is 
government subsidy of social services provided by faith-based and other organizations.708 Such 
programs are based on the premise that religious providers are relatively efficient social service 
providers and that the government therefore should be neutral in funding as between such 
providers and secular ones.709 Such government subsidies may come in two forms. The 
government may provide assistance to such groups only indirectly, for example through a 
voucher-type program in which individual beneficiaries may choose among potential 
providers.710 These programs are controversial enough, but still more troubling to some are 
programs in which the government directly contracts with individual faith-based organizations to 
provide social services.711 With this approach, the government must make an individualized 
decision about the individual group’s ability to perform the contract, as well as about the worth 
of the particular project.712 It is on the latter set of programs that I will focus here. 
In a prize system alternative to contracting directly with individual groups, the 
government would promise some amount of money, say $1 billion, to be distributed among all 
groups, whether or not faith-based, who choose to advance a particular cause, such as providing 
food and shelter for the poor, in a given year. As with the patent prize system described above, 
the government would appropriate the money but invest it, with distribution delayed for 
approximately a decade. Each applicant eventually would receive a share in proportion to the 
                                                 
707 See supra text accompanying notes 493-494. 
708 See generally Albert R. Hunt, Faith-Based Efforts: The Promise and Limitations, Aug. 12, 1999, at A23 (discussing proposals 
to increase subsidies to faith-based organizations). For a discussion of President Bush’s so-far unsuccessful efforts to pass the 
legislation, see Jeanne Cummings & Jim VandeHei, Faith-Based Charity Initiative Takes Worldly, Rocky Path, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 16, 2001, at A16. The bill supported by President Bush is H.R. 7, 107th Cong. (2001). The bill does not create any new 
social programs, but simply allows religious organizations to participate on equal terms with secular organizations in existing 
federal and state assistance programs. 
709 For a representative argument by an advocacy group in favor of such funding, see THE CENTER FOR PUBLIC JUSTICE & THE 
CHRISTIAN LEGAL SOCIETY’S CENTER FOR LAW AND RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, A GUIDE TO CHARITABLE CHOICE  13-14 (1996). See 
also Joe Loconte, The Bully and the Pulpit: A New Model for Church-State Partnerships, J. AM. CITZENSHIP , Nov./Dec. 1998, at 
28. For arguments against charitable choice, see Susanna Dokupil, A Sunny Dome with Caves of Ice: The Illusion of Charitable 
Choice, 5 TEX. RE V. L. & POL. 149 (2000); and Steven K. Green, Charitable Choice and Neutrality Theory, 57 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 33 (2000). 
710 The Supreme Court has generally allowed indirect funding of religious organizations when the funding is available on the 
same terms to secular organizations. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995); 
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dep’t of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 
(1986). The Court’s jurisprudence in the area, however, leaves much room for argument, and the Court in fact recently granted 
certiorari in a case concerning the constitutionality of school vouchers. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 234 F.3d 945 (6th Cir. 
2000), cert. granted, 70 U.S.L.W. 3035 (U.S. Sept. 25, 2001) (No. 00-1751); Linda Greenhouse, Court Takes Case Testing the 
Limits of Vouchers Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2001, at A1 (discussing the case). 
711 The Court has permitted such funding only if the recipient organization is not “pervasively sectarian.” See, e.g., Bowen v. 
Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1984); Roemer v. Bd. of 
Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976). For discussion of the “pervasively sectarian” test, see Stephen V. Monsma, The “Pervasively 
Sectarian” Standard in Theory and Practice, 13 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 321 (1999). 
712 Congress has provided that states may contract with religious organizations in administering federal block grants for the 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families program. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 604a (West Supp. 2001). 
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social benefit provided, as determined by the price decisionmakers. A service provider, however, 
could sell the rights to a prize, either before or after actually performing the relevant services, to 
a third party. Thus, the system would give service providers and third parties incentives to 
predict the social benefit on average that an average government decisionmaker would ascribe to 
any particular program. 
Unlike a program in which the government makes ex ante decisions about which service 
organizations to fund, the decisionmakers in such a program would not have to speculate about 
which programs are likely to be cost-effective, because they could examine statistics and other 
information about the number of beneficiaries served. Just as in the patent prize system, the 
program may be effective even if we expect these decisions to be noisy, with decisionmakers 
arbitrarily finding some programs to have produced far more or less social benefit than most 
would ascribe to the program. As long as systematic biases are not predictable, they will not 
affect initial decisions about what programs to create in an effort to receive prizes. If there is a 
greater degree of arbitrariness in governmental decisions than in private predictions about what 
governmental decisionmakers will choose to do on average, then the prize approach may provide 
social services in a more cost-effective way than an ex ante grant approach. 
Although it is beyond my scope here to analyze the constitutiona lity of such a prize 
system, structuring programs providing benefits to faith-based and other groups in this way may 
alleviate three related constitutional concerns. First, some worry that existing proposals may lead 
to excessive governmental interference with religious organizations, as faith-based groups 
change their practices in order to be able to receive government funds.713 The open-ended 
approach of the prize system, focused on end results such as mitigation of poverty rather than on 
means, mitigates this worry. Though organizations would seek to maximize benefits that prize 
awarders likely would count, the government would not be able to specify how groups should be 
structured. A faith-based group might shift resources from religious education to provision of 
basic services, but such a decision would be a product of the organization’s desire to receive a 
prize for achieving a nonsectarian goal rather than of coercion.  
Second, and more significantly, a problem with “pervasively sectarian” groups receiving 
governmental funds is that those funds might be used to advance religious viewpoints.714 Even if 
the government awards a grant to a church promising to run a soup kitchen, the church might 
divert some of these funds to religious purposes. Funds generally will not advance religious 
viewpoints, however, if they are given only ex post based on the extent to which the groups 
achieve a nonsectarian goal. A faith-based group might earn a profit from a prize system and 
then use these profits to advance religious purposes, but this is no more problematic than a for-
profit group’s decision to donate money to a religious group. The most difficult remaining 
question would be whether it is appropriate to award a prize if a group achieves a nonsectarian 
goal through religious means, for example if it turns out that religious indoctrination is more 
effective at leading homeless people to seek jobs and become self-sufficient than non-religious 
alternatives. 
Third, the prize system reduces the possibility that the government will use faith-based 
programs as an opportunity to advance any particular religion. If governmental entities contract 
directly with faith-based groups to provide social services, there is a danger that decisionmakers 
                                                 
713 See, e.g., Dokupil, supra note 709, at 197-204. 
714 As Carl Esbeck explains, if a religious organization’s secular and religious services “are not separable, then the Court 
disallows the assistance altogether, with the explanation that the Establishment Clause will not allow the risk of governmental aid 
furthering the transmission of religious beliefs or practices.” Carl H. Esbeck, A Constitutional Case for Governmental 
Cooperation with Faith-Based Social Service Providers, 46 EMORY L.J. 1, 3 & n.30 (1997). 
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will base decisions in part on their own religious preferences.715 A decision explicitly justified on 
such a basis surely would be struck down, but in many cases it will be difficult to determine 
whether or not there was an illicit motive.716 Did governmental officials choose the church’s 
proposal for a soup kitchen over the mosque’s because it was stronger or because of prejudice? A 
prize system with a substantial delay alleviates this concern, because prejudice would be relevant 
only if it were expected to affect ex post prize determinations. Even if the religious composition 
of prize decisionmakers can be guessed ex ante, prize decisions might be less prone to bias if 
based on actual results than on speculation about alternatives. 
A modification to the prize system might further reduce concerns about religious 
prejudice affecting funding decisions. If the concern is that prize decisionmakers a decade from 
now might seek, whether consciously or unconsciously, to advance particular religions by 
shading prize awards, it might be useful to require religious groups to sell their right to a prize to 
a non-faith-based third party. Although this approach might be contrary to the spirit of current 
proposals that seek to save faith-based groups the trouble of creating nonsectarian for-profit 
subsidiaries,717 it would ensure that no prize decision would directly lead to any religious group’s 
receipt of funds. To be sure, some prejudice might still exist, as a prize decisionmaker might 
grant a larger prize to a third party that has purchased the right to a particular religious group’s 
prize than to a corresponding third party for another religious group despite the absence of any 
direct effect on either group. Some such prejudice might even be anticipated and thus affect 
investment decisions, but this change likely would reduce the influence of religion on decisions. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Proponents of patent prizes have sought to avoid the deadweight losses associated with 
intellectual property protection by recommending that a centralized governmental spending 
program replace a market-based incentive. In seeking formulaic or algorithmic approaches to 
patent prizes, these scholars implicitly have recognized public choice concerns about 
government’s ability to make wise spending decisions. In this Article, my concern has been less 
with the benefits that a governmental spending program has over the market than with the 
benefits that a retrospective prize system has over a typical governmental spending program. 
Concerns that government will misspend money, either through individual decisionmakers’ 
incompetence or as a result of influence, are understandable. Public choice and administrative 
law scholars have long focused on how to overcome these problems, considering antidotes such 
as separation of powers and judicial review. But they have ignored the virtues of delayed 
retrospective decisionmaking. With a carefully designed prize system, even if an individual 
decisionmaker makes an error or is influenced by political considerations in calculating a prize, 
these flaws will not affect the decisions that matter, those made in anticipation of the eventual 
governmental awards. Prize systems thus hold promise as a tool for improving government’s 
ability to reward useful private activity in patent law and elsewhere. 
                                                 
715 At least one study, however, suggests that minority religious have generally fared as well in receiving government funding as 
more dominant ones. See Monsma, supra note 711, at 327. 
716 The problem of determining legislative motive is, of course, a more general one. See, e.g., Louis S. Raveson, Unmasking the 
Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts?, 63 N.C. L. REV. 879 (1985); Laurence H. Tribe, The 
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717 See H.R. 7, 107th Cong. § 201(d)(2)(A) (2001) (providing that a religious organization seeking assistance under a 
governmental program shall not be required to “alter its form of internal governance or provisions in its charter documents”). 
